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Over The Rhine

By Hal Steward

Corps Operational Directive No. 92 was received at 6:23 a.m., exacting plans for the regroupment of the Corps units and also directing preparations for a Rhine River crossing. The Thunderbolts were to hold the West bank of the river until relieved by elements of the XX Corps and after that to assemble in the general vicinity of Obermoschel-Meisenheim-Sobernheim and Bad Krenznach, in the Corps Reserve. Air operations, already well planned, were placed in charge of the 33rd Field Artillery Brigade. During the day, major units completed clearing operations in their assigned zones. CC A working from West to East, completed its zone at 3:00 p.m., establishing lateral contact with CC B and the 4th Armored Division to the North. CC B operated patrols along the West bank of the river and throughout its zone. The 94th Infantry Division relieved attached 41st Cavalry elements of a portion of the river front at 6:00 p.m. CC R completed its mission at 10:45 a.m., clearing 12 towns and considerable wooded area, plus rounding up an additional 123 prisoners of war.

The final plans for the proposed river crossing were outlined in XII Corps Field Order No. 17, which was received in the early evening. An attack across the Rhine River was directed to seize a bridgehead near Oppenheim. The 90th Infantry Division on the North flank was to simulate river-crossing preparations Northwest of Mainz. The 89th Infantry Division was directed to assemble in a concentration area Northwest of Oppenheim, and to be prepared to assist in expanding the 5th Infantry Division's bridgehead. Supporting the river crossing from the South flank was the 4th Armored Division. The order directed the Thunderbolts to move to a newly located assembly area near Alzey and to be prepared to cross the Rhine and attack to the Northeast.

 SURPRISE RIVER CROSSING

The surprise river-crossing at Oppenheim made by the 5th Infantry Division was progressing satisfactorily and by early morning of March 23, a full regiment had crossed the river in boats and temporary ferries.

Early the same day the Division was directed to relieve without delay the 4th Armored Division along the West bank of the Rhine South of the expanding bridgehead, while the 4th assembled on the Ease side of the Rhine. The Division was ordered to place Tank Destroyers and 76mm high velocity direct fire guns along the West bank so as to destroy any enemy floating demolitions that might destroy the bridge which was about to be constructed. By 6:00 p.m. the Division had completed the relief of the 4th Armored Division and assumed responsibility for its new sector.

Under cover of darkness Corps Engineers commenced construction of a pontoon bridge across the Rhine at Oppenheim.

At 5:00 a.m. on March 24, 1945, the XII Corps pontoon bridge was completed. Although considerably harassed by enemy air activity the 5th Infantry Division had managed to complete its crossing and by early morning one regiment of the 90th Infantry Division had crossed.

The Division continued to concentrate in the Alzey area, patrolling the West bank of the Rhine river in its zone and destroying by fire all floating objects that might have impaired the continuous operation of the Oppenheim bridge. At 11:15 a. m. the 11th Armored Division was released from XII Corps and passed to the control of XX Corps but the existing Division mission was to continue until such time as relief could be effected by XV Corps. The CC A command post opened at Winterscheid about 10:00 p.m. CC B continued patrolling the river line and the city of Worms without incident. CC R marched from Rockenhausen to the assembly area at Kirchheim Bolanden, arriving at 140:30 a.m., Division Artillery moved to Osthoffen at 12:30 a.m., with the 490th Armored Field Artillery Battalion trailing to Alsheim and the 492nd Armored Field Artillery Battalion to Horcheim.

On March 25 the Division continued the assigned river defense, bridge protection, and artillery support missions ordered initially by XII Corps. CC A elements were relieved by the 3rd Infantry Division during the morning, and the command concentrated on the maintenance of vehicles and rehabilitation of personnel. CC B, upon relief by the substituted 3rd Infantry Division, moved to the Framersheim area.

REACHING THE MAIN RIVER

By 7:00 p.m. word was received that the 4th Armored Division had broken through the 5th Infantry Division bridgehead and reached the Main River at Hanau and Aschaffenburg. The 6th Armored Division crossed the river during the day and made a drive toward Frankfurt. The Third Army continued its attack across the Rhine River to push to the Northeast. The XII Corps bridgehead across the Rhine was secured, and the attack was continuing to cross the Main River near Hanau. VIII Corps established a bridgehead across the Rhine River near Boppard and was driving to the East.

XX Corps Field Order No. 19, issued at 8:30 p.m. on March 26, directed an attack to establish a bridgehead between VIII and XII Corps in the vicinity of Mainz and to continue the advance to the Northeast toward Giessen. The 80th Infantry Division was named as the unit to make the assault crossing of both the Main and Rhine Rivers to establish the bridgehead.

During the afternoon the 80th Infantry Division successfully made its crossing of the Rhine near Mainz. Seventh Army's XV Corps also made crossings near Worms.

The Division completed maintenance and rehabilitation activities on March 27, and began preparations for the Rhine River crossing.

Operations Memo No. 45 was issued at 8:30 p.m. covering the protection of bridges to be built at Mainz and Gustavsburg and preparations to pass through the 65th Infantry Division on Corps order.

To accomplish this mission, CC B and CC A were constituted as two balanced and artillery supported combat commands. The 41st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron and 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion were teamed as a Cavalry Command for the bridge protection mission and placed directly under Division control.

On the same day the First Army armored elements broke through the Remagen bridgehead to the North and reached Giessen. VIII and XII Corps made limited progress. Stiff opposition was encountered by the 80th Infantry Division on the East bank of the Rhine opposing Mainz and they were unable to clear the bridge site even from small arms fire.

March 28 found the 80th Infantry Division slowly expanding its bridgehead across the Rhine River near Mainz. Scheduled bridging operations on both the Rhine and Mainz Rivers were delayed as stubborn resistance, including artillery and small arms fire, continued to hinder advancement. The bridge across the Rhine was started at 4:30 a.m. but little progress was made and completion time estimates were periodically pushed ahead during the day.

Meanwhile the Division received verbal instructions from XX Corps at 9:45 a.m. to have a combat command ready to start crossing the XII Corps bridge at Oppenheim at midday, thereafter to swing North to an assembly area near Bischofsheim and prepare to cross a proposed bridge over the Mainz River in that vicinity. Corps also attached the 261st Regimental Combat Team of the 65th Infantry Division to Division and cancelled the previously assigned mission of protecting Corps bridges from ground or waterborne attack.

Under the plan the balance of the Division was to cross the Mainz bridge upon its completion and to reassemble East of the Rhine and North of the Mainz Rivers, prepare to pass through leading infantry division elements, for an attack to the Northeast in the direction of Wiesbaden and Grunberg.

CC A, with the 490th Armored Field Artillery Battalion attached, was directed to cross the Rhine at Oppenheim, the column started marching at 11:30 a.m. and leading elements reached the bridge at 12:15 a.m. They then began coiling off the road between Boschofsheim and Ginsheim to await the completion of the Main River bridge. Estimates of its completion varied widely and at 6:15 p.m. all elements closed in the Bischofsheim area. The Division was released from attachment to XX Corps and was again attached to XII Corps. The 261st Regimental Combat Team reverted to 65th Infantry Division control.

TO HANAU

At 8:45 p.m. CC A was warned to be prepared to march immediately on Hanau, as XII Corps developed plans to pass the Division through a bridgehead being established by the 26th Infantry Division over the Main River in that vicinity. Other major units were informed of existing plans and warned to be prepared to march early on March 29, following the axis of CC A. Shortly before midnight, CC A was directed to march as soon as possible through Darmstadt to the vicinity of Hanau, to establish contact with the 26th Infantry Division, and to attack Northeast along the main road axis in the general direction of Fulda.

The complete plan for the action in which the Division was to engage was set forth in Operational Directive No. 98, issued by XII Corps at midnight of March 28. With the 11th Armored Division and the 4th Armored Division abreast again an advance to the Northeast was laid out. The 4th, from North of the Main River on the left, was assigned the objective of Lauterbach, with the 90th Infantry Division following in support. The 11th Armored Division was to cross the Main River near Hanau and advance to the Northeast through the 26th Infantry Division bridgehead toward the main objective of an area Northwest of Fulda. The 26th Infantry Division, with the 71st Infantry Division, formerly in Corps reserve, was to clear the enemy from a zone behind the 11th Armored Division. The 2nd Cavalry Group was to move on the Right of the Thunderbolts to screen and protect the Corps flank.

The entire zone of operation assigned the Division, which was 70 kilometers long and 15 kilometers wide, contained only one first-class road running in a favorable direction. The terrain, although initially flat Rhine valley land, soon rose abruptly across a wooded hill mass, and thereafter roads and ridges crossed the zone in a series of transverse corridors. The only good corridor was up the Kinzig River valley on the South flank as far as Schluchtern and then down the Fleide River valley toward Fulda. A decision was made to attack in a single column up the only favorable corridor in the Division zone with another column prepared to branch off and operate to the North if determined resistance developed.

Operations Memo No. 47 was issued by the Division at 1:00 a.m. on March 29, specifying a single column advance on the Hanau-Fulda axis with CC A leading. It was originally planned that CC B would follow CC A's axis, outflanking any resistance encountered by CC A. The 183rd Field Artillery Group was placed in support of CC A and Division Artillery supporting CC B.

Leaving their temporary assembly position near Bischofsheim leading elements of CC A inaugurated a blackout march to an assembly area from which to cross the Main River at the first light of morning. At 6:00 a.m. leading elements of CC A crossed the Main River at Grossanheim, passing through the 26th Infantry Division at 7:05 a.m. Task Force Ahee made the first contact at 7:15 a.m. when a roadblock in a heavily wooded area just Northeast of Hanau was encountered. The roadblock was mined and defended by infantry and panzerfaust teams but defending troops were overcome at 7:50 a.m. and the advance continued while engineers removed the roadblock.

Resistance which included anti-tank, panzerfaust, automatic weapons and small arms fire was met at Ruckingen about 8:20 a.m., so Task Force Ahee was split up into two teams which attacked the city simultaneously from the South and Southeast. House-to-house fighting developed and continued until 2:00 p.m. when the enemy was overcome at the expense of two tanks and several casualties.

