(Contents)

MISSION ACCOMPLISHED! was the word among 11th Armored Division soldiers at midnight on May 8, 1945. The war in Europe was officially over and the Germans had surrendered to the Allied Armies unconditionally.

After four months and 10 days of actual combat with the enemy, the 11th Armored Division on May 9, 1945 had established a reputation for itself equal to any combat unit in the American Army. During its period in combat, the Division had captured 76,229 prisoners, nearly twice as many as were taken by the entire United States Army in World War I. This figure does not include the 10,000 prisoners turned over to the supporting infantry divisions for evacuation, or 34,125 German troops who violated surrender terms by fleeing from the Red Army. These troops were rounded up and turned over to the Soviet forces.

On this May day soldiers of the Division looked back over three major campaigns and hundreds of bloody miles. They had come along way since that early morning attack on December 30, 1944, that started the 11th Armored Division along the way to fame and glory over the time worn battlefields of France and Germany.

Adventure for the 11th Armored Division really started at the time the Division was hurried across the Channel to Cherbourg. The advance party, composed of the Headquarters and Headquarters Company of CCA, had left for La Havre with orders to prepare the Division to take over the sector held by the 94th Division at Lorient, where they were containing about l00,000 German troops. However, they had hardly gotten to Chateau Briand before the orders were changed to move the Division to Sissone. Consequently, they were rushed back to Cherbourg where the first LST's were arriving. These troops were staged immediately, ammunition was issued and within 24 hours they started to roll on the 450 mile trip which was to take them into contact with the onrushing Germans as they broke through into the Bulge.

Christmas day found the Division partially assembled in Sissone. An improvised task force under General Willard A. "Hunk" Holbrook, made up of parts of the headquarters of Division Trains, 41st Cavalry, 63rd Armored Infantry Battalion, 42nd Tanks, and CCR. These were rushed to the Meuse with orders to secure the crossings from Givet to Sedan. But this was only temporary. The 17th Airborne Division arrived the next day, thereby releasing the 11th A.D. Immediately orders arrived to proceed to Neufchateau without delay. Midnight of December 28-29 saw the division marching in the brightest moonlight imaginable reflected on the light snow covered fields. By evening the troops were in their positions. Tomorrow was to be the real thing. This was it.

Combat Command A under the command of Brigadier General Willard A. Holbrook, Jr., led the 11th Armored Division in its first attack at 7:30 a.m. on December 30, 1944. This combat command passed through elements of the 6th Cavalry Group, jumped off at 7:30 a.m., and made first contact with the enemy south of Remagne, Belgium, at the officially recorded time of 8:22 a.m.

As this first attack progressed, the two task forces of Combat Command A developed strong points in Remagne and along the south edge of a small woods just one kilometer to the East. Limited by streams and large thickly wooded areas, the possibilities of maneuver were reduced.

Small arms, mortar, artillery and heavy anti-tank fire halted further progress by the Command. The Infantry Task Force dug in along the ridge about one kilometer south of Remagne, and the tank elements withdrew to full defilade positions. The 11th Armored Division was now engaged in hard, tough and bloody warfare against a determined enemy.

On this same morning of December 30, 1944, Combat Command B under the command of Colonel Wesley W. Yale, a Cavalryman, was organized into three task forces and readied for the attack. The infantry force of this unit made first contact with the enemy north of Jodenville at 9:30 a.m. It had run headlong into the 15th Panzer Division attack, which was trying to sever the Bastogne- Neufchateau Highway. When this happened, the Germans decided to stabilize, establishing well chosen positions from which they lashed out repeatedly with tank-infantry counterattacks. The enemy efforts were supported by artillery, heavy mortar, and nebelwerfer rocket fire.

In the meantime, the tank task force of Combat Command B successfully attacked Lavaselle, taking a number of prisoners, and continued north to higher ground near Brul and Houmont.

During the afternoon of December 30, the infantry force of CCB attacked Chenogne, but was driven off. This village, in a defiladed pocket just south of the Bois de Valets, was a heavily infantry defended artillery and anti-lank gun position.

The reserve task force of CCB was not committed to action this first day of combat. Through the night the Command held positions while undergoing heavy German artillery fire at Houmont and Jodenville. During the same night the Combat Command CP moved forward to Copon.

About 1 p.m. on December 30, a squadron of P-47s strafed observed enemy vehicles and troops on the west flank at Gerimont. To assist the Combat Command B attack on Chenogne, another squadron bombed and strafed enemy installations in the town about two hours later.

Following Combat Command A, the Reserve Command under the command of Colonel Virgil Bell, an infantryman, moved to Respelle. The 41st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron was then shifted to the vicinity of Bougnimont for protection of the Division's left flank, until the 87th Infantry Division came abreast. Later in the day Reserve Command was assembled more centrally in the vicinity of Vaux Lez Rosieres.

This first day of combat found the Division Artillery units supporting the advance and reconnoitering for forward positions.

Coordination of plans and establishment of boundaries was arranged with the 101st Airborne Division and Combat Command A of the 9th Armored Division through a G-3, operations, staff visit during the afternoon.

Toward the end of this first day of combat it became apparent that the strong enemy infantry confronting Combat Command A, and the wide dispersal of forces was seriously crippling the attack. An immediate request was dispatched to Corps headquarters asking that a shift be made in the western boundary to exclude Remagne. The request was approved and orders were issued to concentrate troops at the head of the Rechrival Valley. Screened by the 41st Cavalry, Combat Command A was ordered to withdraw from positions south of Remagne, and move to the vicinity of Morhet. The Reserve Command was to move to Magerotte and Division Artillery to positions along the road south to Morhet.

By now the enemy was incorporating sniper action and infiltration tactics into his offensive defense. The hours of dusk on December 30 found him back on terrain yielded during the day.

At the end of the first day of the Division's fighting it found from confirmation by German prisoners that it was facing the German 3rd Panzer Division, the 15th Panzer Division, and the Fuhrer Begleit (Remer) Brigade.

Towards midnight orders were received to renew the attack early the next morning, December 31, 1944.

Plans for the second day called for a concentration of forces at the head of the Rechrival Valley during the hours of darkness, and an early morning attack of mutually supporting Combat Commands. To Reserve Command was assigned the task of shoring up the Division west flank by an attack from Magerotte northwest to secure the ground Southwest of Pinsamont. Combat Command B was charged with the job of attacking along the east side of the valley, reducing Chenogne, securing the commanding terrain contained in the Bois de Valets, and continuing the eastward blocking action by taking Mande-St. Etienne. With both flanks thus secured, Combat Command A was to attack down the center of the valley from Morhet through Rechrival and Hubermont to Flamierge. Division Artillery was assigned a general support mission. Until relieved by elements of the 87th Infantry Division, the 41st Cavalry was to hold the high ground south of Remagne. After being relieved, the 41st Cavalry was to protect the Division's west flank along the Bois des Haies de Magery. Thus the stage was set for the second day of action.

Shortly after midnight, the 41^st Cavalry moved into its screening position. Intense cold, icy roads, and involvement with units of the 6th Armored Division moving in the same direction along the Bastogne-Neufchateau Highway seriously hampered the regroupment of all forces, particularly those of Combat Command A and the Division Artillery.

Reserve Command launched its attack at 9 a.m. and by 10:30 a.m. had advanced to a ridge two kilometers northwest of Magerotte. By 4:30 p.m. Reserve Command was on its objective and had fought in the towns of Acul and Pinsamont, capturing 38 prisoners along the way. Because of heavy enemy mortar and artillery fire, a withdrawal was ordered to the high ground south of Pinsamont where the Reserve Command dug in. A counterattack at 6:30 p.m. was repulsed. The Reserve Command CP was established at Magerotte.

At 12:00 Noon, CCB, following an artillery preparation assisted by fire from its tank task force, sent its infantry task force into Chenogne against enemy mortar, small arms, and anti-tank fire. The infantry succeeded in taking part of Chenogne, but by dark the town had not been completely mopped up. On order, CCB withdrew to the high ground South of Chenogne and out-posted ground gained for the night. The Germans, under cover of darkness, patched up the damage as best they could in Chenogne, and bolstered its defenses with a re-supply of two infantry companies. The relinquishment of this town did not fit in with the enemy's plans, which were, of necessity, now assuming a defensive aspect.

Combat Command A's tank force jumped off at 3:10 p.m., followed by an infantry task force, and progressed to a point just South and East of Rechrival, where they were halted by heavy anti-tank and artillery fire. Beating off a counterattack at 6:30 p.m., positions were consolidated by CCA for the night.

Under a revised attack plan, all artillery was placed directly under the Division Artillery Commander and moved to support positions along the road South of Morhet. The 490th Armored Field Artillery Battalion was placed in direct support of Combat Command A, the 491st Armored Field Artillery Battalion in direct support of Combat Command B; and the remaining organic as well as attached artillery in general support.

The enemy employed mines along the shoulders of roads, fringes of woods, and numerous defiles existing in the frozen and snow covered terrain. But the vigorous employment of artillery, mortars, tanks, and concentrated small arms dispelled any speculation about the enemy's intention to withdraw.

Prompted by this dogged enemy resistance, a redefinition of successive objectives for the major units was directed. This included a closer tie-in of massed artillery fire, concentrated effort to reduce the Bois de Valets stronghold north of Chenogne, and closer coordination of action between all Division and adjacent unit commands.

Combat Command A was assigned Hubermont, Flamierge, Givroulle, and Bertogne as successive objectives, together with support of Combat Command B as required. The Division main effort was shifted to the East flank and charged to Combat Command B. After the capture of Chenogne, in coordination with Combat Command A of the 9th Armored Division, Combat Command B was to assault and clear the key Bois de Valets; following through to Mande-St. Etienne, Flamizoulle, and Longchamps. Reserve Command was to continue its west flank protection, being assigned Pinsamont, Macravivier, and Salle as successive objectives.

A thorough and extensive scheme of harassing and interdiction fires was planned by Division Artillery, with particular attention to the enemy main supply route from Givroulle to Salle. Supporting Combat Command B's main effort, all available fire was to be used in powerful massed concentrations on Chenogne, the high open area south of Bois de Valets, and Bois de Valets itself.

The possibility of deep enemy flanking action through Bois des Haies de Magery on the west was counteracted by the continued assignment of the 41st Cavalry to patrol and road blocking activities in this area.