Task Force Brady, which was under order to clear the Main River bridge as soon as possible so as to permit the advance of trailing units of the Division, by-passed leading elements of CC A to the North. and returned to the main axis of advance at Langenselbold where the column was halted by anti-tank, mortar and artillery fire. At 3:00 p.m. this resistance had been reduced, a damaged bridge repaired, and the city cleared and occupied.

By this time Task Force Ahee had advanced along the main axis into Langenselbold after by-passing a blown bridge. Task Force Brady, while pushing forward to Rothenbergen was again halted by enemy infantry, supported by three tanks. Temporary defensive positions were organized for the night after small-scale counterattacks had been diminished. The remainder of the command assembled near Langenselbold where the command post was established. CC B started to march across the Rhine River at 6:00 a.m., reaching the Oppenheim bridge an hour later. Slowly tailing CC A's column, which was periodically halted by enemy action, the command reached Darmstadt and Wessel at 10:45 a.m., thereafter coiling off the road near Jugesheim to await movement by CC A. Movement was resumed again about 2:00 p.m. after refueling and feeding and the command crossed the Main River at 3:00 p.m.

CC B was ordered to turn North at a road junction in the woods just West of Ruckingen and attack on a parallel axis to the Northeast as CC A was unable to make rapid progress.

The Division's remaining elements followed CC A and CC B. The Cavalry Command reached Klein Auheim at 9:00 p.m. and CC R reached Hainstadt at 9:30 p.m., thus bringing the remaining combat elements up to the West bank of the Main River ready to cross early the following day.

ASSAULT ON ROTHENBERGEN

CC A resumed its assault on Rothenbergen at 6:15 a.m. on March 30, 1945, with dismounted infantry, and encountered immediate resistance. This resistance was reduced by 8:10 a.m. after the attacking force had been reinforced by Company A, 42nd Tank Battalion. Proceeding further against light resistance CC A seized Lieblos at 10:00 a.m. and cavalry elements of the command, on the South flank, reached Niedermittau at 10:15 a.m. When stiff opposition developed at Roth it became apparent that the enemy would defend Gelnhausen powerfully and the favorable terrain where the Kinzig River valley funneled down to a narrow canyon through the mountainous Budingerwald.

At this point an urgent request was made for more infantry and the 55th Armored Infantry Battalion was attached to CC A at 11:00 a.m. It was estimated that the Gelnhausen position was held by 600 infantrymen and supported by five tanks. Artillery was sent forward and went into positions in an effort to erase the enemy fire. A plan was formulated for the combined use of the 63rd and 55th Armored Infantry Battalions so as to force the enemy by dismounted infantry. The 63rd was committed frontally by the vicinity of Roth; captured about 1:00 p.m., meanwhile dismounted elements of the 55th were sent up on high ground and through the weeds of Gelnhausen in an effort to outflank the enemy force and attack the town from dominating positions. Most of the afternoon went by while the 55th was moving into position.

Alternate Division measures were resorted to when, by mid-afternoon, it became apparent that CC A would not be able to crack the Gelnhausen position in time to maintain any momentum behind the attack. A regiment of the 26th Infantry Division was arranged for to take over this action. The Cavalry Command was ordered through an alternate break in the mountains of Budinger Wald. CC R was directed to resume control of the 55th Armored Infantry Battalion and to block at Gelnhausen while CC A disengaged and prepared to follow the cavalry.

Meanwhile CC B renewed its advance at 6:30 a.m. and seized Huttengessas at 8:45 a.m. Their progress was impeded by an extremely bad road net, and well placed booby-trap road-blocks which were covered by fire. The command proceeded North through Budingen without opposition but a massive roadblock in a wooded area East of the town halted the column until 3:00 p.m. when the villages of Wolferborn and Rinderburgen were seized. Pushing forward against light resistance at 6:40 p.m. and there the command coiled for the night and the command post was established.

Cavalry Command commenced movement at 6:30 a.m., crossing the Main River and proceeding to Langenselhold where it coiled at 11:20 a.m. When CC A's advance was halted at Gelnhausen orders went out to the Cavalry Command to advance immediately on the Haingrundau-Breitenborn-Wittgenborn axis to Schlierbach in an attempt to bypass Gelnhausen and get behind the defending force. The command moved out from Nieder Grundau at 2:30 p.m., reaching Haingrundau three hours later. Resistance was nil and after a rapid advance Breitenborn was cleared at 5:30 p.m. and advance elements reached the outskirts of Schlierbach at 7:10 p.m. The command assembled in the area of Schlierbach-Wittgenborn for the night.

CC R crossed the Main River at 7:00 a.m., following CC B to Huttengessas. CC R had been ordered to assume control of the 55th Armored Infantry Battalion and then to contain the enemy force at Gelnhausen, protecting the rear and right flank of the Division until relieved later. The command moved to Mittel Grundau late in the day so as to insure control over the Gelnhausen situation.

All remaining units of the Division completed crossing of the Main River during the day. The 133rd Ordnance Maintenance Battalion was sent forward to Hanau and the 81st Medical Battalion assembled in Langenselbold. Train Headquarters command post opened at Ruckingen at 4:00 p.m.

Verbal orders for the continuation of the Division plan were received and the attack Northeast of Fulda to seize the high ground Northeast of Grossentaft was laid out.

CC B resumed the attack at 5:30 a.m. on March 31, 1945, pushing quickly from Nieder Seemen and reaching Ober Seemen at 6:30 a.m., Volkartsheim at 6:35 a.m. and Nieder Moos at 7:30 a.m. Although slight enemy resistance was encountered at Reichlos the village was cleared by 8:00 a.m. The advance guard lost one vehicle near Hauswerz when two enemy tanks were encountered and a fire-fight ensued. Supporting XIX Tactical Air Command Fighter-bombers severely damaged Bauswerz and Ober Moos and left the towns blazing. CC B advanced rapidly following the air strike, reaching Geisel at 11:50 a.m. and dominating terrain West of Fulda at 1:15 p.m. While patrols were feeling out resistance in the city of Fulda in preparation for an attack orders were delivered covering the continuation of the attack to the Northeast. Turning North the command proceeded to Grossenluder, arriving at 5:30 p.m. The post was established there at 7:00 p.m.

CC A's cavalry moved out at 5:30 a.m. following the route opened the previous day by the Cavalry Command. A brief delay North of Wittgenborn occurred two hours later from road blocks and small arms fire. The block was cleared and the resistance neutralized by 8:20 a.m. allowing the column to proceed. Anti-tank, mortar, automatic weapons and small arms fire was encountered at Hellstein at 10:15 a.m. after the column had passed through Soielberg and Streitburg without hindrance. The town was cleared in an hour and the advance resumed through Undenhain.

A further enemy strong point was liquidated near Karholsichwillenroth at 12: 30 a.m. and the advance renewed through Eckardaroth, Romsrhal, Kebersdorf and Sarrod. Resistance met at Ulmbach at 2:00 p.m. was reduced in 45 minutes. Between Kressenbach and Breitenbach n enemy tank and self-propelled gun were destroyed. In the towns of Wallroth and Muldorf the command was slowed by enemy tanks, anti-tank, mortar and small arms fire. Numerous enemy infantry made direct support artillery fire imperative, followed by house-to-house dismounted action. Both towns were cleared by 4:00 p.m. CC A destroyed a total of six enemy tanks and eight miscellaneous vehicles during the day and captured a total of 80 enemy prisoners of war. Its total losses included one M-4 tank and one halftrack.

CC R held enemy forces in Gelnhausen until 11:00 a.m. when they were relieved by the 104th Infantry Regiment, 26th Infantry Division. At midday the command resumed the march, following CC A and assembling for the night at Reichlos. CC R, following CC A and blocking the Southeast flank, moved to Marborn.

Early in the evening orders were brought in from XII Corps involving a complete change of plans for the following day. An advance via Meiningen over the Thuringia Wald was ordered to seize the communications centers of Armstadt and Kranichfeld. This was part of the Corps effort to seize the High German Command and the key German political figures.

Quickly summarizing the damage inflicted on the enemy during the month of March we find the comparative figures paid in men and materiel startling and revealing.

COMPARATIVE CASUALTIES

Enemy killed and wounded amounted to 2,572, plus 21,001 prisoners of war, totaling 23,573 casualties. Our own total battle casualties were 655—164 of which were killed in action, 488 wounded, and three missing. The enemy figure for prisoners represents the number processed through Division PW Cages. A total of at least 23,537 prisoners were actually captured, however, 2,537 of these were turned over to the following infantry units for processing and evacuation.

Total casualties for vehicles and weapons presented an even more starting comparison. Enemy casualties amounted to 14,977 against our own 85. In addition to mentioned destroyed enemy materiel the fast-moving columns of the Division further crippled Germanys capacity to continue the war by destroying warehouses stocking Wehrmacht food, enemy ordnance factories, enemy hospitals and numerous miscellaneous plans operating in support of the German Army.

During the month approximately 1,000 reinforcements kept the Division's strength up to 620 officers and 10,206 enlisted men. Critical materiel, constantly replaced, kept the Division strength high. Division Artillery fired approximately 16,000 rounds of ammunition in 675 separate missions, inflicting extensive damage on the enemy.

The Division had made a 300-kilometer advance in direct ground contact with the enemy. A total of over 450 kilometers of movement during the month, or an average of 15 kilometers per day, illustrated the long-term mobility capabilities of an armored division.

ADVANCE TOWARD ARNSTADT

According to the plan received from XII Corps on March 31, certain communication centers in the area were selected as objectives. The 4th Armored Division was to attack Northeast and then Southeast along an autobahn, around the North end of the Thuringia Wald to seize Gotha and Ohrdruf. The 11th Armored Division, abreast of the 4th Armored Division and on the South flank, was directed to advance by the most direct routes to the Northeast via Meiningen over the wooded Thuringia Wald hill mass, bypassing all resistance, to seize Arnstadt and Kranichfeld. The Thunderbolts were once again confronted with an operation zone offering but a limited secondary road net, perpendicular corridors, and both the Werra River and a mountain range to cross. The city of Fulda and wooded hill area Northwest and North of it were still being strongly held by the enemy, therefore, it was found advisable to bottleneck the entire division through the one open road in the 90th Infantry Division zone to the Northwest as far as Schiltz.