NEW YEAR'S DAY 1945

New Year's Day, 1945, found Combat Command B launching a coordinated attack at 8:30 a.m. on Chenogne. The infantry task force attacking from the south was supported by massed tank and artillery fire. By noon, the town was securely in Combat Command B hands. The tank task force followed up from the vicinity of Houmont, reducing all enemy opposition in the woods northwest of Chenogne, and rejoining the infantry task force. Reorganized, the Command then launched its full power northeast toward the Bois de Valets stronghold. The tank task force led the attack followed closely by the infantry. The reserve tanks remained in position near Chenogne.

Following the massed artillery preparation of 13 artillery battalions, Combat Command B forces entered the Bois des Valets and reduced all remnants of enemy opposition. The Command then dug in for the night in a position overlooking Mande-St. Etienne from the north edge of the Bois des Valets. Mande-St. Etienne at this time was being held by the Germans with about 200 infantrymen, 18 Mark IV tanks, artillery, anti-tank guns, and nebelwerfers.

With the fall of Chenogne assured, Combat Command A jumped off at 12:00 Noon in an attack on the heavily defended Hubermont-Millomont-Rechimont areas. The leading tank force made some progress but was shortly slowed by a heavy German infantry and armor counterattack from the northwest tip of the Bois des Valets. Air support, artillery and tank fire stopped the counterattack with huge losses to the enemy, however, the Command had to reorganize before continuing.

After reorganization, the Command, once more in column formation, tanks leading, launched an attack at 3:00 p.m. directly north down the valley towards Hubermont. The edge of the town was reached just before dark, but forces were withdrawn to consolidate on high ground East of Rechrival for the night. Dug in for the night, Combat Command A troops held their positions under heavy German fire.

During this time the Reserve Command continued the defense of the Division's left and maintained neutralizing fire on towns to the north and northwest. A counterattack was dispersed at 11:00 p.m. Units of the 56th Armored Engineer Battalion were kept busy defending a roadblock in the Bois des Hais de Magery, and clearing booby traps and mines from the area.

PRECEEDING THE ATTACK

Reinforced by artillery of the 4th and 9th Armored Divisions and the 101st Airborne Division, the Division Artillery massed fire on the Division east flank in powerful support of Combat Command B's operations, as well as for the Combat Command A attack. Preceding the attack of Command B into the Bois des Valets, the massed fire of 13 battalions raised havoc with this strongly held key enemy position. Division Artillery alone, during the day, fired some 6,000 rounds. Later, the 491st Armored Field Artillery Battalion deployed forward to Flohamont

Favorable weather and VIII Corps interest gave the Division five squadron air missions during the day. In connection with the Combat Command B attack on Chenogne, enemy troops and vehicles in the Bois des Valets and north were bombed and strafed. Also, troops and vehicles in the vicinity of Bertogne were bombed and strafed by American planes at 9:35 a.m. An enemy armor and infantry counterattack against Combat Command A was disorganized and delayed by two air squadron attacks shortly after noon in the Renuamont and Flamierge areas. To assist the late afternoon attack of Command A, one air squadron bombed and strafed enemy tanks and troops in Hubermont.

The 41st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron moved its command post to Magerotte on January 1, 1945, and elements of the Squadron maintained outposts and roadblocks along the west flank of the Division. To facilitate contact with major units, a Division advance CP was established late in the afternoon at the Railroad Station along the road one mile south of Morhet.

The seizure of the key terrain on which Combat Command B ended its operations for the day definitely doomed to failure the strong German effort to seal off, for the second time, the vital Bastogne-Neufchateau highway. However, personnel and materiel casualties were mounting at a rapid rate, the continuous exposure of men to the bitter cold began to tell; and the desperate German defense of their one main supply road south of the L'Ourthe river continued.

ADVANCE TO MORHET

Around 8:30 p.m. the VIII Corps commander visited the advance CP southeast of Morhet and made an appraisal of the Current situation. He then directed a consolidation and defense of ground gained for the following day.

Following the Corps commander's order, all major unit commanders in the Division were assembled at 10:00 p.m., assigned sectors of responsibility for clean up and defense and directed to reorganize their commands for further offensive action.

On the fourth day of combat for the Division, January 2 1945, Combat Command A tank elements were withdrawn from forward positions east of Rechrival to mobile reserve. The infantry was deployed to defend positions along the Command front. The command post was moved to Morhet. The Reserve Command continued defense of the Division left flank, maintaining contact with the 87th Infantry Division and Combat Command A.

At the instigation of the commander, and in order to complete action which would pinch out the severely mauled Combat Command A of the 9th Armored Division, an attack to capture Mande-St. Etienne and join forces with the 101st Airborne Division was worked out by Combat Command B. This operation was cleared with Corps. At 3:00 p.m., again supported by powerful massed artillery, Combat Command B launched an attack on Mande-St. Etienne. The town was captured by a right flank enveloping movement with infantry, while the tanks supported the attack, and later joined in the clearance of the town proper. A tough counterattack, in which the enemy utilized practically all component ground arms, including nebelwerfers, was repulsed at 10:45 p.m.

Division Artillery was again reinforced by eight additional battalions of artillery in supporting Combat Command B's attack on Mande-St. Etienne. In this attack 3,800 rounds were fired on 120 targets. Harassing and interdiction fire,. as well as continual defensive missions, assisted other major units in holding their positions.

Information was received on January 2, 1945, that the 17th Airborne Division was en-route and would relieve the Division in place the following day. Division Headquarters moved to Vaux Les Rosieres, and the advance CP was closed and rejoined Division Headquarters at 2:30 p.m. Later in the day a Corps Field Order arrived, prescribing a successive relief from right to left, upon which the 11th Armored Division was to assemble in Corps Reserve.

Division Artillery was directed to remain in place and support the 17th Airborne Division. On occupation of the concentration area, the Division was ordered to prepare to assist an attack of the 87th Infantry and the 17th Airborne Divisions or to block hostile counterattacks from the north or northwest.

ENEMY COLUMN SIGHTED

An enemy column about two hours long containing some armor was reported at 10:30 p.m. moving southwest on Highway 26 toward Bertogne.

The Corps commander visited the Division CP at 10:30 a.m. on January 3, 1945, to check the progress of the relief and counterattack support plans. In the early afternoon of January 3, Combat Command B, being the right flank unit of the Division was the first to be relieved. The Command was assembled and moved to its concentration area southwest of Bercheux, closing during the night. The command post was established at Bercheux.

Patrols maintained contact with the enemy in the vicinity of Hubermont until the relief of Combat Command A by the 17th Airborne Division was effected at 3:00 p.m. Combat Command A withdrew to a supporting position in rear of the 17th Airborne Division right flank, assembling its units in the vicinity of and establishing its CP at Sibret. About 4:00 p.m. the Reserve Command was relieved in place by units of the 17th Division. The Command was withdrawn to the vicinity of Magerotte, where the CP was set up. Roadblocks and patrols were maintained in the Bois des Haies de Magery.

To cover the relief of the Division by the 17th Airborne Division 3,700 rounds were fired by Division Artillery in harassing fire.

In preparation for possible future employment of the Division, the 56th Armored Engineer Battalion, which was released from the Reserve Command, initiated reconnaissance of routes to the northwest and northeast in the general area Neufchateau-Libramont-St. Hubert-Bastogne. The 22nd Tank Battalion (Companies A and D ) was attached to the 17th Airborne Division for operational control to stiffen key positions in anticipation of further enemy armored counterattacks.

BAPTISM OF FIRE

In five freezing days the Thunderbolt Division had tackled two ace German divisions, punched them back six miles, cleared 30 square miles of rugged terrain, liberated more than a dozen towns, and ended the threat to the supply route. The Division had suffered heavy casualties in its baptism of fire, but had earned its spurs with honors.

From January 4 to 11, 1945, the 11th Armored Division, minus Division Artillery, was in Corps Reserve. During this time rehabilitation of personnel, reorganization, and maintenance of materiel was stressed. The Division was also placed on an alert status to render support to the 87th Infantry and the 17th and 101st Airborne Divisions should they need it.

Under the skillful command of Brigadier General Charles S. Kilburn, the 11th Armored Division during the first five days of combat accounted for an estimated 769 Germans wounded and killed in action plus a verified 411 prisoners. The Division's losses during the five day period amounted to 184 soldiers killed in action and 441 wounded. German forces had definitely gotten the short end in their efforts against the Thunderbolts.

Orders were received on January 12, 1945, in which a combined attack of all Corps units was ordered for January 13. The attack plan, as far as the 11th Armored Division was concerned, called for the employment of Combat Command A and the Reserve Command in column, supported by the full weight of the Division Artillery.

Reserve Command was initially ordered to assist the Command A attack by fire from positions west of Longchamps, and then to follow Combat Command A as it pushed through on a narrow front along the highway from Longchamps to Bertogne.

The 41st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron was to be held in readiness for protection of either flank. Combat Command B was to be held in the vicinity of Villeroux, prepared to pass through the 101st Airborne Division along the Bastogne-Noville-Wicourt axis on the morning of January 14. Division Artillery was to be deployed to put the 490th Armored Field Artillery Battalion in direct support of Combat Command A. The 491st Armored Field Artillery Battalion was staged where it could be shifted to the direct support of Combat Command B when required. The 492nd Armored Field Artillery Battalion plus the 333rd Field Artillery Group provided general support. Air liaison observers were provided for all major units. On securing Bertogne and the crossroad southwest of it, it was planned that the Reserve Command would take over from Command A and hold the position. Combat Command A was then to turn East and, in coordination with Combat Command B and elements of the 101st Airborne Division, launch a converging attack on the Division final objective, the high ground South of Houffalize.

Meanwhile, the enemy's plans were so conceived that two of his Panzer and one Volksgrenadier Division were unconsciously slated to experience the might of the Thunderbolt Division. The 130th Panzer "Lehr" Division had already started deploying eastward from the vicinity of St. Hubert toward the Bertogne-Houffalize road. The 9th Panzer Division, recently enriched by replacements, along with the 26th Volksgrenadier Division, had completed their dispositions north of Bastogne, designed to hold the South flank of the Bulge.

SOUTHWEST OF LONGCHAMPS

The Division Artillery, which had been continuously in action since December 30, 1944, was released from its 17rh Airborne Division support mission, moved into positions southwest of Longchamps, and registered all its battalions before darkness came on January 12.

Attacking in column formation along the Longchamps-Bertogne highway northwest of Bastogne, Combat Command A sparked the drive of the Bertogne-Houffalize engagement. The Thunderbolts were in the thick of it again.

At 11:00 a.m., January 13, 1945, just an hour after the attack had been launched, an enemy counterattack of approximately 20 tanks developed on the east Flank. Massed Artillery fire directed by liaison planes smashed the German effort. Six enemy tanks were definitely hit and set afire and the rest withdrew to the northeast. Combat Command A tanks then took the lead and made progress against moderate opposition until reaching an enemy minefield midway through the Bois de Nom de Falize. Division Engineers quickly breached this mine field that threatened to slow the advance. The attack continued.