CC B, the first major unit to be affected, situated on the North, was ordered to advance along an axis East from Schiltz, by-pass Meiningen on the North, and seize Arnstadt. Division Artillery was directed to support CC B, and CC R following along the Northern axis. CC A, following CC R until reaching the vicinity of Hilders, was ordered to advance on a parallel Southern axis and seize Kranichfeld. The 183rd Field Artillery Group was directed to support CC A, and Cavalry Command to follow along the Southern open-flank axis. All division troops were directed to proceed along the CC B axis.

CC A, commencing movement at 9:15 a.m. on April 1, followed CC R along the single axis of advance until Ober Nust was reached late in the afternoon. CC A trains were attacked near Wallroth at 12:35 a.m. but the enemy was driven off with no casualties inflicted to the command. Task Force Ahee's advance was harassed between Mackenzell and Gotthards by mortar and small arms fire from high wooded hills adjacent to the route of advance. Branching South at Ober Nust the first contact was made, and the enemy quickly overcome at Mahlerts. At 5:00 p m. Hilders had been seized and Frankenheim and Reichenhausen fell after scattered light resistance.

During the day Division Artillery and the 183rd Field Artillery Group supported CC B and CC A, respectively. CC R and Cavalry Command, advancing behind CC B and CC A, respectively, were occupied with clearing towns and woods along the routes of advance throughout the day. CC R gathered an approximate 400 prisoners of war and turned them over to the 90th Infantry Division at Schiltz. CC B resumed the advance at 6:30 a.m., marching North as far as Schiltz. Turning East, scattered enemy groups situated in towns and wooded hills along the route slowed the column with stubborn action. Mackenzell was reached at 8:45 a.m., thereafter pushing rapidly forward to Ober Nust which was reached at 10:50 a.m.

The first contact was made with the enemy defending Lahrbach shortly after 11:00 am. Fighter-bombers of the XIX Tactical Air Command softened the attack on Lahrbach, leaving it in flames. CC B then commenced the advance through the town. One hundred enemy soldiers were estimated killed in the action. Others, totaling 259, dazed by the combined armored-air attack, surrendered hopelessly. Several general purpose vehicles and 20 to 25 horse-drawn artillery pieces were knocked our in this action. The command then proceeded further along the sniper-infested route and at Hundsbach anti-tank, mortar, and small arms fire was encountered. The town was completely destroyed after air, artillery, and tank fire eliminated all resistance. As Kaltenwestheim was neared a little after mid-day, heavy artillery and mortar fire was poured from the surrounding hills onto the advancing CC B. Here all units were halted for re-supply of fuel and ammunition while the artillery went into position and destroyed or dispersed the enemy.

The advance continued as far as Kalrensundheim where CC B established a command post and temporary defensive positions were organized for the night. During the day CC B had advanced 35 miles and taken about 1,000 prisoners of war.

During the last day of March and April 1, the Division had outdistanced its supporting infantry by over 60 kilometers. Meanwhile, far to the West near Gelnhausen, by-passed enemy groups had returned to ambush positions from secluded wooded areas and were greatly harassing and threatening the Corps rear. As a result, a TWX received from XII Corps ordered the Division to restrain its operations West of a North-South line through Meiningen.

On April 2, after the experience of the previous day, a number of precautionary measures were taken and orders issued. To increase the Division's flank protection Troop C, 41st Cavalry, was attached to CC B and the remainder of Cavalry Command was placed under direct control of CC A.

Division Artillery was directed to maintain air patrols on the South flank between Fulda and Ostheim and on the North between Schmalkalden and Geisa for early warning of any attempted flank attack. Company D, 22nd Tank Battalion, was placed under Division control to escort Division trains on their long haul from supply installations through by-passed enemy pockets to the forward combat elements.

ACROSS THE WERRA RIVER

CC B, jumping off at 7:00 a.m. on April 2, advanced rapidly, reaching Aschenhausen, Ober Karz and Unterkats by 8:00 a.m. Leading elements of the command seized Mehmeis at 9:25 a.m. Advanced elements found a bridge blown over the Werra River at Wasungen. A Division order was received directing CC B to establish a bridgehead and repair the crossing of the Werra River. Work on the pontoon bridge was initiated at 11:30 a.m., after elements of the 21st Armored Infantry Battalion forded the river to establish a small bridgehead. At 5:45 p.m. the bridge was completed and the remainder of the 21st Armored Infantry Battalion, plus an attached medium tank company, crossed the river at 8:00 p.m. thus deepening the bridgehead and setting the stage for resuming the attack.

Resuming the attack at 7:00 a.m., CC A gained 21 kilometers against light enemy resistance during the day. The command followed the Schafhausen-Gerthausen-Wohl-Muthausen-Betrlenhausen-Hazelbach-Hennergerg-Bauerbach-Ritschenhausen axis. One German Mark V and one Mark III were engaged and destroyed near Berrenhausen.

CC A's mission of securing the heights West of the Werra River near Grimmenthal was changed at 9:30 a.m. to seizing all available bridges across the Werra near Rirschenhausen and establishing a bridgehead for further use. Although under fire, Task Force Ahee seized intact three bridges across the Werra and tributary rivers near Grimmenthal and a small bridgehead established by 11:15 a.m. Untermassfeld was seized and secured by 1:30 p.m. Both Untermassfeld and Obermassfeld were held under heavy nebelwerfer fire throughout the afternoon. From a Grimmenthal camp CC A liberated 400 Allied prisoners of war, most of whom were crippled. In preparation for the following day's action a reinforced infantry company was sent East to Vachdorf late in the afternoon to seize and hold a bridge over the Werra. This mission was accomplished at 8:15 p.m.

CC R moved to the vicinity of Unterweid at 9:15 a.m. and placed the 22nd Tank Battalion in positions covering the Division rear. The day was mainly devoted to clearing previously by-passed towns and handling prisoners along the CC B route of advance.

During the day the 4rh Armored Division to the North, reached the Werra River also to find all bridges blown by the retreating enemy.

CC B continued the advance at 7:00 a.m. on April 3, pushing rapidly forward through Metzels, Christes, and Breitenbach. The few remaining, disorganized defenders were quickly overrun and the command advanced through Springscille, reaching Steinbach-Hallenberg at 11:10 a.m.

As the command climbed to Ober Schonau heavier resistance in the form of Panzerfaust and small arms fire developed. The town was cleared and the advance continued at 11:30 a.m. The route of advance from Ober Schonau to Oberhof was along a winding mountain road climbing steeply through a heavily wooded gorge. Two massive roadblocks, which were heavily defended by panzerfaust teams and small-arms, took the entire afternoon to liquidate. Dismounted elements of the 21st Armored Infantry Battalion advanced on Oberhof through a driving snowstorm to seize this road center on the crest of the Thuringia Wald. The 41st Tank Battalion followed and the city was cleared of snipers by 11:00 p.m. Artillery elements of the command remained in place between Ober Schonau and Oberhof during the night. The command's cavalry elements, in the meantime operating on the North flank overcame light resistance to seize the large town of Schmalkalden during the afternoon.

ADVANCE LIGHTLY CONTESTED

CC A's cavalry moved out at 6:00 a.m., followed by the main body at 7:00 am. The advance was lightly contested but by 9:20 a.m. the towns of Oberstadt, Marisfels, and Suhler Neundorf were all cleared of the enemy. As the advanced elements emerged from the woods one and a half kilometers from Suhl considerable resistance was encountered. Divided into three columns for a coordinated attack on the city, progress was slowed by anti-tank, artillery, panzerfaust, automatic weapon and small arms fire. Upon seizing dominating heights overlooking the city, it was subjected to heavy concentrations of tank and massed artillery fire.

The defending enemy force which was made up of an estimated 600 Volkssturm, augmented by a few regular Wehrmacht personnel, strongly contested progress from behind roadblocks and in buildings. Into the Southwestern position of the city moved infantry elements and tanks 2nd the defenders were cleared out in bitter street and house-to-house fighting which continued long after dark. Several supporting missions were flown by the XIX Tactical Air Command on this day of April 3. The main air strike of the day occurred in the afternoon when a retreating column of approximately 200 enemy vehicles were strafed along the highway and at least 40 destroyed.

Following CC B's axis of advance, CC R left Unterweid at 10:00 a.m. and marched to Ober Karz. As the progress of CC B allowed another abound to be made, the command was ordered to clear towns forward to Sreinbach-Hallenberg during the early afternoon. While clearing the area elements of the 22nd Tank Battalion engaged and destroyed one German Tiger tank one kilometer Southeast of Stepferhausen.

Preceding CC R, the Division command post followed CC B's route to Steinbach-Hallenberg, after a temporary stop at Metzels. Division troops and trains followed closely behind CC R. The 133rd Ordnance Maintenance Battalion moved to Metzels and the 81st Armored Medical Battalion moved to Herges Heleinberg as trailing elements closed into an area where protection could be afforded by CC R.

The Division's advance to the crest of the Thuringia Wald during the day placed it further East than any other United States Army unit in Germany. Until the following day it was not apparent that the location of the bulk of the Division in the heart of Nazi-land actually surrounded a German Army, small-arms manufacturing center until factory after factory was uncovered the following day.

During the day the 4th Armored Division crossed bridges constructed over the Werra River to the North and made further advances along the autobahn toward their final objective. CC A advance elements reach6d Hastrungsfeld and CC B a point five kilometers Northwest of Gotha.