INTO THE TOWN OF BERTOGNE

By 2:00 p.m. leading tank elements of Combat Command A had cut the crossroads Southwest of Bertogne, and were disposed on high ground to the south and east of the town itself. Tank fire supplemented by artillery and an air mission, was poured into the town of Bertogne during the remainder of the afternoon. Enemy forces in Bertogne were whittled down to about two companies of infantry with 11 tanks in support, four of which were destroyed and the rest immobilized. When nightfall came, Command A consolidated its position astride the enemy's main line of resistance between Gives and Compogne and remained in a dominating position over Bertogne.

Combat Command B, after an all night march, closed in the vicinity of Villeroux at 10:00 am. In the meantime, the commander and a small party had made contact with the 101st Airborne Division, and conducted a daylight reconnaissance for its attack the following morning. To speed the planned action, Combat Command B was moved forward through Bastogne to an assembly area astride the Bastogne-Noville highway, one mile South of Foy. The Command CP was established at Bastogne.

Under cover of darkness during the night of January 13-14, the Germans occupying Bertogne withdrew in an attempt to form a defensive block to the east in the vicinity of Compogne.

RESUMING THE ATTACK

Spearheaded by an infantry task force, Combat Command A at 10:00 a.m. on January 14, resumed its attack to clear the Bois de Nom de Falize. In coordination with this effort, the 41st Cavalry attacked in the same direction along the east flank, to clear the Les Assins woods. Concentrated enemy small arms, machine gun, and mortar fire, together with some artillery, slowed the attack. By 3:00 p.m. the infantry task force had fought its way to the north edge of the Bois de Nom de Falize, and was joined there about two hours later by the 41st Cavalry along the Longchamps-Compogne road. Heavy fire across open ground from the Pied du Mont woods and Compogne along with tank fire from the vicinity of Bertogne, prohibiting further advance.

Further east, Combat Command B plunged through Foy and Recogne to Noville, where the column was forced to halt before stiffening resistance.

Command B's plan of attack had to be altered to fit the loss of Recogne and Foy by units of the 101st Airborne Division during the night. The tank task force, however, under cover of darkness, was moved into position south of Recogne, and an infantry task force moved into position astride the main highway just South of Foy. At 9:30 a.m., following an artillery preparation, the tank task force attacked Recogne, and the infantry task force attacked Foy. Both towns were retaken against light enemy opposition.

Maneuvering along the fringe of woods on the high ground to the west, the tank task force then attacked Cobru from the left rear, with immediate success. Simultaneously, the infantry task force pushed northeast along the main highway. A German nine tank counterattack from Vaux at about 3:00 p.m. was broken up by an air mission on Vaux. Artillery fire directed by air observation destroyed four of the nine advancing German tanks.

Overcoming a difficult stream crossing, the tank task force entered Noville, followed by the infantry task force. Heavy German fire from weapons of all types inflicted heavy casualties upon the Command, and delayed the final reduction of the town. When nightfall came all units of the Command withdrew to positions on high ground south and west of Cobru ,and astride the highway south of Noville.

Division Artillery's effort during the day was concentrated principally on the preparation for, and support of Combat Command B's attack.

Staff and command representatives of the 11th Armored Division met at 7:00 p.m. with members of the 101st Airborne Division at Bastogne to coordinate plans for the attack scheduled for January 15. Agreements arrived at provided for assistance and close follow-up of Combat Command B's attack to capture the woods one-mile east of Noville. Arrangements were also made at the meeting for holding the Fazone Woods between Combat Command A and Combat Command B and coordination of the offensive effort in this area.

During the day (January 12) the 602nd Tank Destroyer Battalion, minus Company C, was attached to the 11th Armored Division on Corps order. Company A of the battalion was in turn attached to Command B and instructed to report to Foy. Company B was attached to Command A and ordered to proceed to Monaville.

A Field Order from Corps headquarters was received at 8:25 p.m., prescribing action to be taken when the final objective had been seized. The Thunderbolt Division was assigned the sector between Houffalize and Neufmoulin for occupation, organization, and defense. Contact with the VII Corps and protection of the North flank along the L'Ourthe River from Houffalize to the vicinity of Grinver was also charged to the 11th Armored Division. For its eastward attack on the Bertogne-Compogne-Mabompre road on January 15, 1945, Combat Command A was organized into two task forces. A heavy infantry task force was initially to assist the attack by fire from positions along the north Edge of the Bois de Nom de Falize until Compogne had fallen, whereupon it was to join in the advance in a Northeast direction. The heavy tank task force was assigned the main effort of pushing east along the highway through the Pied du Mont woods to seize Compogne, and continue along the axis of advance.

After a powerful artillery preparation and air strike on Pied du Mont woods, supported by fire of the infantry task force, the tank task force pushed rapidly eastward, clearing the Pied du Mont woods at 11:30 a.m. Compogne was cleared at 3:10 p.m., Rastadt immediately thereafter, and Velleroux shortly before dark.

The 77th Volksgrenadier Regiment of the 27th Volksgrenadier Division had attempted to hold at all cost the defensive terrain of the Compogne-Rastadt -Velleroux triangle, to protect its division’s further withdrawal. A strong delaying action was maintained in the Pied du Mont woods. This force, supported by artillery fire, put up stiff small-arms, automatic weapons, and mortar fire resistance until overrun by the Combat Command A tank task force. Over 400 prisoners were taken in this action.

THE FALL OF COMPOGNE

With the fall of Compogne, the infantry task force, under cover of available woods, moved to the northeast to join forces with the tank task force astride the Compogne-Mabompre highway just west of the Rau De Vaux. Heavy fire from woods on this unit's objective halted the attack at nightfall 500 yards short.

At 7:10 p.m., leading elements of the tank task force continuing eastward through the Rau De Vaux defile were heavily counterattacked in the flanks by enemy tanks, artillery, and anti-tank fire. After losing nine medium tanks, the task force withdrew to high ground west of Velleroux for the night.

With elements of the 101st Airborne Division assisting by fire from their east flank, and neutralizing the enemy stronghold in Vaux on the west flank, Combat Command B planned to by-pass Noville and assault the key elevated and wooded terrain one mile east of Noville, from which so much fire had been observed during the previous day's action.

Organization for the accomplishment of this mission contemplated a broad front assault by tanks, with infantry following closely for mop-up purposes. After carefully registering each artillery battalion by air observation, massed artillery fire was brought down at 11:00 a.m. to destroy or neutralize known enemy positions in the forward edges and on commanding terrain within the woods. A portion of the woods north of the Noville-Bourcy Highway was also softened by an air attack.

Combat Command B launched its combined tank and infantry attack at 11:45 a.m., bypassing Noville to the east. With closely coordinated supporting fire, CCB took its objective by 3:30 p.m. Units of the 101st Airborne Division followed up, occupying Noville, and taking up positions at 5:00 p.m. along the Noville-Bourcy Highway to the East.

Throughout the day, Division Artillery fired preparations for both Combat Command A and Combat Command B attacks, and continued active support missions. Late in the afternoon the 492nd Armored Field Artillery Battalion was again placed in direct support of Command A’s infantry task force. The 802nd Field Artillery Battalion, attached to the 333rd Field Artillery Group, supplemented direct fire support for Command A.

The critical routes between Longchamps and Bertogne, as well as Longchamps and Compogne were swept for mines by members of the 56th Armored Engineer Battalion. Progress during the day of January 15, 1945, made it apparent that the Division final objective probably would be taken within the next 24 hours. The marked intensification of the enemy's defensive posture indicated that forces in contact had been ordered to make a last determined stand, selling space for time as expensively as possible.

THE ATTACK CONTINUES

Recognizing this situation, orders for major units of the Division for January 16, 1945, were formulated. Combat Command A was directed to continue its attack on a broad front, leading initially with strong infantry units to secure a bridgehead east of Vaux. Upon crossing the Rau de Vaux, Combat Command A was ordered to advance rapidly astride the Bertogne-Houffalize road to seize its assigned portion of the Division objective. The 41st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron was to continue on its north flank protection and VII Corps contact mission as far east as Houffalize.

Combat Command B was directed to initially assist the attack of 101st Airborne Division units on Vaux by fire, and to soften the woods north and northeast, as well as the town of Rachamps by similar action. The Command then was to attack and seize the southeast tip of the woods one-mile north of Vaux, and probe for further resistance to the northeast along the Noville-Houffalize Highway. Upon completing that mission, Command B was to be prepared to either continue northwest, and assist CCA's crossing of the Rau de Vaux; or to continue its advance to the northeast along the Noville-Houffalize Highway.

Just past 10:00 orders were received from Corps Headquarters directing that the attack be continued at 8:30 the next morning, January 16. 1945.

Elements of the 41st Cavalry, by continuing through the night of January 15-16, reached the high ground west of Houffalize at 6:30 a.m., January 16, and drew fire from enemy forces still in the town.

Combat Command A’s infantry task force jumped off at 8:00 a.m. to complete reduction of its previous day's objective. The main effort to the east was started at 9:00 a.m. on January 16. An infantry bridgehead over the Rau de Vaux allowed quick construction of a treadway bridge by engineers. The tank force then pushed rapidly northeast through Mabompre in pursuit action. The infantry task force followed, echeloned to the right. Several road-blocks having been reduced while advancing under heavy artillery, sniper and automatic weapons fire, the advance tank elements of CCA reached the final objective at 1:20 p.m. Regrouping for a then assigned defensive mission, CCA deployed its infantry units across the front, and the tanks were rallied in defilade positions to the west. The Combat Command A CP was moved forward from Longchamps to Compogne, where it closed in at 3:00 p.m.

THRU WICORT

Combat Command B, in accordance with plans, on January 16, initiated action with tank and artillery fire on the woods north and northeast of Vaux and the town of Rechamps. With its tank task force leading, followed closely by the infantry, CCB attacked at 9:45 a.m., and an hour later had seized the woods north of Vaux. Immediately reorganizing, Combat Command B pushed northeast through Wicourt against anti-tank fire from enemy forces to the east, in the vicinity of Rechamps. Leaving a small holding force to reduce Wicourt, the infantry moved ahead, into the woods. The final objective was attacked at 3:00 p.m, supported by artillery and fire from the tank task force. The final objective was secured and outposted by 4:30 p.m.

Anti-tank, rocket, and mortar fire from a strong enemy position in the woods near Neufmoulin was hurled into forces closing on the final objective during the remainder of the afternoon. At the close of the engagement, enemy forces in the Division sector included remnants of the 130th Panzer "Lehr" Division, 26th Volksgrenadier Division, 9th Panzer Division, and various General Headquarters troops, predominately engineers. Spearheading the VII Corps attack to reduce the Belgian Bulge, the Division was first to link up with First Army forces to the north, along the L'Ourthe River near Houffalize.

In four days of offensive action (January 13-16) against stiff enemy resistance, an 11th Armored Division two-pronged attack had advanced over seven miles, liberating 45 square miles of Belgian territory. Over 12 towns had been taken by Thunderbolts, or cut off to fall into the hands of following troops. Most notably, these were Bertogne, Compogne, Mabompre, Noville, and Wicourt. During this period about 800 prisoners had been captured. Also, 50 irreplaceable German tanks, including six powerful Mark VI's had been taken from the enemy.

THE DRIVE FOR HOUFFALIZE

An American Armored Division and two Airborne Divisions had joined forces to operate as an indomitable team. In the drive for Houffalize, there were numerous examples of heroism. Sergeant (then Corporal) Wayne E. Van Dyke of Havana, Illinois, gunner in Company B of the 41st Tank Battalion, earned a Silver Star for his action at Noville. When his tank was knocked out by an 88, he was left in the town with a seriously wounded driver and bow gunner. The tank commander and loader went to the rear to direct other tanks around the town. Van Dyke pulled the driver and bow gunner from the tank, dragged them over to a church wall, and played dead while German troops marched through the town.

Once, while Van Dyke was sprawled on the driver who was suffering from shock, a curious German came over to the apparently lifeless group and looked at the bow gunner's wrist watch but didn't touch him. After lying in this position for two hours, Van Dyke brought the two men into the church and placed the driver, who was unable to go farther, near the altar. Having given him first aid, Van Dyke and the bow gunner crawled back to their lines The driver, in the meantime, was treated by a German medic and next day was rescued by his own men when they pushed into the town.

Another Company B, 41st tanker, Technician Fifth Grade (then a Private First Class) Herbert Burr of Kansas City, Missouri, won the Distinguished Service Cross when he continued to fire at the enemy after all the crew in his tank were either killed or wounded from the blast of two 88 hits on his tank. After knocking out the enemy 88 crew, Burr pulled the wounded loader from his burning tank, crawled 200 yards through snow to the CP, dragging his helpless buddy. He then crept back to the tank, extinguished the fire and drove it back. This heroic act took place just outside of Houffalize.

With all enemy forces cleared south of the L'Ourthe River line as far east as Houffalize, the VIII Corps temporarily assumed a defensive attitude.

A Corps Field Order reached Division Headquarters at 1:00 a.m. on January 17, prescribing relief of the Division by the 17th Airborne Division. The 11th Armored Division relieved the 101st Airborne Division, and was charged with organizing and defending a line from Hardingny to Bourcy inclusive, maintaining contact with the III Corps on the south and the 17th Airborne Division on the north flank, and protecting the right of the Corps.

Based on these premises, the Division plan called for the use of a heavy infantry and defense weapon force, under CCR, for defense of the newly assigned sector. The Division Artillery supported the defense of the two major combat commands, which were held in reserve assembly areas.

Word was received at 3:00 a.m. that sweeping of the Bastogne-Houffalize road as far north as the Division final objective had been accomplished. By early daylight a field order from the 17th Airborne Division was received outlining their plan for relieving the Division elements.

At 8:00 a.m., January 18, 1945, the Division assumed responsibility for defense of the sector from Hardigny to Bourcy. The defense, based on infantry strong-points organized in depth, took full advantage of critical terrain. In order to secure the Noville-Houffalize road, a limited objective attack was ordered in a field order that was received from Corps at 12:30 p.m. The 11th Armored Division was to be on the right in the attack, with the 17th Airborne Division on the left. The Division mission was outlined as an attack at H hour, D day, to secure the high ground north and east of Buret; clear all enemy in a limited zone, and protect the Corps south flank.

CCR continued its defense of the Division sector, maintaining active patrol contact with enemy forces to the east, and friendly forces to the sorth and south.

"D" DAY

Information was received from Corps on January l9, that "D" day had been established as January 21, 1945. Plans were made for the renewal of offensive action. The Division limited objective attack plan visualized CCA and CCB moving abreast, CCB on the right with CCR following centrally.

CCA was directed to move to an assembly area southwest of Rachamps, prior to daylight on January 21. CCB was directed to move to an assembly area in the vicinity of Noville, prior to daylight on January 21. From these areas the two Combat Commands were poised for the attack. The Division CP was moved forward in the late afternoon of January 19, to a more central position, one kilometer west of Bastogne.

Movement of Division units to attack position got underway on January 20. Around 5:30 p.m. Corps sent a message to Division Headquarters, designating 8:30 a.m. of the next day as H-Hour.

NO RESISTANCE

The first elements of CCA initiated their advance at 7:30 a.m. on January 21. Pushing forward from the CCR line at 9:00 a.m., a small combined infantry and tank task force went through Boeur without resistance. A blown bridge and numerous hastily placed mine fields delayed progress. However, dismounted infantry and cavalry elements proceeded toward Buret, reaching there at noon. A bridge having been constructed at Boeur, the bulk of the command moved forward and closed on Buret about 6:00 p.m. Ten prisoners, who were waiting to surrender, were captured. CCB moved its infantry task force forward to the vicinity of Bourcy at 9:00 a.m. A tank task force remained in the woods about one mile east of Noville. Because of the unopposed progress of III Corps elements to the South, and the rapid progress of CCA, CCR was not committed to action, but remained in a state of readiness.

Division Artillery fired no missions during the day, except for the 490th Armored Field Artillery Battalion’s original registration in preparation of CCA's attack.

Near noon on January 21, an operations memorandum arrived from Corps which changed the boundary between the III and VIII Corps, and extended the Division s sector further eastward to include the whole of Bois de Rouvroy. Another operations memorandum arrived shortly afterwards, directing that the Division continue its advance the next morning and clear all enemy within its zone.

On January 22, 1945, at 7:00 a.m., 41st Cavalry units moved into Bois de Rouvroy to complete the clearing of the Division sector. By 11:30 a.m. the Division pinch-out point was reached, without further enemy contact.

On January 22, VIII Corps directed that the Thunderbolt Division prepare to assist the ] 7th Airborne Division in the accomplishment of its mission. CCA was in the most advantageous position for such an assignment, so the directive was relayed to it.

Liaison was established by CCA with the 17th Division on January 23, and routes were reconnoitered to facilitate troop movements.

From January 24 to January 28, 1945, the Division saw little action other than active patrolling. On January 27, at 9:30 p.m. a Corps field order was received, outlining the Corps attack plan for January 29, and specifying the Division mission. H-Hour was designated at 8: 30 a.m. With the Bulge liquidated, the 11th Armored Division began a drive to pierce the Siegfried Line. In the beginning of the attack launched to penetrate the Siegfried Line the Thunderbolt Division was retained in a reserve status.

On February 1, 1945, the 11th Armored Division, with a strength of 613 officers and 9,642 enlisted men, was still in VIII Corps reserve. With the mission of remaining in place, it was prepared to exploit any penetration of the enemy defenses resulting from the Corps attack then in progress. The attack to the east, generally along the high ground west of the Our River, continued against resistance varying from light to heavy, depending on the nearness of the Siegfried Line.

Orders were received from Corps on February 3, directing the Division to relieve elements of the 90th Infantry Division, in the Southern part of its zone, not later than midnight, February 5. Then, at 4:00 a.m., February 6, the Thunderbolts were to attack, seize, and hold Hill 568 for the protection of the 90th Infantry Division's south flank. Hill 568 is a dominant terrain feature within the Siegfried Line, approximately three kilometers East of Grosskampenberg, and commands views of the area in all directions.

SURPRISE ATTACK

CCR launched its attack on Hill 568 at 4:00 a.m. on February 6, as scheduled. The attack was made with the 55th and 21st Armored Infantry Battalions abreast, with the 21st battalion on the left. No artillery preparation was fired. As a result of exceptionally accurate intelligence on identification, strength, and disposition of enemy occupied pillboxes, complete surprise of the enemy was accomplished. The Thunderbolt forces advanced swiftly through fortified, mined, and booby-trapped areas, to seize and occupy the division objective by 8:30 a.m. The enemy was expecting an armored frontal attack with the usual heavy artillery preparation. Instead, CCR jumped off before dawn without artillery preparation, in a superbly executed maneuver. This action resulted in an advance of approximately two miles through the tough Siegfried Line.

On the morning of February 7, stiff resistance encountered during a 90th Infantry Division attack delayed their progress, leaving CCR's north flank unprotected. Because of this, CCR delayed a scheduled attack, and dug in to further improve its position.

Verbal instructions were received from Corps to continue the attack on the early morning of February 8. However, fighting through a heavily fortified and hotly defended valley, the 90th Division attack still was unable to bring its line forward, abreast of the CCR and Hill 568 position. Accordingly, CCR restricted its action to limited dismounted patrol activity. Late in the day, the 90th Infantry Division reported that the reduction of two or three pillboxes would have to be accomplished before lateral contact with the Hill 568 position could be established. CCR was ordered to coordinate with the 90th Division on the renewal of the attack the next day.

Reconnaissance of routes and areas for possible future operations continued on February 9, 1945. CCB continued to maintain contact with the 6th Armored Division on the south and bolstered the south flank with additional troops on the west side of Our River.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Limited patrol activity was continued by CCR, still waiting for the 90th Infantry Division elements to seal off one of its exposed flanks. A psychological warfare attack was launched at 1:30 p.m. on February 9, employing both artillery leaflets and a public address system. Moderate enemy artillery fire was received throughout the day, increasing to heavy concentrations while the psychological warfare broadcast took place. The 63rd Armored Infantry Battalion reached a concentration area, and relieved the 21st Armored Infantry Battalion. The 21st then moved to a reserve position at Heckhalenfeld. At about 4:55 p.m., contact was finally established the 90th Infantry Division.

At 10:30 p.m. on February 9, an anticipatory field order from VIII Corps was received. Temporary assumption of a defensive attitude by the Corps after the capture of Prum and seizure of the Prum River line was ordered. With a general shift of sectors to the south, the 11th Armored Division was to be relieved by the 90th Infantry Division and assembled on Corps reserve, prepared to repel any enemy counterattack in the Corps zone.