Operational Directive No. 101 was received from Headquarters XII Corps at 5:30 a.m. on April 4, 1945, designating the limit of Corps Eastern advance as a Gotha-Suhl line. The 4th Armored Division on the North was directed to seize and hold Gotha and Ohrdruf. The 26th Infantry Division assignment was a separate zone between the 4th and 11th Armored Divisions for clearance. The Thunderbolts were ordered to hold Suhl and Oberhof, and thereafter to patrol to the East as far as a line from Grafenroda to Gehren. The Division was also ordered to clear the enemy from its zone West of the Oberhof-Suhl line and protect Corps right flank East of Fulda. The Division therefore was stopped short of its original objective and found its offensive mission had been substantially completed.

The Division still undertook, on its own initiative, the task of securing the crest of Thuringia Wald on the South flank. CC A was ordered to seize Stutzerbach while CC B's mission was the securement of Oberhof. CC R was directed to clear the zone between CC A and CC B, including the arms manufacturing center of Zella-Mehlis. Division Artillery continued to flank air patrols and support major unit operations along with the 183rd Field Artillery Groups. The 56th Armored Engineer Battalion was to secure the Wasungen and Grimenchal bridges over the Werra River. Just before renewing the offensive operations originally planned for the day, CC B was held up and the task of clearing enemy from its zone was undertaken. During the day the enemy rained Oberhof with sporadic artillery, mortar, and nebelwerfer fire. Patrols scouting on the North and East made close contacts with the enemy.

CC A planned its own operation, this being to open a direct lateral route to the bulk of the Division. This plan was approved at Division Headquarters with the exception that the forces were not to proceed further North of Benhausen where contact with elements of CC R was directed. CC A continued its clearance of Suhl while cavalry and tank destroyer elements patrolled the Division South flank. The majority of resistance was met on the outskirts of the town where small arms fire was met in considerable volume. Volkssturm sniping troops, in civilian clothes and with no distinguishing armbands, delayed the action to some extent.

After repeated reports of this type of resistance had been received orders were issued to burn the town, but these orders were reclassified after the commanding general of CC A flew to the Division command post and explained that such an order could nor be executed. The area was reported cleared at 6:55 p.m. An estimated 5,000 mixed nationality slave workers who manned arms factories in the town, pilfered and looted, destroying considerable property after they had been liberated.

CC R mopped up in the Steinbach-Hallenberg area during the morning. A two-column advance on Zella-Mehlis was initiated at 2:00 p.m. Roadblocks, found undefended, felled trees, and debris-littered roads delayed the advance. The command was greeted by white flags when it entered Zella-Mehlis at 4:00 p.m. Contact was later established with elements of CC A at Benshausen and Suhl but an attempt to make contact with CC B along a road to Oberhof was unsuccessful.

The 56rh Armored Engineer Battalion and supporting units established and maintained company guards at the important bridges over the Werra River at Wasungen and Grimenthal.

The 4th Armored Division to the North captured Gotha at noon and passed to control of the VIII Corps.

MUNITIONS PRIZE

With the capture of Suhl, Zella-Mehlis, and several surrounding smaller Thuringia towns, one of the largest munitions industry prizes of the war fell to the Thunderbolts. Included among them was the famed Walther Arms Works. A capitulation of the arms, armament parts, and materiel seized in the area included: Pistols, P38—1,600; 7.65mm— 4,600; Signal—598; 22 cal.—325. Sniper rifles and scopes complete—2,210; scopes incomplete—4,420; rifles partly assembled—1,140; 113 lathes, 97 milling machines, 41 drill presses, nine punch presses, two hydraulic presses, and 40 grinders. At least 500 new type enemy carbines and 2,500 Burp guns with sufficient parts for an additional 5,000 were uncovered at Suhl. Over a million rounds of small arms ammunition were included. This material was found in several large plants and over 50 small, decentralized plants. In addition to weapons, several of these factories produced parts of robot aircraft.

CC R renewed its effort to establish lateral contact with CC B during the early morning of April 5. A small task force was successful in breaking through to Oberhof after reducing three roadblocks. The bulk of the command, which had been organized into two forces, moved toward Meiningen from Zella Mehlis at 11:30 a.m. The 22nd Tank Battalion with an additional infantry company moved along the Rohr-Meiningen axis and on reaching the airport was encountered by dug-in panzerfaust crews and infantry. After a bitter fight the airport was seized at 3:00 p.m. and the battalion advanced to the East edge of Meiningen against small arms fire.

 ALLIED PRISONERS LIBERATED

The 55th Armored Infantry Battalion, plus a medium tank company, meanwhile moved on the axis Kuhndorf-Helba to Meiningen. Three roadblocks, defended with small arms fire, automatic weapons, and panzerfaust, delayed the action. In the absence of artillery, Meiningen was attacked by fighter-bombers of the XIX Tactical Air Command to soften evidently determined resistance. Immediately after the air strike both task forces fought their way into Meiningen. Once in the city a hospital containing 470 Allied prisoners of war was liberated and seven German hospitals with 1,600 patients were captured. The city was cleared by 7:00 p.m. and 600 prisoners of war were taken, including students at the Wehrmacht Non-Commissioned Officer and Officer Candidate Schools. A guard was placed on a camp containing some 500 political prisoners in Unter Massfeld. Later in the afternoon a FW 190 landed at the airport in error and the pilot surrendered with disgust. CC R troops were relieved shortly after 7:00 p.m. when a battalion of the 26th Infantry Division, 101st Infantry Regiment reached the town from the West.

While clearing and occupying additional small towns in the zone CC R killed an estimated 100 enemy troops and captured 2,200 prisoners during the day. Destroyed enemy materiel included six half-tracks, two 75mm anti-tank guns, two 20mm guns and three general-purpose vehicles. The Command's losses included one killed, 13 wounded, and two medium tanks destroyed.

CC A renewed attempts to capture Schmiedefeld and Srurzerbach at 7:00 a.m., April 5. Quick advance was made until the head of the valley near Goldlauter was reached and there enemy resistance stiffened and two defended roadblocks on dominating wooded terrain delayed progress. The enemy withdrew when dismounted infantry outflanked the position. Progress was further halted Northwest of Schmiedefeld with strong opposition from the high ground.

Further dismounted action was taken but automatic weapon and nebelwerfer fire was so heavy only limited progress could be made, and at nightfall the bulk of the force withdrew to Suhl.

Before daylight enemy activity East of Oberhof indicated the enemy may be preparing for a counter attack but no action developed. Division Artillery fired several neutralizing missions to eliminate sporadic enemy mortar and artillery fire that fell on Oberhof during the day.

The Division command post moved out of Steinbach Hallenberg to Zella Mehlis during the day, opening about 10:30 a.m.

At 6:10 p.m., XII Corps advised the Division to expect a change in plans and relief of some units by the 26th Infantry Division. Corps also indicated another impending advance, probably in a southerly direction, therefore CC B and CC A were directed to cease offensive action and warned to expect new orders.

While awaiting the new orders, the Division spent the morning of April 6 in regrouping and maintenance work. Advance parties of the 26th and 90th Infantry Division made relief arrangements with major units.

The principal obstacles to the Division's 80-kilometer advance East from Fulda were constituted of defended towns blown bridges, and well-placed roadblocks. The 4,500 prisoners of war taken during the first five days of April came mainly from replacement battalions, training battalions, antiaircraft units, hastily assembled school troops Volksstrum and belligerent civilians added to the list.

Nearly 1,000 Allied prisoners were liberated in the Division's drive, and several thousand political prisoners and Allied nationality slave workers set free from their Nazi Taskmasters. The continued looting, rioting, and general disorder of these liberated groups became such a problem that combat elements had to step in, in an attempt to eliminate it.

Field Order No. 18 from XII Corps Headquarters was received at 1:25 p.m. This outlined plans for a continuation of the advance to the East and Southeast, while VIII Corps on the North maintained a limited advance directly East. XII Corps planned to turn to the Southeast and attack through the Thuringia Wald as far as the Czechoslovakian border with the 26th and 90th Divisions abreast. The 71st Infantry Division on the South flank was ordered to protect the Corps South flank West of Meiningen and was assigned to clear a zone in the rear of the 11th Armored Division attack to the Southeast.

When relieved by the 26th Infantry Division, the 11th Division was directed to seize an assembly area along a line Schleusingen-Hillburghausen, not later than April 8, and then prepare to advance toward Bayreuth.

The remainder of the day was spent in preparing the advance of the following day. The 26th Infantry Division meanwhile, completed the relief of CC A and CC R and assumed responsibility for the Southern portion of the former Division zone. Elements of the 90th Infantry Division relieved CC B at Oberhof. The command of CC B was taken over about mid-afternoon by Colonel Wesley W. Yale.

ATTACK ANTICIPATED

During the afternoon an enemy field order was seized. It indicated that the German 413th Infantry Division was about to counterattack on the Division South flank in the vicinity to retake Meiningen and cut the Division's main supply route. As such an attack would endanger the Grimenthal bridge, elements of CC R were sent immediately to the scene. The counterattack did not materialize in force but a roadblock defended with anti-tank guns near Ritschenhausen cost CC R Infantry elements one 105mm SP gun. CC R withdrew its force and augmented engineer defensive positions around the bridge site. Radio relay stations were established to warn the Division lest any threat should develop from the Bauerbach area.

At 7:00 a.m. on April 7, the Division initiated movement to seize an assembly area in the Themar section. CC A, CC R, and Cavalry Command moved out on separate routes. Organized in three balanced task forces, CC A advanced on Schleusingen, Hildburghausen, and Themar, respectively. Task Force Sheely, on the route to Hildburghausen, encountered anti-tank, artillery and roadblocks. Task Force Ahee, on the right, had reduced a roadblock and was attacking Themar; Task Force Sheely, on the left, was attacking Schleusingen; and Task Force Brady in the center was within seven kilometers of Hildburghausen. All forces were meeting increased resistance. The opposition in Themar and Schleusingen consisted primarily of small arms, anti-tank, and panzerfaust fire from enemy infantry dug in cellars and houses. At 2:30 p.m. Task Force Brady was delayed by a blown bridge and roadblock at Ebenhards, but the block was reduced and they had the town cleared at 4:00 p.m.