A ground attack was resumed by CCR at 9:00 a.m. on February 10, 1945. To the south and southeast of Hill 568, the refreshed Company C of the 63rd. Armored Infantry Battalion reduced an additional ten fortified places, including five pillboxes and five bunkers. After capture, the bunkers and pillboxes were dynamited and rendered useless. Fifteen prisoners of war were taken. Coordinating with the CCR's attack, Division Artillery fired 64 missions, a total of 852 rounds on opportune targets. Fifty additional rounds containing surrender leaflets were fired on isolated pillboxes during the morning hours.

Thawing and rainy weather continued through the day. Road conditions throughout the entire VIII Corps zone reached a critical stage. Orders were issued to all units, limiting road use to essential tactical and administrative vehicles. The 56th Engineers and additional troops from major and attached units were put to work on a 24-hour road repair detail to help alleviate the situation. The capture of Prum and the Prum River line was accomplished by other elements of the Corps. At 6:00 p.m. on February 10, 11th Armored Division Field Order No. 12 was issued to comply with VIII Corps Field Order No. 9, received the previous evening. Minimum movement of CCR elements only was directed, due to the critical road situation. Enemy casualties after five days of fighting in the Siegfried Line amounted to 387 men, 100 of which were killed and wounded. The remaining 287 were taken as prisoners. Pillboxes and bunkers destroyed totaled 37. In addition, five enemy tanks, one G.P. vehicle, and one Anti-Tank gun were destroyed or captured.

On February 11, 1945, CCR was contacted by elements of the 90th Infantry Division, and relief arrangements were made. Around midday, Co. B of the 56th Armored Engineer Battalion moved back west of the Our River. The 21st Armored Infantry Battalion then moved to the CCB assembly area at Weiswampach.

During the day an exchange of telephone calls, based on higher level developments, changed the VIII Corps plan. The Thunderbolts, minus the 41st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, were assigned to a new zone of defense. This involved a shift to the south to relieve certain elements of the 6th Armored Division. Contact with the 90th Infantry Division on the left flank was to be maintained, and the Division was prepared to resume the offensive on short notice.

Moving to the South, CCB was directed to defend the southern portion of the new zone. CCR, after being relieved of its position by the 90th Infantry Division, was to occupy and defend the area held by the 41st Cavalry, with. Division Artillery supporting CCA and CCR in holding the area. Upon being relieved, the 41st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron passed to operational control of the 6th Armored Division.

Elements of the 90th Infantry Division initiated relief of the 55th and 63rd Armored Infantry Battalions before midnight, and the armored infantry battalions moved to a reserve position west of the 41st Cavalry lines. February 11 still found the Engineers working tirelessly to keep roads open for vehicular movement.

By 1:30 a.m. on February 12, 1945, CCR's Armored Infantry Battalions were relieved by elements of the 90th Infantry Division, while the 63rd Armored Infantry Battalion in turn completed the relief of the 41st Cavalry at 6:45 a.m. At 8:00 a.m. the Cavalry Squadron commenced it's move South to the 6th Armored Division sector, clearing the area around 10:45 a.m.

Reconnaissance was initiated by CCB to relieve elements of the 6th Armored Division situated in its extended zone to the south. Axial road repair in the Division area continued at a high rate as the 381st Quartermaster Truck company reinforced the 56th Engineer Battalion along with an additional Divisional work detail of 225 men, all fully engaged in the task. A total of 400 mines were cleared by A Company from a field Northwest of Krumbach.

The quiet of February 13, 1945, allowed Division elements to complete and improve defensive installations and maintain contact with the 90th Infantry Division and the 6th Armored Division. No resistance was encountered by patrols to the west bank of the Our River in the CCB sector. Nebelwerfer, mortar and artillery fire fell on CCR positions during the day, but being light and sporadic, did little harm. Training of reinforcements, maintenance, and work on the roads in the vicinity of CCA continued without interruption. Division Artillery fired a total of 36 missions, expending 366 rounds, 20 of which were surrender leaflets.

Counterattacks of platoon strength were made against CCR on February 14, but resulted in no loss. Quiet continued much as yesterday, but was accompanied by pouring rain. Division Artillery completed the first half of the month with its 695th mission. A strenuous battle to repair and maintain roads was continued, being directed and supervised by the 56th Engineer Battalion.

Very little enemy activity was noted on February 15, 1945 as the Thunderbolts continued their defensive mission.

UP TO THE SIEGFRIED LINE

Field Order No. 11 was issued by VIII Corps at 12:00 a.m. directing an H-hour attack to the southeast, this being to clear enemy in the area west of the Prum River, and to make a junction with the XII Corps in the vicinity of Mauel. The VIII Corps was operating at this time as the northernmost Corps in the Third Army, with the V Corps of the First Army on the north flank, and XII Corps bringing up the south flank. From south to north, VIII Corps troops were disposed in the following order: 6th Cavalry Group, 6th Armored Division, 11th Armored Division, 90th Infantry Division, 4th Infantry Division and the 87th Infantry Division. Field Order No. 11 directed the 11th Armored Division, minus the 41st Cavalry, to attack at H-hour on February 18, and to capture Leidenborn and Reiff, thereby clearing the enemy in the zone, and maintaining a contact with the 90th Infantry Division on the left. Also, in preparation for assisting the advance of the 6th Armored Division, the Corps action ordered for H-hour was to be a limited objective action, using mainly only the 90th Infantry Division and the 11th Armored Division in the center. The 6th Cavalry Group and the 6th Armored Division situated on the south were to attack east, and the 4th and 87th Infantry Divisions were directed by the Corps order to maintain their defenses on the north flank. Division plans for the attack were initiated immediately.

After dark, the 63rd Armored Infantry Battalion and the 55th Armored Infantry Battalion were rotated according to plans made that afternoon by CCR. Intermittent mortar and artillery fire continued to fall on Infantry positions. Three annoying pillboxes were seized and destroyed during the day of February 16, 1945, by patrols of the CCR. Meanwhile, the main Axial roads were beginning to show signs of recovery under the constant attention and toils of the 56th Armored Engineer Battalion.

A new plan for attack was detailed, which would take advantage of the partial penetration along the northern flank of the Siegfried Line. This entailed a series of daily "leap-frog" infantry battalion attacks on a narrow front, to cut through the remaining fortifications of the Siegfried Line by a flanking action from the north. With CCR through the fortified area, it was then contemplated that in turn CCB would move through the CCR zone, and then attack from the north flank, approaching the concrete fortifications from deep in the left flank and the rear. Field Order No. 13 was issued at 12:00 a.m. on February 16, 1945, formalizing this attack at H-hour on February 18. The maximum effort was to be on the left flank, in order to capture Leidenborn, Reiff, and to clear the enemy in the Division zone Further orders were preparations to assist the advance of the 6th Armored Division; the occupation of Harspelt, Sevenig and Roscheid. The 56th Armored Engineer Battalion was directed to continue road repairs and maintenance on routes in the Division area, and was to be prepared to install a bridge across the Our River at Peterskirche for the CCB.

Identification of enemy units opposing the Division, which included the 167th Infantry Division, 339th Infantry Regiment, 340th Infantry Division, the 694th, 695th and 696th Infantry Regiments and Artillery of the 79th Infantry Division, revealed a total strength of 1800 men but all without the apparent aid of tanks. The enemy utilized a general lull on the division front by sending out small patrols, the firing of small and medium artillery of an annoying nature and generally bettering small-scale positions.

GERMAN MORALE LOW

It was obvious after questioning prisoners that the enemy was conducting a constant reshuffling of troops. The German morale was very low due to a dire lack of food. Medical supplies were also inadequate and there was a noticeable lack of supply of heavy weapons and transportation facilities. Enemy desertions were frequent. Since February 6, 1945 the Division had captured 291 prisoners of war, the majority of whom had surrendered or deserted at their first opportunity.

On February 17, Division Artillery destroyed three concrete bunkers and one permanent roadblock with a 155mm gun at close range. Two tanks were also knocked out. CCR and CCB maintained their positions and contact with the 90th Infantry Division on the north and the 6th Armored Division on the south. CCB Infantry elements crossed the Our River at Peterskirche without contacting the enemy and proceeded one kilometer South of Lutzkampen to Hill 512.

Under the supervision of the Corps Engineer, 200 men from CCA and 240 men from CCB were assigned to road repair work with the 56th Armored Engineer Battalion. A narrow-front sneak attack was launched at 5:45 a.m. on February 18, 1945, led by the 63rd Armored Infantry Battalion. CCR caught the enemy in the midst of a troop shifting disposition. The vigorous infantry-tank assault, without the warning of an Artillery preparation completely surprised and confused the enemy, according to the prisoners of war from the 987th Grenadier Regiment and the 267th Volksgrenadiers, who began to pour in. The 63rd Armored Infantry Battalion recaptured Grosskampenberg at 8:05 a.m. the same day with base fire support from Lutzkampen. Company C of the 56th Armored Engineer Battalion blasted two paths through the dragon's teeth and a minefield in the rear. This was accomplished by 9:15 a.m. The 63rd Armored Infantry Battalion cleaned out fortifications to advantageous positions with support from tanks and artillery fire. Sustaining the force of attack, the 55th Armored Infantry Battalion, with support by Engineers and tanks, passed straight through to take the first objective, Leidenborn, by 5:00 p.m.

In many instances it was found that unoccupied trenches and scattered mines surrounded the pillboxes. Most of these pillboxes were defended while others were abandoned soon after our troops fired on them. A further 72 prisoners of war were captured.

Division Artillery fired 90 missions in support of the attack, expending 1,724 rounds while intermittent firing of surrender leaflets continued on defended towns.

In coordination with the 90th Infantry Division, VIII Corps directed the Thunderbolts to continue the attack on February 19.

The enemy reacted to CCR's previous day attack with a company strength counterattack at 9:30 a.m. This counterattack was made by elements of the 986th Volksgrenadier Regiment and the 276th Volksgrenadier Division, armed with rifles and automatic weapons and supported by moderate artillery fire. C Company, 55th Armored Infantry Battalion, met and repulsed the attack.

After considerable artillery fire on the proposed target, two companies of the 55th Armored Infantry Battalion jumped off to seize Herzfeld. Extremely heavy mortar and Artillery fire delayed the attack at the edge of town, but the town was secured by 3:00 p.m. After clearing the general area a net total of pillboxes, destroyed or neutralized, amounted to 23 for the day and 63 prisoners of war captured. The 63rd Armored Infantry Battalion prepared to continue the attack on Reiff the following morning after clearing the Leidenborn area improving its position.

Road maintenance was continued by the 56th Armored Engineers, and a total of 130 Tellermines were cleared from the area.