Fighter-bomber support was used in clearing the route into Hildburghausen and to soften the city itself. Task Force Brady continued into Hildburghausen against light opposition and reported the center of the city cleared at 8:S5 p.m. Schleusingen was cleared by 4:30 p.m. after Task Force Shelly had been forced to house-to-house fighting against stubborn resistance.

Task Force Ahee, after losing five tanks to anti-tank fire in an unsuccessful attack on Themar, employed artillery and dismounted infantry in a house-to-house mopping up of the city.

After CC R had reached its objective in mid-afternoon, the Division ordered Company B, 55th Armored Infantry Battalion, to assist in the mop-up of Themar. The task was completed at 8:00 p.m. and Company B released to CC R. The 183rd Field Artillery Group followed and supported CC A. During the day CC A seized and cleared eight towns; capturing more than 450 prisoners of war.

CC R encountered only light resistance. The towns of Vachdorf, Leutersdorf, and Henfstadt were occupied by 11:00 a.m. thus completing the command's mission. Reports of a large enemy build-up to the East in the vicinity of Schniedefeld for a counter-attack on Suhl were relayed to CC R with directions to maintain contact with elements of the 26th Infantry Division and to stop any such threat should it actually develop. Late in the day the command received enemy fire from the woods North of Ritschenhausen, presumably from elements of the German 413th Infantry Division. The fire was returned and an enemy halftrack and ammunition dump destroyed.

According to plan, Cavalry Command moved out at 7:00 a.m., picking up Troop C at Marisfeld enroute. The command seized its objective, Juchsen, by 1:50 p.m., meeting only light resistance. Exdorf was cleared at 5:00 p.m. Occasional enemy artillery fire harassed the troops until 8:00 p.m. Thirty-nine prisoners were taken during the day. Advance reconnaissance and artillery elements of CC E3 moved from their assembly area near Oberhof at 11:30 a.m., reaching Bischofred some two hours later. At 1:00 p.m. the main body followed through Zella Mehlis and SuhI, with artillery in the lead, anticipating action to re-cross the Werra River. Previous plans to proceed through Themar were changed due to the resistance encountered there by CC A. Placing Division Artillery in position near Bischofred the column continued West and crossed the Werra River at Henfstadt unopposed. Continuing Southeast down a ridge, the command reached Beinerstadt at 5:45 p.m. and advance elements held up at Bernhards for the night.

Clearing the newly taken assembly area, establishing internal and lateral contacts, and preparing for future operations were the principal activities for April 8, 1945.

CC A continued to clear Hildburghausen during the morning. Around midday the command was ordered to make lateral contacts with the 26th Infantry Division. A task force, moving out at 6:20 p.m. established contact with the 101st Infantry Regiment, 26th Infantry Division, about 7:35 p.m.

PFERSDORTH

CC B resumed the advance at 7:00 a.m., reaching Pfersdorth and Zeildfeld without opposition. By midday all elements of the command had closed in the Dingsleben-Pfersdorth-Zeilfeld area. A half-hour later the Division ordered CC B to establish contact with CC A and to seize and occupy Bedheim and Leimrieth.

Against light resistance Leimrieth was seized at 3:05 p.m., Bedheim at 4:30 p.m. and Roth in addition at 4:55 p.m.

Throughout the night the 41st Cavalry received sporadic artillery and nebelwerfer fire from the Southwest flank.

Reports from Intelligence continued to point to a concentration of 2,000 SS troops, reinforced by 80 tanks, situated in the area of Schmiedefeld, preparing to recapture Suhl. Division Artillery and seven squadrons of Division controlled fighter-bombers were concentrated on this area throughout the day and fires continued into the night. Although exact results of this shelling and bombing were unknown, the enemy failed to attack.

XII Corps was notified at 6:30 p.m. that the Division had seized and occupied its assembly area as ordered.

April 9 was devoted mainly to rehabilitation of personnel and maintenance of vehicles, as well as maintaining patrol contacts with the Division area.

Operations Memo. No. 52 was issued at 10:00 a.m., outlining the Division plan for the continuation of advance as far Southeast as Bayreuth. The zone, 80-kilometers long and 20-kilometers wide, was subdivided between CC B and CC A. The terrain in the zone was rolling, with dominating heights to the East and several cross-cutting river valleys, bur containing a more favorable road net. Coburg and Bayreuth were included among the several large cities to be dealt with.

CC A was assigned the task of seizing Neustadt, Kronach, Kulmbach; assisting CC B in seizing Bayreuth; and maintaining lateral contact with the 26th Infantry Division. CC B was to seize Coburg, Marktzeuln, assisting CC A with taking Kulmbach and Bayreuth, also to establish lateral contact with CC A on such successive objectives. The 183rd Field Artillery Groups continued to support CC A and Division Artillery supporting CC B. The 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion was to provide security for Division Troops while the 41st Cavalry protected the Southwest flank.

The 71st Infantry Division accomplished its mission of clearing the areas by-passed by the Division and major units were advised at 3:00 p.m. that they were to pass through the 11th Armored Division and attack to the Southeast on April 10 or 11, 1945.

During the afternoon Seventh Army's 14th Armored and 45th Infantry Divisions advance elements came up abreast of the Division on the Third Army South flank.

THE APPROACH TO COBURG

Through a heavy ground haze the Division resumed offensive operations at 6:15 a.m. on April 10, the objective being to seize the city of Coburg and the vicinity. The general plan contemplated that CC A would semi-isolate the city by seizing and blocking all the North and East approaches to Coburg, while CC B attacked the city itself from advantageous terrain to the Northwest and West.

The enemy pattern of resistance during the following several days was built around a continuous defense and withdrawal from delaying obstacles. Large fighting units went unidentified. The basic German hastily organized unit consisted of Kamp Gruppe and miscellaneous battalions, built around an SS cadre, and filled out with any and all available manpower. Prisoners were taken from the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Training and Replacement Battalion and 17 other miscellaneous units. River lines, wooded or terrain defiles, and particularly road center towns on favorable defensive terrain, were strongly defended from behind heavy log roadblocks.

CC A's advance cavalry elements moved out at 6:15 a.m., on April 10, followed an hour later by Task Force Brady, reaching Ahlstadt by 7:30 a.m. The advance resumed and Otrowind was occupied at 8 35 a.m. and Moggenhrunn a half-hour later. A defended road block near Oberlauter caused the first contact to be made, this being cleared around 10:00 a.m., but the advance halted when forward Troop A, 41st Cavalry elements, found Oberlauter defended. Task Force Brady, advancing through artillery and small arms fire, attacked and captured the towns, blocking the main North route out of Coburg. A blown bridge at Wohlbach was by-passed after Task Force Ahee overran dug-in enemy infantry, seizing the towns to cut a second main road into Coburg.

While engineers completed a treadway bridge at Wohlsbach Troop A, 41st Cavalry, reinforced with Tank and Tank Destroyer elements, advanced to Monchroden and by 3:50 p.m. cut the main road from Neustadt to Coburg, completing Coburg’s isolation from the North and East. Task Force Ahee seized Unterlauter at 6:00 p.m. after it had been softened by a squadron air strike. The 183rd Field Artillery Group, supporting CC A, fired 25 missions expending 719 rounds and destroying at least two enemy general-purpose vehicles. The command organized defensive positions and established roadblocks on all critical roads before assembling in the area of Wohlsbach-Oberlauter-Unterlauter for the night. An advance of 30 kilometers had been made during the day and the planned mission accomplished.

Resuming advance at 7:00 a.m. on April 10, CC B made first contact with the enemy, armed with panzerfaust and small firearms, in the area of Steinfeld-Eishausen. Abetted by tactical air and artillery these towns were entered and cleared by 8:45 a.m. Passing through the blazing wreckage to the South, the advance guard reached the outskirts of Rodach by 9:00 a.m. The 21st Armored Infantry Battalion attacked and the defenders, including infantry and panzerfaust teams, were overrun or killed, and captured by 12:30 a.m. The advance continued beyond the blazing Rodach and the towns of Schweighof, Neida and Wiesfeld were taken by 2:05 p.m., against light resistance. The command consolidated their positions near Weisenfeld on Division order, developing the situation through aggressive patrolling around Coburg for the remainder of the day.

At 4:00 p.m. CC R was directed to march on Hildburghausen, clearing a lateral route across to CC B s axis of advance and clearing the Eishausen-Rodach area for occupation by the 410th Field Artillery Group and Division troops. At 10:45 a.m. CC R reduced a roadblock, thus opening the road from Hildburghausen to Rodach. At this point the command was divided, the 22nd Tank Battalion took an Eastern cross-country route and the 55th Armored Infantry Battalion swung around to the West to clear the area. Seven towns were cleared, Rodach occupied, and patrol contacts made with CC B and the 41st Cavalry before sundown.

The 41st Cavalry, falling behind CC A at Hildburghausen, continued to the East on the main road to clear Schackendorf at 11:00 a.m. and block along the Division's Northeast flank. The bulk of the Squadron followed CC A to Ahstadt where the patrols were sent to the North and Northeast as far as Harras and Rottenbach meeting no resistance.

The 410th Field Artillery Group, following CC R, moved forward to positions Southeast of Rodach during the afternoon. On order from the Division a coordinated heavy artillery fire was laid on Coburg throughout the night.

The Division was aided during the day by particularly effective tactical air support as squadron fighter-bomber missions targeted Eishausen, Unterlauter, Meustadt, Rodach, and Coburg. Several missions were diverted to destroy enemy aircraft active in the area.

Preceded by the 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion and followed by the 56th Armored Engineer Battalion, Division Headquarters moved to Rodach between 4:00 p.m. and 4:30 p.m. Over 350 prisoners of war were evacuated through the Division cage.

CIVILIANS EVACUATED

CC A's headquarters were visited at 9:00 p.m. on April 10, by emissaries of the Duke of Coburg who requested evacuation of 300 women and children refugees said to be residents of Coburg Castle. The Division granted permission for the evacuation to be made on the morning of April 11.