ENEMY DISORGANIZED

A progressively disorganized enemy offered little hindrance against the rapidly advancing 63rd Armored Infantry Battalion on February 20, 1945, completing a narrow penetration of the main Siegfried Line fortifications. The town of Sengerich was secured at 8:30 a.m., but the retreating enemy dropped heavy mortar and Artillery fire on it shortly afterward. This brief, but bloody, vigorous, and determined action resulted in the capture of 52 prisoners of war and the seizure and destruction of 10 pillboxes.

CCB upheld contact with adjacent elements and continued its probing patrol activity.

An enemy tank was destroyed by the Division artillery. Quick action on the part of counter-battery missions continually minimized hostile mortar and artillery fire.

CCR submitted a plan for the following day's action at 6:25 p.m., which was approved at 7:50 p.m. along with orders for a renewal of attack.

On February 21, 1945, CCR's mission was a limited objective attack to seize Roscheid and to clear the pillboxes northeast and northwest of Roscheid to the Sevenig-Roscheid road, widening the break of the main Siegfried Line. CCR's 55th Armored Infantry Battalion launched its attack at 7:00 a.m., supported by Company B, 22nd Tank Battalion and Company C, 56th Armored Engineers. By 9:36 a.m. the mission was accomplished. The 63^rd Armored Infantry Battalion remained in positions captured the previous day while it prepared for the final assault on Reiff, which was scheduled for February 22. Troublesome civilians at Lutzkampen required guarding by one platoon of Battery D, 575th AntiAircraft Battalion.

A patrol was dispatched from Sevenig by CCB at 11:45 a.m., to gain contact with the 6th Armored Division on the s outh flank, but enemy occupied pillboxes enroute prevented completion of the mission.

On the same day, Division Artillery fired on a German troop concentration in Reiff and scored four direct hits on enemy tanks.

The 41st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron was released from the 6th Armored Division at midday, and moved back north to an assembly area in the vicinity of Lascheid. Meanwhile the 90th Infantry Division, with a toe-hold in the Siegfried Line provided by the Division’s action earlier in the month, was making steady progress on the north flank On the south flank, the 6th Armored Division initiated offensive action eastward across the Our River. At about 4:00 p.m. on February 21, Binscheid was captured and lateral contact was maintained.

THRU THE SIEGFRIED LINE

Orders for resuming a coordinated attack on February 22 were made by the 6th Armored Division on the south flank. Fragmentary verbal orders were transmitted to the major units concerned without delay.

The attack plans for CCR, CCB, and Division Artillery were submitted and coordinated, and Operations Memorandum No. 27 was issued at 8:00 p.m. for the completion of the division mission the following day. The general plan contemplated a continuance of the infantry action. It was received from VIII Corps at 10:55 a.m. The general Corps plan contemplated an accelerated drive to the south by the 11th Armored Division and the 90th Infantry Division, who were then through the main defenses of the Siegfried Line. A frontal assault along the East flank was to be made by CCR, while permanent fortifications in the Siegfried Line to the west were masked by smoke.

CCB was then to move infantry and ranks through the CCR zone via Lutzkampen and Herzfeld, afterwards swinging southwest, and clearing their zone in the Siegfried Line by an attack from the left rear.

CCR was directed to seize and occupy Eschfeld and Reiff, coordinating closely with the 90th Infantry Division. Upon capture of Eschfeld by CCR, CCB was directed to clear bunkers and pillboxes in its zone. The normal support mission was allocated to the Division Artillery. This included specific provisions for coordinating fire with the 6th Armored Division and the 90th Infantry Division.

At 7:30 a.m. on February 22, 1945, CCR's 55th Armored Infantry Battalion, supported by tanks and engineers, jumped off from positions East of Roscheid, to seize and secure Eschield. This move was made in order to set the stage for the CCB attack. The town itself was taken at 10:00 a.m. and by 10:45 a.m. critical ground surrounding Eschfeld was securely within our hands. Ten bunkers were cleared during this action and a total of 74 prisoners of war were taken.

After a heavy artillery preparation the 63rd Armored Infantry Battalion launched a surprising mounted infantry and tank attack on the town of Reiff. This attack was made at 8: 15 a.m. and an hour later remnants of the 988th Volksgrenadier Regiment of the 276th Volksgrenadier Division were completely overwhelmed and the town was securely in our hands. The speed of this attack resulted in the capture of a battalion commander and his staff, along with an additional 187 prisoners of war.

An American M4 tank being used by the Germans was also recaptured. Immediately after, dismounted infantry was sent to the south and east to clear the remainder of the division zone and to occupy advantageous high ground to the south of the town of Reiff. At 4:30 p.m., a counterattack of two-platoon strength was repulsed without loss. Passing through Eschfeld after its capture by CCR, the first of two task forces of CCB attacked southwest through the Siegfried Line fortifications with ranks and infantry, systematically clearing bunkers and pillboxes until the southern division boundary was reached. Contact was made with the 6th Armored Division by the second task force by 1:20 p.m.

Division Artillery fired heavy concentrations on towns in the division zone during the day’s action, and a total of 2,662 rounds were expended. Air observation planes dropped surrender leaflets on towns just before they were entered by our attacking ground forces. This aided greatly in reducing the lengthy process of mopping up.

The attack of February 22 ended the division's offensive action in the Siegfried Line, and resulted in the reduction of 30 square kilometers of the main Siegfried Line fortified zone, as the division made advances totaling 12 kilometers on an average two and one half kilometer front. A total of 197 pillboxes and bunkers were seized and cleared and 716 prisoners of war were captured.

The principal operational activity during the day of February 23 consisted of extensive patrol activity and the strengthening of positions along the division boundaries. There was no enemy activity on this day although nine prisoners gave themselves up to our troops. Company B, 22nd Tank Battalion, after 18 days of continuous wearing action, was detached from CCB, and replaced by Company A, 22nd Tank Battalion. Company A, 602nd Tank Destroyer Battalion was released from CCR to join the 90th Infantry Division. Battery C, 174th Field Artillery Battalion was released from attachment at 3:00 p.m.

TO HERMESPAND

According to verbal orders from VIII Corps, CCA was alerted for movement east to the vicinity of Hermespand to back up the 87th Infantry Division. Operations Memorandum No. 25 was received from VIII Corps at 6:45 p.m. directing the 11th Armored Division to assemble in its present location and await orders.

Patrol activity and maintenance of various outposts in the Reiff and Eschfeld area were continued on February 24, pending a solid juncture of the 90th Infantry Division and the 6th Armored Division. CCA was attached to the 87th Infantry Division for such defensive activities as repelling counter-attacks on the Corps North flank.

The long and backbreaking work of engineer details and improving weather had healed the road communications problems, so all men engaged in repair and maintenance road work were ordered to rejoin their parent units at 5: 00 p.m.

Field Order No. 12 from VIII Corps headquarters was received at 1:00 p.m. on February 24, directing an H-hour attack on February 27, 1945, to capture Hallschlag and Ormont, and to seize the high ground south of Cronenburg, while the Corps turned its attention directly east toward the Kyll River. The Thunderbolts (minus CCA) were placed in Corps reserve. They were prepared to resume offensive operations on short notice, to capture the high ground north of the Ober Beteingen, or to exploit a breakthrough. Field Order No. 14 was issued at 9:00 p.m., directing CCR to assemble in the Lascheid-Bracht-Haspelt-Gruflange area and to release certain platoon and company sized elements to other units. One platoon of Company B and Company C, 56th Engineers were to return to their parent unit. One platoon of Battery D, 575th Anti-Aircraft Battalion went to Division Artillery; and Company A, 22nd Tank Battalion went to CCB. Division Artillery was placed in general support of the Corps and was directed to reconnoiter the vicinity of Habscheid and move into position areas.

On February 25, 1945, CCA with the 161st Smoke Generating Company and Battery B, 174th Field Artillery Battalion attached, initiated a movement to the 87th Infantry Division area, closing in the Losheim Pass area near Manderfeld at 3:50 p.m. That night under the cover of darkness, the 63rd Armored Infantry Battalion and the 41st Cavalry relieved elements of the 347th Infantry Regiment, 87th Infantry Division as that division concentrated on its south flank for an attack to the east. CCR moved to its new assembly area at 3:30 p.m., their command post opening at Lascheid, Belgium. Company A, 22nd Tank Battalion, Company B, 81st Medical Battalion and Company C, 56th Engineer Battalion were released from CCR to return to their parent units. Headquarters Division Artillery and the 491st and 492nd Armored Field Artillery Battalions moved to Habscheid. New weapons were test-fired, and the conduct of combat drills on the proper engagement of Tiger tanks was practiced by CCB on February 26. General maintenance and rehabilitation were emphasized throughout the division. 56th Armored Engineer Battalion parties initiated route and bridge reconnaissance north and northeast of Bieialf, in anticipation of a possible movement to that area.

On the same day, CCA, under operational control of the 87th Infantry Division, relieved the 374th Infantry Regiment in the line at midday, meanwhile the 87th Infantry Division pushed eastward to the south of the Losheim pass. Two companies of the 42nd Tank Battalion and Battery B, 174th Field Artillery Battalion were attached to the 490th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, to increase the volume of fire support along the Corps North flank.

The following day Division Artillery continued reinforcing missions for the Corps Artillery. CCA, still under the 87th Infantry Division, continued enemy contact patrolling activities and fire support of the infantry attack. The 161st Smoke Generating Company was released from attachment at 11:00 a.m. on February 26. Plans were made covering the possibility that CCA's task might be altered to an attack on enemy positions to the East, with the mission of capturing the Losheim Pass entrance town of Scheid.

Throughout the day of February 26, 1945, the division continued maintenance, rehabilitation, combat drill, and test-firing of weapons.

CROSSING THE KYLL RIVER

From VIII Corps came verbal orders directing the division to attack through the 4th Infantry Division early on March 3, 1945. They were to push rapidly to the east to capture the high ground north of Gerolstein, and to seize the crossing over the Kyll River between Ober Bertingen and Gerolsrein. The 4th Infantry Division was to continue the attack until March 2, and remain in the zone after the Thunderbolts passed through on March 3, to clean up enemy passed by the armor. The 87th Infantry Division, 6th Armored Division and the 6th Cavalry Group were also to continue powerful pressure on a broad front.

At this point the 11th Armored Division stood ready for an accelerating destruction of the deteriorating German Army, after adding a significant part in the cracking of the Siegfried Line to its notable mid-winter Ardennes action. They had fired about 1,200 missions, expending 24,000 rounds during the month, inflicting the great majority of damage on enemy personnel and materiel. No tactical air missions were flown in support of the division due mainly to adverse weather conditions and the close-in nature of action.