A reconnaissance made by CC B late in the afternoon indicated that Coburg would be strongly defended. A report was made to XII Corps pointing out that in such a large city the commitment of the entire Division infantry elements would make such a deliberate mop-up action a long drawn-out process. In reply XII Corps advised that a Regimental Combat Team of the 71st Infantry Division had been given the task of seizing Coburg on April 11.

Continuous harassing artillery fire focused on Coburg during the night and an early morning dive-bomber and strafing attack added to the softening process of the city.

While the authorized evacuation of civilians was being executed in the early morning of April 11, final preparations were made by CC B and Combat Team Five, 71st Infantry Division for an assault on the city.

Emissaries from Coburg returned to CC A's 42nd Tank Battalion command post at 9:00 a.m. seeking surrender terms for the Castle, under control of the Duke of Coburg, and the city, controlled by the Wehrmacht. The enemy was given until 10:30 a.m. to capitulate, while air and artillery fire was suspended and a staff party from Headquarters CC A sent into the city to negotiate surrender.

SURRENDER OF COBURG

A flight of fighter-bombers from XIX Tactical Air Command arrived at Coburg at 10:00 a.m., circling continuously over the city, ready to strike in the event of refusal to surrender. At 10:30 a.m. both the Castle and the city surrendered to the Thunderbolts, and, under terms imposed in the capitulation, the civilians commenced to clear the streets of roadblocks and other obstacles.

CC B's Counter Intelligence Corps, Military Government, and IPW personnel immediately entered Coburg and engineer parties were sent forward to clear the streets of mines and determine roads into, through, and out of the city.

CC A continued to block all roads North and East of Coburg during the morning. Several small towns South of Wohlsbach were cleared by 11:15 a.m.

A verbal order issued to major units at 1:00 p.m. on April 11, outlined the plan for renewal of attack. CCA was ordered to by-pass Neustadt and advance in its zone to capture Kronach and establish a bridgehead across the Hasslach River. Similarly CC B was directed to advance in its zone and secure a bridgehead across the Hasslach near Marktzeuln. Coordinating with CC A, CC R was directed to move the 22nd Tank and 55th Armored Infantry Battalion forward to Oberlauter and release them to CC A seize Neustadt with the 42nd and 63rd Armored Infantry Battalions and occupy the city until relieved by following elements of the 71st Infantry Division's 66rh Regiment.

The 41st Cavalry was ordered to continue protecting the Division's Northeast flank, maintain contact with the 26th Infantry Division; and, in addition, to block the main road running into the Division's rear from Sonnegherg, near Worlsdorf. The 183rd Field Artillery Group was to support and give CC R fire priority until the seizure of Neustadt. The 5th Regimental Combat Team, operating under the 11th Armored Division control, was directed to sweep the woods West of Coburg, protect the position of the 410th Field Artillery Group, and clear and occupy Coburg. The 5rh Regimental Combat Team was to revert to the 71st Infantry Division after completing this mission and being passed through by the 11th Armored Division.

Moving forward at 2:00 p.m., CC R turned over the 22nd Tank and 55th Infantry Battalions to CC A. Establishing a command post at Wohlspach, a small task force made up of Company B, 63rd Armored Infantry Battalion and Company B, 42nd Tank Battalion, was sent Northeast to develop the situation near Neustadt. Finding Neustadt undefended, the Task Force moved in and occupied the town at 8.15 p.m. Artillery fire, planned to harass the town during the night, and support of the attack were cancelled.

A squadron of fighter-bombers, running an armed reconnaissance Southeast of Coburg in preparation for the following day's action, discovered a small tank column and destroyed or disabled five of them. CC B was warned of armor in their projected zone.

At 7:40 p.m. an order was received from XII Corps outlining an alternate plan to have the Division turn East after reaching the second objective, relieving pressure on the 26th Infantry Division, and seizing the key communication center of Hof, along the Czechoslovakian border.

Resuming offensive operations according to the original plan, both CC B and CC A jumped off at 6:15 a.m. on April 12, 1945, so commencing a day of excellent progress against light resistance.

CC B moved through Coburg and advanced, meeting little or no resistance, on the Rohrbach-Freisendorf-Ebersdorf axis to defended Sonnenfeld, which was cleared at 9:20 a.m. The command was split up into two task forces at Weidhausen, while artillery went into position to support the river crossing. One force, moving via Markzeuln, found a good ford near a blown bridge across the Hasslach and continued across the river without opposition, coiling into positions near Ober Zettlitz. The other Task Force advanced on the Trubenbach-Marktgraitz-Redwitz axis unopposed, coiling for the night across the stream near Obristfeld, thus forming a solid bridgehead.

CC A's column reached Fecheim at 7:00 a.m. without incident. At 8:15 a.m. near Zedersdorf an enemy tank and a small group of infantrymen were engaged and destroyed and the advance continued to Gestungshausen by 8:35 a.m. In the woods near Modlitz an estimated 200 enemy which had been bypassed by advanced elements, were engaged and captured or dispersed. While the column turned up the small valley toward Kronach, Cavalry elements attacked defended roadblocks in Kups, which threatened the East flank. Infantry Task Force Hearn, in the lead, reached the outskirts of Kronach at 1:20 p.m. and Tank Task Force Wingard, following, cleared several towns along the route. After clearing Kronach of a few isolated defenders at 3:00 p.m. Task Force Hearn seized intact a vital bridge across the Hasslach River and captured 60 prisoners in addition to a German Army hospital housing 600 wounded Wehrmacht personnel.

Following artillery fire that left the town blazing, Cavalry elements entered Kups at 3:15 p.m. At 4:30 p.m. this strong point was reported clear and 53 enemy soldiers captured. For extra security and to acquire favorable terrain for continuation of the attack, Division ordered CC A to seize the dominating wooded hills Southeast of Kronach. This mission was accomplished by 6:15 p.m. with the fall of Weissenbrunn. At 4:45 p.m. the combat command post had been established at Schmolz. A CC R Task Force relieved CC A elements holding Kronach at 10:15 p.m., allowing the command to consolidate and prepare for the following day.

CC R followed CC A from the Wohlsbach-Oberlauter area at 9:30 a.m. Elements occupying Neustadt were relieved by the 71st Infantry Division at 10:00 a.m. Mopping up towns passed through by other elements of the division and clearing by-passed enemy pockets, the command cut across via Emberg and Gross Gernstadt, rejoining the CC B axis at Eberdorf about 1:10 p.m. Closing in on Ebersdorf the command was ordered to clear surrounding towns and woods for the emplacement of the 410th Field Artillery Group in the event of heavy opposition from Kronach. While clearing the area the 42nd Tank Battalion discovered nine Mark IV, one Mark V, and Mark VI tanks abandoned in a wooded area, all of which were destroyed by fire and demolitions. Without a single casualty the command captured 26 prisoners of war and killed at least six enemy soldiers.

SURRENDER LEAFLETS

Moving forward behind CC R, the 41st Cavalry continued to protect the Division Northeast flank during the day. At 4:30 p.m. the Squadron blocked the main road South from Sonneberg and set up a command post at Furth. Division Artillery, supporting CC B, continuously flew liaison plane missions ahead of the column, dropping surrender leaflets in towns along the route to advance. These leaflets admonished the civilians to fly white flags and surrender their towns without resistance to avoid total destruction and produced excellent results. Surrender leaflets were used throughout the central German campaign and were officially credited with expediting the command's movement and saving many American lives.

The Division command Post moved forward to Gertungshausen, arriving at 5:00 p.m. Enemy snipers, dug in the woods immediately to the East, inflicted several casualties, and a close support fighter-bomber strike was called in to strafe and bomb the enemy-infested area. The quadruple mounted 50 caliber machine guns of 575th AA Battalion and destroyers of the 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion were also employed to sweep the woods in the area with fire.

The 133rd Ordnance Maintenance Battalion moved into Coburg at 5:00 p.m. so as to render close support, and the 81st Medical Battalion joined the Division Train Headquarters at Ebersdorf at 5:30 p.m.

Operations Memo. No. 54 was issued by Division at 6:30 p.m., outlining a continuation of the advance to the East through Kulmbach and then a swing to the North and East to seize Hof and the road center nine kilometers West of Hof. Combat Commands were ordered to continue the advance abreast with CC B on the right. The axis of advance prescribed was Kulmbach-Muchberg-Hof. CC A was assigned the mission of seizing Kulmbach as it advanced and CC B was directed to take Munchberg and Hof proper. CC A was also directed to protect the North and West flanks and CC B the South and East flanks of the Division. The 41st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron was attached to CC B to block in the direction of Bayreuth when the Division turned East. An additional troop was assigned CC A to accomplish its flank protection mission. Restrained in Kulmbach by a Corps Directive received at 11:00 a.m., April 13, the Division made rapid progress for half the day, despite difficulties in rain-soaked terrain from a heavy storm during the night.

CC A continued the advance at 7:00 a.m. over a rapidly deteriorating secondary road net, reaching Gossersdorf at 7:25 a.m., Poppenholz at 7:40 a.m., and Lehenthal at 8:05 a.m. Complete failure of the planned road caused a delay and another selected route was used through Grafendobrach which was seized at 10:05 a.m. Troop B, 41st Cavalry liquidated a defended roadblock four kilometers South of Lebenthat and as the advance continued 45 enemy troops were captured.

ENTERING KULMBACH

Task Force Hearn entered Kulmbach opposed by light small arms fire, and, with assistance from Troop B, 41st Cavalry, seized the city. High on a hill in the city a walled castle was found to be defended and it was reported that several hours would be required to clear Kulmbach. At midday CC A was directed to remain on the taken third objective and clear the city. Searching for better roads to the East. Task Force Weineandt proceeded to Unter Steinach clearing it by 2:30 p.m. Also shifting to the East, Task Force Wingard entered and cleared Stadt Steinach where two 240mm railroad guns were seized and a million dollar experimental electronic laboratory fell to the command. CC A's command post followed Task Force Wingard and opened in Stadt Steinach at 4:00 p.m. Kulmbach was cleared by 6:00 p.m. and the command consolidated positions in the Stadt Steinach-Unter Steinach-Kulmbach area for the night. During the day a 183rd Field Artillery Group liaison plane was shot down by enemy aircraft.