The 167th Volksgrenadier Division was defending the sector where the 11th Armored Division made its attack on February 6, 1945, and continued until February 11. The 261 prisoners of war taken during that action were from the 331st and 339th Regiments of that division.

South of the 167th Volkgrenadier Division, the 340th Volksgrenadier Division was defending the sector to which the 11th Armored Division moved as a result of the boundary shift to the South on February 11. Believing that VIII Corps would remain on the defensive for some time as a result of the main Allied effort impending in the north, the enemy started a switch of units. Fortress Battalions, Alarm Companies, Fusilier Companies, Construction Companies, and some Nebelwerfer units were used as a holding force while the 340th V.G. Division started a movement north to the Prum River area. The 276th Volksgrenadier Division had already assembled near Lichtenborn, and on February 17, was in the process of relieving the 340th V.G. Division on the 11th Armored Division front to reinforce these miscellaneous units.

EARLY MORNING ATTACK

The attack in the early morning darkness of February 18 completely surprised the 987th Volksgrenadier Division, which had only arrived a few hours beforehand. It destroyed its combat effectiveness with the exception of a few remnants, which managed to get back and join the 988th Regiment, which had not yet come into the line.

In an effort to forestall complete destruction of the 276th V.G. Division, General Tollsdorf of the 340th V.G. Division, ordered the 694th V.G. Regiment of his division back from the Prum vicinity, in order to bolster the sagging defense, as a piecemeal recommitment of his forces was made. On February 19 and 20 the 968th Volksgrenadier Regiment of the 276th V.G. Division was committed, with the same disastrous results. When the 11th Armored Division accomplished its mission by capturing Reiff on Februarv 22, the 694th Regiment of General Tollsdorf's 340th V.G. Division had returned to the scene and was thrown in with the remaining 988th Regiment of the 276th Volksgrenadier Division to stop the Thunderbolt thrust. Their lack of success is evidenced by the speed with which the division objective was taken, and by the capture of 202 prisoners on that day.

In spite of badly crippled communications, limited personnel for such close-in deliberate ground action and grueling weather, the combined arms and indomitable will to win of the 11th Armored Division had produced a highly significant contribution to the VIII Corps in the Siegfried Line during the month of February.

On March 1, 1945, the VIII Corps was pushing eastward to the Kyll River, through a gap in the Siegfried Line. From north to south on a broad front the 87th, 4th, and 90th Infantry Divisions, the 6th Armored Division and the 6th Cavalry Group were all seeking a toehold on the east bank of the Prum River, from which a dash to seize crossings over the Kyll River could be made

In the center, with Prum secured, the 4th Infantry Division led the Corps. A small bridgehead across the river at Prum began to look like the most favorable springboard from which to launch a rapid thrust for a bridge across the Kyll River.

The Thunderbolts (minus CCA), were regrouping in preparation for their planned attack through the 4^th Infantry Division on March 3 to capture the high ground north of Gerolsrein, and to seize bridges over the Kyll River between Ober Getringen and Gerolsrein. Meanwhile CCA, under operational control of the 87th Infantry Division, was consigned defensively on the Corps north flank, blocking the Losheim Pass from the vicinity of Manderfeld. As a whole, with 622 officers and 9,786 enlisted men, the Division was slightly under-strength, although no significant shortages of combat equipment existed.

With the return of CCA to Division control being problematical, flexible plans had to be formulated for the accomplishment of the assigned Corps mission. The terrain being favorable for an armored combined arms action, and the delaying effect of a single bridge crossing bottleneck being appreciated, the basic constitution of a very strong CCB for accomplishment of the Division mission was arrived at. Tanks and armored infantry battalions were assigned to this command for the basic constitution of two balanced task forces. In the event of CCA becoming available, it was contemplated to launch the attack with the major combat commands abreast, CCB making the main effort on the south flank. Both combat commands were to be supported by centrally controlled artillery, which in any event could throw its full weight in behind CCB.

WEST OF THE PRUM RIVER

Operations Memorandum No. 30 had been issued accordingly, directing a movement to an assembly area west of the Prum River, and preparations for an attack at H-hour on March 3 through the 4th Infantry Division to seize the Division objective.

Upon release from the 87th Infantry Division, CCA was directed to move to another assembly area in the vicinity of Celierich, Hersheid and Hontheim, and prepared to attack early on March 3. CCR was to follow CCB to its assembly area around Eluchet. Division Artillery was directed to move its elements to an assembly area near Niedermehien.

On March 1, 1945, Division Forward Command Post moved from Wilwerdange, Luxembourg to Hersheid, Germany. CCA remained committed under operational control of the 87th Infantry Division.

Shortly before midnight the 4th Infantry Division sent out information that a Bailey bridge was ready for traffic at Prum.

At midday on March 2 a conference was called between the Corps Commander, and the commanding generals of the 4th Infantry Division and the 11th Armored Division, to discuss the lack of a sufficient bridgehead east of the Prum River to allow for the deployment of armored troops. A decision was made to postpone the attack planned for the following day until March 4. In the meantime the 4th Infantry Division was to enlarge the bridgehead while the 11th Armored Division completed arrangements for passing through the infantry.

In preparation for the attack, a survey was made by CCB and Division Artillery. The 492nd Armored Field Artillery Battalion moved into defiladed positions east of the Prum River, and engineers cleared and repaired the narrow, twisting road through Prum and across the bridge. Meanwhile, the 4th Infantry Division was making only limited gains east of the Prum River.

RENEWING THE OFFENSIVE

At this time parts of the 340th Volksgrenadier Division and the German 5th Parachute Division were deployed along the high ground east of the Prum River. According to the 4th Infantry Division, they were putting up determined resistance. The enemy was using an unusually large number of machine guns, which were well dug in, and both AT and AP minefields were abundant. Heavy small arms, automatic weapons, rocket artillery and mortar fire were being received along the front. Enemy morale seemed to be much better than the Wehrmacht average. Arrangements for delaying the attack until March 4, 1945 were cancelled by a telephone call from VIII Corps at 9:00 p.m. The Division was ordered to make its attack not later than noon on March 3. An hour and a half later, Corps Operations Memorandum No. 27 was received by the 11th Armored Division, confirming the telephone call, and directing a general renewal of offensive action all along the Corps front to capture the high ground west of the Kyll River, and to effect a junction with the XII Corps near Densborn. The 4th Infantry Division was to assist the attack in the 11th Armored Division zone, protecting the North flank between Gondelsheim and Oos and follow the advance of the 11th Armored Division.

The operation then seemed to be determined, so all units were alerted. Traffic control through the wreckage of Prum and across the bridge was provided for. Before midnight, Field Order No. 15 was being distributed to all the division elements covering the mission of attack to establish a bridge head across the Prum River, advancing through the 4th Infantry Division to capture the high ground West of the Kyll River, and seizing crossings of the Kyll in the vicinity of Gerolstein.

CCB was directed to attack, establishing a bridgehead across the Prum River, and to advance along the Prum-Budesheim axis to seize the division objective. They were also directed to protect the Division's south flank, and to protect the north flank from Oos inclusive to the east. With the 491st and 492nd Armored Field Artillery Battalions in the direct support, and the 333rd Field Artillery Group in general support of CCB, Division Artillery was to support the attack with preparations and massing of fire. Division Reserve, (Company A, 22nd Tank Battalion), was to be prepared to move east of the Prum River to follow CCB. Anti-Aircraft protection was to be provided by 575th Anti-Aircraft Battalion around the bridge east of Prum.

At 6:00 a.m. on March 3, 1945, the 4th Infantry Division launched an attack and captured Weinsheim, with elements proceeding to the east and south of the town, to improve the bridgehead by 10:30 a.m.

Coordinating with the 4th Infantry Division, Division TCP's were placed in operation at critical points in Prum, and on the Prum bridge site before daylight. At 7:00 a.m., CCB initiated its move across the Prum River. By noon both infantry battalions were in position, and the tank battalions were across the River.

At 12:30 a.m., CCB commenced moving through the forward elements of the 4th Infantry Division. The jump off had to be delayed temporarily, as the exact location of the 4th Infantry Division's front lines could not be determined, due to continuous movements of the foot elements of that division. CCB launched its attack at 12:55 a.m., without the assistance of artillery, in order to clear the forward infantry elements. Only light to moderate resistance met the Division's attack. The commanding general of the 11th Armored Division at this point asked the commanding general of the 4th Infantry Division to freeze the infantry troops in place. By 3:05 p.m., CCB's northern task force had shaken loose and reached the high ground, where the advance was delayed by the extensive enemy mines. One minefield cost the Division three medium tanks. Meanwhile the southern task force of CCB entered Fieringen at 4:55 p.m. At 5:15 p.m., the town was cleared and the high ground to the east was secured and organized. More mines were removed by engineers than had been encountered by the Division at any previous operation. The day's action resulted in an advance of six kilometers on a two kilometer front.

Division Artillery in supporting CCB fired 56 missions, expending 1,064 rounds during the half-day's operation, and destroyed four enemy tanks. The 491st Armored Field Artillery Battalion moved forward to positions to the east of Prum River at 3:00 p.m., in order to give close support to the following day's actions.

The entire 5th Parachute Division, the 14th and 15th Parachute Regiments, and Kampf Gruppe Kegal opposed the Division advance during the day. Anti-tank guns, mortars and tanks were used to augment a defense from well-chosen positions. A total of 56 prisoners of war were captured.

WALLERSHEIM AND BUDESHEIM

CCB resumed the attack at 6:30 a.m. on March 4, moving forward against moderate resistance on the south, and heavy resistance on the north. Wallersheim and Budesheim were cleared of the enemy by noon and 2:00 p.m., respectively, representing an advance of four and one half kilometers. By late afternoon the high wooded ground three kilometers to the west of the Kyll River was secured. By 4:10 p.m. leading elements were at the edge of the woods one and one half kilometers west of the Kyll River opposite Lissingen. Further advances were halted by artillery, mortar, and anti-tank fire from east of the river. This action resulted in the command destroying five enemy tanks, six 88mm guns, and the capture of 70 prisoners of war.

CCA was released to Division control, and at 3:00 p.m., a movement was initiated to an assembly area west of the Prum River and north of CCB's zone. The 41st Cavalry was turned over to CCR on arrival at Buchet. The combat command closed in the Wescheid area at midnight, after being slowed down by intermittent rain and snow.

The 4th Infantry Division followed up the advance closely, scouring out the wooded areas and taking over the occupation of captured towns. Budesheim was reached at 6:50 p.m. by leading elements.