Leading CC B, Troop D, 41st Cavalry, moved out at 6:00 a.m., April 13, reconnoitering for a route that would by-pass Kulmbach to the West, avoid converging with CC A in that city, and isolate the city by cutting the main road to Bayreuth. Preceded by a liaison plane dropping surrender leaflets, the cavalry moved rapidly forward without resistance through white-flagged towns. Rotthwind was reached at 7:30 a.m., and near Mainleus a prepared bridge was seized before it could be demolished.

Division orders went out at 7:46 a.m. to hold on the third objective so as to curb this rapid progress until CC A's attack on Kulmbach had been launched. Turning South across the Main River progress was slowed considerably by muddy secondary roads.

Cavalry reconnaissance elements entered the third objective area at 10:10 a.m. and Division artillery had taken up positions to fire on Kulmbach by 10:20 a.m. Moving out again at 10:45 a.m., preceded by cavalry, the column encountered great difficulty moving along soggy secondary roads. Light enemy resistance was overcome at Kelkendorf shortly after 11:00 a.m. Three enemy 88mm anti-tank guns were destroyed near Ober Kobach at 11:40 a.m. Occupying the third objective entirely and cutting the main road from Kulmbach to Bayreuth near Mangersreuth at 1:00 p.m., CC B coiled and cleaned up scattered resistance in the area.

Again desiring to develop the situation around Bayreuth because of good progress made by the 26th Infantry Division toward Hof during the morning, XII Corps directed the Division to send strong reconnaissance in that direction. A request for permission to send an entire combat command, due to the size of the city, was denied. Preparation to seize Hof on the part of the Division was diverted and CC B was accordingly ordered to send the 41st Cavalry toward Bayreuth on a reconnaissance mission.

With CC A in Kulmbach an attempt was made to pass the following 41st Cavalry around CC B through the city but this possibility was erased because of a blown bridge near Burghaig. The 41st Cavalry made its way through CC B following the muddy by-pass to the West while engineers were dispatched to repair the bridge at Burghaig. Reaching the main road again at Mangersreuth about 4:00 p.m., the 41st Cavalry advanced through Rohr and Neudrossenfeld by 5:50 p.m. Clearing the town by 8:00 p.m. the command coiled and waited daylight before proceeding through a woods-flanked defile. In this rapid action lOC) prisoners of war were taken.

CC R, ordered to clear the area East of Gestungshausen enroute, moved East toward the CC A axis ahead of Division troops, reaching Kronach at 12:50 p.m. Leaving a small holding force there to clear the main road between Kronach and Kumbach, the remainder of the command continued to Kirchleus. Eschbach and Losau were mopped up and three roadblocks reduced, thus opening the main roads to Kulmbach. In Weissenbrunn and Kirchleus CC R troops were strafed by four enemy planes, which inflicted nine casualties. Elements of the 26th Infantry Division relieved the holding force at Kronach at 8:00 p.m. and they rejoined the main body in the vicinity of Kirchleus where the command post was established.

During the afternoon enemy air was exceptionally active in the Division area. Besides attacks on CC A and CC R, 133rd Ordnance installations near Mainroth were attacked by four ME-109's. The 575th AA Battalion's accurate fire accounted for one enemy plane destroyed and one damaged. Division troops moved from Gestrungshausen to Mainleus on April 13, where the command post was established at 3:00 p.m. The 410th Field Artillery Group followed to pound Bayreuth with its long range 155mm guns during the night. The Long Tom 155mm guns were placing H and I fires on the city by 8:40 p.m., starting numerous fires. Verbal orders were received from XII Corps about 9:00 p.m., directing a small task force to seize and secure Bayreuth the following day, and otherwise to remain in place while the 71st Infantry Division passed through the Division. CC B directed to execute the Bayreuth task while all other major units were instructed to concentrate on maintenance. Road priority throughout the zone was granted to the 71st Infantry Division.

The objective of the day of April 14th, 1945, was the seizure of Bayreuth, a historic city famed for its annual spring festival and as the birthplace of Richard Wagner, the noted composer.

Task Force Foy, consisting of the 41st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Company A of the 41st Tank Battalion Company C of the 21st Armored Infantry Battalion, one platoon Company B of the 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion and one platoon Company B of the 56th Armored Engineer Battalion, was constituted for CC B elements. Organized into two task groups the troops moved out from Muckenreuth at 8:00 a.m. to seize Bayreuth. One maneuvering column moved via Muckenreuth through the woods to a crossroad and the high ground West of Bayreuth, reducing several roadblocks and occasional small arms fire. The second task force moved through Alten Plox and Hethersreuth to dominating terrain one kilometer North of Bayreuth. By 11:00 a.m. both groups commanded excellent observations positions and Division Artillery had moved forward within range of the city. Considerable artillery fire was rained on the city bur seemed only to make the enemy more stubborn in their defense.

SURRENDER OF BAYREUTH

With only insignificant forces to defend the city and a seeming desire for surrender on the part of the defending force, negotiations for the capitulation of Bayreuth were begun at 1:00 p.m. A captured German officer and the local Burgomeister who presented himself, were given until 2:30 to surrender and turn over all troops within the city. While negotiations were in progress, several tanks from the 14th Armored Division opened fire on Bayreuth from the North, in violation of the agreed truce. A request was made immediately to XII Corps for withdrawal of this unit from the area. CC B meanwhile, maintained close radio contacts with elements of the 2nd Cavalry Group, which had moved around to the South and West of Bayreuth, blocking several main roads and scooping up hundreds of enemy troops attempting to escape from the city.

At 2:10 p.m. the Burgomeister informed CC B that the majority of the enemy troops in the city were willing m surrender, but that he could not control the activities of fanatic groups.

Certain high-ranking German officers were reported to be withdrawing East to a castle at St. Johannes and intense artillery concentrations and air bombardment were directed against the establishment with good results.

Company C, 21st Armored Infantry Battalion, with a platoon of the 41st Tank Battalion entered Bayreuth from the North at 2:45 p.m. and seized control of the center of the city against scattered sniper resistance. Around the North and West of the city the 41st Cavalry captured 268 prisoners attempting to escape in small parries. A motorized regiment of the 71st Infantry Division arrived at 7:00 p.m. to occupy the city whereupon Task Force Foy withdrew to Neudrossenfeld at approximately 9:00 p.m. CC B elements, other than the 41st Cavalry, were released to parent units and returned to the Kulmbach area.

CC A uncovered a number of large German Army food and clothing warehouses in Kulmbach and placed guards over them.

From April 10, 1945 to April 14, the Division had intermittently advanced 80 kilometers from the Hildburghausen area to Bayreuth, clearing 115 towns, and evacuating 792 prisoners through the Division cage. Material captured or destroyed in the advance included 12 enemy tanks, four 88mm antitank guns, two 240mm guns, and four enemy aircraft. The advance was highlighted by the capture of Coburg and Bayreuth.

With the seizure of Bayreuth in mid-afternoon the Division had accomplished its assigned mission and as the day ended it assembled and continued preparations for further Third Army spearhead advances into Southern Germany. The Division devoted the day of April 15 to rehabilitation and maintenance, also guarding captured military installations within the area, especially in Kulmbach.

The 90th Infantry Division seized Hof during the afternoon and the 26th Infantry Division reached its restraining zone, placing its forward elements generally from Munchberg South to Gefrees. The 71st Infantry Division, passing through the 11th Armored Division, advance along the Southwest flank to the restraining line, generally from Gefrees South to Bayreuth. The Division command post was established at Kulmbach.

Fifty Hitler Jugend boys drilling in Losau were picked up by a CCR patrol and turned over to the Provost Marshal for evacuation through prisoner of war channels.

At 8:00 am. on April 16, CC R was directed to move to Kulmbach to relieve the 55th Armored Infantry of guard duties, in an attempt to equalize the rehabilitation opportunities of CC A troops. The 63rd Armored Infantry Battalion moved into Kulmbach first, remaining tank and headquarters elements followed.

Operational Directive No. 107 was received from XII Corps at 5:00 p.m., directing the Division to assemble in the Burgkunstadt-Stadt Steinach-Unter Steinach-Katschenreuth area and relieve all elements of the 26th and 71^st Infantry Divisions of guard responsibility in that area The directive also informed that Kulmbach would remain under the 71st Infantry Division control while their command post was located in the city. Orders were issued to CC A to move the 55th Armored Infantry Battalion out of Kulmbach early the following day to relieve congestion

Later in the evening the Division was warned by telephone that XII Corps would resume offensive operations to the Southeast, possibly on April 19. The Thunderbolts were directed to relieve the 71st Infantry Division in the interim early April 17 and defend along the Corps restraining line between Gefrees and Bayreuth.

At 10:00 p.m. CC B was ordered to take over defense of a line between Bayreuth and Berneck from elements of the 71st Infantry Division early on April 17. Similarly CC R was directed to rake over the Berneck-Gefrees line CC A was ordered to relieve CC R elements and resume the mission of supporting the defense. All other elements of the Division were ordered to complete maintenance work and prepare to move on two hours notice after midnight of April 17.

At 1:20 p.m. on April 17, CC B made a request that the 2nd Cavalry Group relieve the 71st Infantry Division in their location between Bayreuth and Seublitz. Relayed to XII Corps, the request was approved and CC B dispersed its elements across a narrower sector to the Northeast CC B moved to the Bayreuth area at 7:30 am. to relieve 71st Infantry Division elements in the city and forward elements along the line Seublitz, Northeast to Berneck. The relief of forward elements was completed at 1:10 p.m. while troops occupying Bayreuth and posting of guards at the city's main factories, bridges, and other vital points, was completed at 6:00 p.m.

FURTHER ADVANCE

CC R initiated movement to its assigned sector at 7: 30 a m and had completed relief of the 71st Infantry Division elements from Gefrees to Berneck by 11:30 a m The command post was established at Wirsberg about 11:00 am. CC A had restored previous guards on captured installations in Kulmbach by 8:15 am., freeing CC R elements. Division Artillery moved forward to Bayreuth during the day and assumed its support mission. The 490th Armored Field Artillery Battalion was placed in direct support of CC R, the 491st Armored Field Artillery Battalion in direct support of CC B, and both the 947th and 492nd Armored Field Artillery Battalions in general support.

On the basis of a Third Army directive, XII Corps G-3 met with corresponding staff officers of the 11th Armored Division and the 26th and 90th Infantry Divisions at Kronach about 3:00 p.m., and a plan for the next Corps operations was worked out. XII Corps assigned mission was the continuance of an advance to the Southeast, West of the Czechoslovakian boundary, initially as far as Cham and then to the Austrian border. The 71st Infantry Division was to move to the Southwest and pass to control of XV Corps, being replaced by the 97th Infantry Division coming in on the Northeast and assembling in the vicinity of Hof. The Corps plan envisaged a series of limited objective attacks by the Thunderbolts, followed up with zone clearance operations by the 26th Infantry Division to the Southwest and the 90th Infantry Division to the Northeast along the Czechoslovakian border. Protecting that flank and moving Northeast was the 2nd Cavalry Group. On arrival, the 97th Infantry Division was to follow the 90th Infantry Division in the latter s zone, relieve the 90th and block to the Northeast along the Czechoslovakian border.

The Thunderbolts were specifically directed to continue the advance to the Southeast early April 19, to seize Weiden and Cham successively. The 183rd Field Artillery Group was directed to continue reinforcement of artillery fires for the 11th Armored Division and Supplementary Engineer Support provided.

Verbal orders were issued CC A and Division Troops to concentrate in the Bayreuth area the following day. CC B was directed to relieve elements of the 2nd Cavalry Group without delay.

Batteries B and C of the 128th AAA Gun Battalion, attached to the Division for enemy aircraft high-level attack protection, were placed under control of the 575th AA Battalion.

The zone assigned the Division for the coming operation was approximately 100 kilometers long, varying from 20 to 30 kilometers wide. Rolling terrain once again predominated, marked particularly by extensive wooded areas. Only secondary roads were apparent in a favorable direction with the exception of one 25-kilometer stretch. Numerous streams, including the Naab and Regen, offered favorable defensive or delay possibilities.

On studying a smaller scale map than that used when the Corps operation had been laid out, it was found that the first objective could not be skillfully approached without using at least one route through the 90th Infantry Division zone. Moreover, the assigned objective of Weiden, appeared only as a small road center, while Grafenwohr, 20 kilometers to the West, appeared as a much larger and important locality.

With these factors in mind the Division plan for accomplishment of its mission was formulated. Two pairs of mutually supporting routes were laid out for the major combat commands. One set favored the center of the Corps zone and led through Weiden. The second set were confined to the 26th Infantry Division zone on the Southwest flank and led through Grafenwohr. Both pairs contemplated a series of five zig-zag 20 kilometer advances to seize assigned objectives or critical terrain features within the Division zone.

Operations Memo No. 55 was published by the Division at 9:30 a.m. April 18, crystallizing the plan for the advance to Cham. CC B and CC A abreast, with CC B on the right, were directed to advance along prescribed axes as soon as possible after daylight on April 19, to seize designated successive objectives. The 41st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron was attached to CC A as of 6:00 a.m. April 19. CC A was directed to protect the Division's Northeast flank and maintain contact with the adjacent 90rh Infantry Division. Division Artillery was to continue support of CC B, and the 183rd Field Artillery Group supporting CC A. CC R, after being relieved by elements of the 26th Infantry Division, was ordered to follow along CC B's axis in reserve.

SURRENDER OF BRANDHOLZ

At 11:00 a.m. the Burgomeister of Brandholz arrived at CC R command post at Wirsberg seeking to surrender this town. The surrender was accepted and artillery fire, which had been concentrated on the town, was lifted. Elements of the 26th Infantry Division's 328th Infantry Regiment relieved CC R between Gefrees and Berneck at approximately 9:00 p.m., after being relieved in turn by the 90th Infantry Division on the North. The 490th Armored Field Artillery Battalion was released from direct support of CC R and reverted to control of the 183rd Field Artillery Group.

The Division command post moved from Mainleus at 9:30 a.m. reopening in the Western outskirts of Bayreuth at 12:30.

Late in the evening the Division was informed that it would be responsible for maintaining guards on installations in Bayreuth until relieved by troops of the Corps Area Defense Command, and that the relief could nor be expected for at least two days. In order to free all of CC B's troops for the following day's attack, CC R was ordered to move into and assume responsibility for guarding all Bayreuth military installations.

During the temporary stabilization of the situation around Bayreuth the enemy had had time to patch together a few town defense detachments and prepare demolitions and roadblocks to the Southeast. School troops and miscellaneous headquarters units from the large military installations at Grafenwohr sought to stem the Division's advance.

April 19 proved to be the best day for the Division's air cooperation, as cool, clear weather predominated, with a slightly overcast sky and generally good visibility. Easing the way for attacking ground troops, the XIX Tactical Air Command fighter-bombers flew their first reconnaissance mission of the day to Grafenwohr at 7:05 a.m. Occupied military barracks were hit and set afire. Ahead of CC A, a second squadron bombed and strafed Kemnath at 8:15 p.m., dispersing or killing several hundred troops, and burning in motor transports as well as destroying four enemy aircraft operating in the area. An hour later Neustadt and Pressath were set ablaze by a third mission. Five missions against Grafenwohr later in the day, and in the face of considerable flak, started numerous additional fires, dispersed or destroyed a column withdrawing from the city to the Southeast and burned at least 15 additional vehicles. Surrender leaflets were dropped on towns by artillery liaison planes in advance of the CC B column.

CC A initiated the advance when Troop A, 41st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron moved out at 6:00 a.m. from the Neudrossenfeld area. The troop encountered a blown bridge at Neunkirchen but another bridge, one mile West of Seublitz, was found to be a suitable by-pass. The column made first contact in Iresau, this being quickly overcome and the advance guard reached Senoyenreuth at 10:50 a.m.

Meanwhile the main column of CC A had moved forward, coiling off the road in the Bayreuth area to await the progress of the advance elements and bypass of construction work at Neukirchen. Two roadblocks were encountered by Troop A, 41st Cavalry, in the woods, halting their advance. On the arrival of Task Force Wingard consisting principally of tank and armored infantry elements, the attack resumed, the roadblocks and woods cleared, and the town entered at 1:40 a.m. Forty British prisoners of war were liberated at Kirchenlaibach.

THROUGH TRESSAU

Operating on the North flank, the 41st Cavalry broke up its defensive disposition and cleared light resistance in Tressau. Remaining CC A elements moved forward from coiling positions near Bayreuth at 12:55 p.m. Task Force Wingard reached Speichsdorf at 12:45 p.m., after clearing light resistance and Le Lettenhof at 1:20 p.m. The artillery fire and fighter-bomber strafing which Neustadt had received enabled it to be taken without opposition. Pressath was seized against remaining scattered resistance at 3:05 p.m. and two enemy tanks destroyed in the fight for this town. Task Force Wingard proceeded South through the woods against light sniper resistance to Grafenwohr, entering the city from the North, in coordination with CC B. Infantry Task Force Hearn mopped up and completed clearing Pressath while the 41st Cavalry, skirting Kemnath to the Northeast, worked its way South into Pressath for the night. All elements closed into Grafenwohr or Pressath by 8:40 p.m. In the still undamaged outskirts of Grafenwohr a command post was established.

CC B meantime, gathered its scattered defense forces at daylight of April 19, and renewed the advance from Bayreuth at 7:30 a.m. Proceeding through the previously cleared 71st Infantry Division zone into Greussen, the column swung East into enemy territory. Losau was reached without opposition at 9:35 a.m. by advanced elements. Division artillery went into positions and both towns were pounded and set afire under heavy concentrations of fire. Vorbach, on the first report line, was seized at 10:00 a.m. in the first contact action. Bypassing blistered and littered Vorbach, Ober Bibbach was seized at 11:30 a.m. after cellar holdout opposition had been encountered. Resuming the advance shortly after 1:00 p.m., the command passed through Tremmersdorf at 1:30 p.m., Eschenbach at 2:30 p.m., and Stegenthumbach at 3:40 p.m. At the river line South of Stegenthumbach light resistance was encountered, but quickly overcome. Continuing through Grunhund, the command, in coordination with CC A, entered Grafenwohr at 5:00 p.m. and commenced clearing the battered Southern portion of the city. At 5:30 p.m. the Division reported the city taken. An enemy retreating column South of the city was fired on by Division Artillery with good results.

CC R relieved CC B guards in the Bayreuth area during the morning. At 1:20 p.m. CC R was ordered to avoid the CC B axis, continue the advance and clear the Ober Bibach area for anticipated occupation by the 410th Field Artillery Group. CC R cleared six towns during the afternoon, including Schlammersdorf and Frankenberg. From these towns and the woods surrounding them 28 prisoners of war were captured and one 120mm mortar seized and destroyed. The command post opened in Schlammersdorf at 6:30 p.m.

The Division command post, preceded by the command control party, left Bayreuth at 1:00 p.m. and reopened near Vorbach at 2:40 p.m. The 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion preceded the Division Headquarters to Vorbach and secured the area. The 56th Armored Engineer Battalion and the 575th AA Battalion followed Division Headquarters to Vorbach and at Neunkirchen, the 56th Armored Engineer Battalion supervised construction of a 70-foot Bailey bridge to replace the blown structure.

The 133rd Ordnance Maintenance Battalion and the 81st Medical Battalion joined Division Train Headquarters and moved forward to the Bindlach airport supply area to the Northeast of Bayreuth.

GRAFENWOHR SEIZED

During an 11-hour operation the Division had advanced 33 kilometers, seizing its first objective of Grafenwohr. In this thrust, over 700 prisoners of war were captured, 15 towns seized and cleared, and at least 20 enemy combat and transport vehicles were destroyed.

Restrained from continuing the advance, by Corp