With CCA now available to the Division, plans were made in the afternoon for completion of the Division mission. Enemy action in the Lissingen indicated strong defensive positions east of the Kyll, in the vicinity of Gerolstein. The terrain here was also unfavorable, offensive action being canalized to a narrow valley dominated by a ridge on the east side of the river. The plan was directed toward more favorable crossing sites to the north, between Ober Bettingen and Nieder Bettingen. The plan directed CCB to hold its positions at Lissingen, with a skeleton force to assemble in the vicinity of Budensheim, and, on order, to renew its attack to the north and east, and seize the Bettingen crossings of the Kyll River. Hoping to seize a bridge intact by a quick surprise action, the 4th Infantry Division agreed to push their elements north of CCB rapidly eastward on March 5, in order to seize and secure two wooded hills north of the Oos River crossing. This assistance to the CCB attack was designed to preserve the element of surprise. Also, this was to avoid the bogging down of an armored thrust before the final objective was reached, through the necessity of making a preliminary river crossing. The support mission of Division Artillery remained unchanged. CCA was ordered forward to the Budesheim-Wallersheim area pending developments. Division troops were scheduled for a movement to Rommersheim.

Field Order No. 14 was received from VIII Corps at 11:20 p.m., directing an attack in the prescribed zone and the seizure of the west bank of the Rhine River from Andernach to Sinzig, both inclusive. The Thunderbolts were ordered to spearhead the attack by making a crossing of the Kyll River, and then advancing on a Budesheim-Kelberg-Mayen axis to capture Andernach. The Kyll River crossing was to be made in the 4th Infantry Division zone and in conjunction with them. They were also to assist the river crossing.

The 87th, 4th and 90th Infantry Divisions were to follow on a three-division front, assisting the 11th Armored Division where necessary, and clearing their respective zones north and south.

On March 5, CCB left a screen opposite Lissingen, and moved north from the Budesheim area, ready to move through the elements of the 4th Infantry Division after their capture of the two dominating hills just north of Oos. Company A, 22nd Tank Battalion was released from CCR, and returned to its parent battalion. The 4th Infantry Division attack failed to accomplish its assigned mission by noon. CCB sent a tank task force north to the Oos crossing. They found the bridge blown up. Automatic weapon and small arms fire prevented any engineer work at the site until the 4th Infantry Division could complete its mission. No by-pass could be located.

Late in the day the easternmost critical hill still remained to be captured by the infantry. Plans were made for renewing the attack at first light on the morning of March 6. The screening force left by CCB at Lissingen was passed through by the 90th Infantry Division late in the afternoon, as a result of a shift of boundaries to the north. This gave the 90th an opportunity to force the Gerolstein crossing site by suitable infantry action.

During the morning, Division Artillery moved forward to Budesheim. The bulk of the artillery was also brought forward and shifted to the north, where the full weight of all six battalions could be used to cover the planned crossing site at Bertingen.

On March 5, CCA moved to the Budesheim-Wallersheim area. The Division Command Post moved to Rommersheim by echelon in the morning of the same day. The 56th Armored Engineer Battalion followed to the same location. Gathering up trailing elements for the long push ahead, Trains Headquarters was moved to Hersheid, and the 133rd Ordnance Maintenance Battalion was moved to Prum. The problem of forcing a crossing of the Kyll River and then continuing rapidly to the east was discussed by telephone early in the evening between the 4th Infantry Division and VIII Corps Headquarters. A verbal modification of the Division's mission was arrived at. This involved seizing the high ground west of the river opposite the Bettingen sites, and assisting the 4th Infantry Division in the actual crossing. Consequently, at 11:30 p.m. Field Order No. 16 was issued, specifying that the Division was to secure the high ground on the west bank of the Kyll River, and then to pass through a bridgehead to be established by either the 4th or the 90th Infantry Division, and to attack East along the Kelberg-Mayen axis to capture Andernach. Combat commands were to be abreast with CCB on the right.

OBER BETTIGEN SEIZED

At 4:35 a.m. on March 6, the second critical hill north of Oos was occupied by elements of the 4th Infantry Division. CCB resumed its attack at 6:30 a.m. Task Force Sagaser doubled back to the west through Duppach, and then attacked northeast to seize Ober Bettingen at 3:00 p.m. The enemy blew the bridge over the Kyll River as troops entered the town. Moderate resistance and rain-soaked terrain were the principal obstacles enroute.

At least 200 men of the German 5th Parachute Division were dug in on the high ground across the river, and many of these men were armed with sniper rifles, limiting activity around the crossing site. However, shortly before dark dismounted infantry forded the river and forced the snipers out of their positions, to establish a small bridgehead. Task force Wingard captured Nieder Bettingen at 11:00 a.m. the same day by crossing an engineer constructed bridge at Oos, and attacking northeast through Roth and Kalenborn against only light to moderate resistance. At this point the bridge across the Kyll was found to be blown. Infantry elements waded the stream, establishing a bridgehead to the South near Dohm. Two medium tank companies also forded the river successfully, but the ford became impassable during the night.

Although a limited bridgehead had been established by each Task Force, neither could be expanded rapidly due to ruggedly wired-in positions and slushy; wet weather. Carefully laid abatis and elaborate anti-tank defenses including anti-tank ditches and mines all contributed to slowing down movement. The 5th Parachute Division defended the river line with fanatical fury, using heavy tank fire, anti-tank guns and mortars during the seizure of the crossing sites and the actual crossing.

Throughout the period, Division Artillery continued to support CCB, the main targets being enemy strong-points on the east bank of the Kyll River around Hiliesheim. Up to noon ,37 missions involving the expenditure of 886 rounds were fired. Throughout the afternoon and night constant concentrated fires were maintained to cover the crossings made.

The 4th Infantry Division following on foot was scheduled to relieve CCB, expand the established bridgeheads and build a bridge at Nieder Bettingen during the night of March 6 and 7. By midnight, troops for the relief had not arrived on the scene.

The Division Advance Command Post moved to Budesheim during the day, and CCR moved to Fleringen, arriving at 4:30 p.m. The 56th Engineer Battalion was directed to move to Oos early on March 7, to construct a bridge at Ober Bettingen.

At 8:00 p.m. that night word was received from VIII Corps stating that the 90th Infantry Division had captured Gerolstein. Work was immediately started on an alternate plan to pass CCA through the 90th Infantry Division, crossing the Kyll River at Lissingen. CCA went on a two-hour alert for this possible crossing. One platoon of Troop A, 41st Cavalry was dispatched at 11:00 p.m. to the bridge site, to ford the river and reconnoiter routes to the east. Meanwhile, the 90th Infantry Division engineers were constructing a bridge over the Kyll River at Lissingen. Throughout the night CCA engineers worked bridging craters in the road approaching the river west of Lissingen.

The 56th Armored Engineer Battalion worked feverishly during the early morning hours of March 7, 1945, to complete a bridge over the Kyll River at Ober Bettingen. The job was complicated by continuing wet weather, and the bridge was still not ready for traffic at midday.

Between three or four in the morning 4th Infantry Division units relieved elements of CCB on the side of the Kyll. The enemy counterattacked during the relief, but it was successfully repulsed. A task force consisting of infantry elements and two medium tank companies from CCB was organized. Their plan was to divert attention from the bridge construction going on at Ober Bettingen, so as to assist in expanding the bridgehead. The force was organized on the east side of the river opposite Dohm, and was to attack north to Hillesheim. However, completion of the bridge at Lissingen altered the situation. At 1:30 p.m., CCB was ordered to stop river crossing movements and to move south, following CCA across the Kyll River in the 90th Infantry Division zone.

GEROLSTEIN CAPTURED

With the capture of Gerolstein completed on March 6, the 90th Infantry Division was able to erect a Bailey bridge across the Kyll River at Lissingen during the night. At 6:00 a.m., CCA was ordered to march to the Lissingen bridge site, and to attack through the 90th Infantry Division bridgehead in the direction of Kelberg. Task Force Ahee of CCA had commenced crossing the bridge at 10:30 a.m. The combat command passed through the lines of the 90th Infantry Division along the Lissingen-Gerolstein-Pelm axis. Unceasing spasmodic rain and snow had made a swamp of the countryside. A road-block was by-passed at Pelm by taking an alternate route through Kerchweiler and Hinterweiler.

At 1:00 p.m., two miles East of Pelm, the first contact with the enemy was made. At Hinterweiler light resistance was encountered. At Dockweiler, where the breakthrough was started, heavy resistance was encountered, and 100 prisoners of war were taken. Mark VI and Mark IV tanks were destroyed, and a great many enemy infantry units were destroyed or by-passed. Dreis and Boxberg were taken against light to moderate resistance. However, the CCA Task Force Ahee at Kelberg was not having it so lightly. This critical road center on the master ridge between the Kyll and Rhine valleys was the last hope for an enemy stand. Fierce resistance in the form of nebelwerfer, mortar, automatic weapons, and antitank fire was encountered by the task force. Artillery was quickly brought forward, and additional infantry asked for, to continue the attack. A combined tank-infantry attack, supported by artillery, was launched immediately. At 6:20 p.m. the town was seized and a complete breakthrough completed.

Enemy losses in the action included four tanks, numerous wheeled vehicles and 207 men, compared with Division losses of five tanks and 14 casualties. Kelberg was cleared at 8:15 p.m. The night was pitch black, so CCA was directed to suspend the attack for the night, in the meantime bring up all trailing elements. Temporary defensive positions were posted around the town. Company B, 63rd Armored Infantry Battalion, was sent forward a mile to the east of Hunnerbach to seize stream crossings and establish a line of departure for the next day's operations.

CCA knocked out six German tanks and captured 800 prisoners of war during the day's operation. The PW's were evacuated through Division channels. Many hundreds of enemy troops who offered to surrender were waved to the rear for evacuation by the follow-up infantry division, as it was evident after the capture of Kelberg that the enemy was in a completely disorganized and in s a confused state. However, the Germans were still capable of inflicting casualties, which was proven by the action of an enemy anti-tank gun on the CCA's flank, which was passed by leading elements. Before the gun crew could be destroyed, it had knocked out several engineer vehicles, two light tanks, one medium tank and a halftrack of Task Force Brady.

During the afternoon, CCB withdrew all troops from the east side of the Kyll River, and assembled north of Budesheim. Leading elements started east from Budesheim for the Lissingen crossing about 4:00 p.m. to follow CCA. Movement was slowed down to a snail's pace because of the narrow one-road bottleneck, continuous rain, and the need for constant road repairs. After dark, vehicles had to be individually guided along the steep-banked river approach road in order to cross the several treadway bridged craters, slowing movement further.