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AFTER ACTION REPORT HEADQUARTERS CC”A” 11TH ARMORED DIVISION HEADQUARTERS COMBAT COMMAND “A” APO 261, U.S. ARMY SUBJECT: Action against the enemy for period 23 December 44 thru 31 January 45. TO: Commanding General, 11th Armored Division 1. The following report is submitted of the action of CC A against the enemy for the period 23 December 44 thru 31 January 45, as required by AR 345-105, C3. DECEMBER 1944 23 On 23 December 1944 the 11 Armd Div was still engaged in movement from BARNEVILLE on the Cherbourg Peninsula to a concentration area in the vicinity of SOISSONS. The bulk of Hq & Hq Co CC A was on the road, but the CG, accompanied by S-2, S-3 and aide, had preceded the column and arrived in RHEIMS at 1900 23 December. Division having received the mission of defense of the MEUSE RIVER line, a combat command and staff was hastily constituted from units available and placed under the command of CG CC A. So as to accomplish this mission, during the night 23-24 December a CC A staff was organized at SISSONNE, and issued FO #5 0430 24 December. The CC was composed of the following troops, divided as indicated, into two task forces: TF BLUE (Brady) 63 AIB (-1 Rif Co) Det Hq CC A 492 AFA (-1 Firing Btry) 41 Cav Rcn Sq (-D Tr) 2 M Cos 42 Tk Bn C Btry (-) 575 AAA AW Bn Plat A Co 56 Engrs A Co 81 Med Bn Plat C Btry 575 AAAW BN SP TR WHITE (Ahee) Co 63 AIBn Btry 492 AFA Bn A Co (-) 56 Armd Engr Bn Plat C Btry 575 AAA AW Bn SP 42 Tk Bn (-) 24
In compliance with CC A FO #5, TF BLUE moved 0730 24 December
with CC Serv Elms by way of SISSONNE-LAON-BRUNCHAMEL-AUVILLERS-ROCROI-FUMAY, to
Vic VIREUX-MALHAIN 08569 prepared for action against enemy on order. The 41 Cav Rcn Sq (Mecz) (-) preceded main
movement with the dual mission of securing liaison with British forces to the N
and establishing contact with enemy NE of the MEUSE RIVER. TF WHITE moved 1200 to area
SEDAN-CHARLEVILLE-PUSSEMANGE to secure bridges at SEDAN and CHARLEVILLE. 25
41 Cav Rcn Sq was ordered to restrict operations to movement W
of line BEAURAING P1042-BIEURE P0552 and CR P1042. Patrols contacted personnel of 9th Armd Div in this area. Balance of CC conducted route reconnaissance
and prepared for future action. CP CC A
moved to FUMAY O 815405 at 1800, and at 0100 26 December FO #6 was issued,
ordering movement of CC to concentration area SW FUMAY. 492 AFA Bn (-), A Co 63 Armd Inf Bn, Plat C
Btry 575 AAA AW Bn SP remained in position to secure the bridge at
VIRHEUX-MALHAIN. 26
The balance of the CC moved by daylight 26 December and closed
in new concentration area SW FUMAY by 1400.
Positions were improved that night.
Elms of CC left to hold bridge were relieved by units of 17 A/B Div and
returned to unit areas by nightfall.
Liaison was maintained with British at GIVET by CG and staff while units
conducted maintenance and rested. 27-28 Enemy planes were reported over Biv area night of 26-27 December but no action took place. Troops continued maintenance and training activities, and quiet period persisted until the evening of 28 December. 28-30
At 2100 28 December orders were received to move all units CC
A to vicinity CHARLEVILLE by 0500 29 December, prepared for march to an unknown
concentration area. A verbal warning
order and march order were issued at once, and the first Elm of the march
column crossed the IP at 0145 29 December.
A long forced march was made that night over roads covered with snow and
ice in the teeth of a driving snow storm.
Route: Biv 0-745555 – ROCROI (06952) – RIMOGNE (0-7043) – CHARLEVILLE
(0-8334) – sedan (0-9926) – CARIGNAN – FLORENVILLE – SUX, HOSSEUSE –
MONTPLAINCHAMPS – NEUFCHATEAU (P3440) – MOLINFAING (P3944) – RESPELLE (P3745)
approximately 70 miles. Enroute written
orders for the move were received from Div.
Hq CC A closed in Biv at P 375455, near RESPELLE, Belgium, at 1030 29
December, and all units were closed by 1400. 31 At 0745 TF WHITE crossed LD and advanced
during the morning to vicinity Coord P 4054, S of REMAGNE, where strong enemy
AW and AT fire was encountered. TF
WHITE was pinned down in place due to strong defensive nature of the terrain
and excellent siting of enemy AT weapons.
TF BLUE was not committed on either flank. Heavy artillery fire was delivered on enemy positions and two air
strikes were made during the course of the day. At dusk both task forces dug in, in partial defilade on VOCG and
improved their positions. After dark troops
were withdrawn to full defilade to consolidate under cover of darkness. At 2300 Ln O brought verbal instructions for
immediate movement of the CC to an attack position Vic MORHET, Belgium,
(P4558). Leaving the 41 Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
(-) to contain the enemy along the ridge line S of REMAGNE until relieved in
place by the 87th Inf Div, the command started on the road at 0100 31
December. Route: VAUX-les-ROSIERES (P4442) - PTE ROSIERE
(P4543) – MORHET (P4558) – MAGEROTTE (P4555).
Due to heavy traffic, snow, and icy roads, column was repeatedly held up
and did not close until 1130. CP CC A
was established at MORHET HALT. At 1210
31 December verbal attack order was issued to assembled unit commanders. Mission of the command was to attack N
between CCR and CCB to capture objective vicinity TROINE P470625. TFs for the attack were constituted as
follows: JANUARY 1945 1
After daylight 1 January 1945, a coordinated attack was
organized together with CCR on the left and CC B on the right. Due to the relative positions of the CC’s,
CC A could not attack until ate in the day since it was necessary that the
flanks of CC A be protected, and the position was considerably north of the
other two commands. The attack jumped
off at 1200 on VOCG to capture the group of small towns immediately N of
RECHRIVAL. TF BLUE led and made some
initial progress, which was shortly slowed by a heavy German counterattack from
the NE involving Inf and armor. Prompt
and well coordinated action of air support, plus artillery and tank action
stopped the counterattack with heavy losses to the enemy but necessitated
reorganization of our troops. At 1500
another coordinated attack was launched due N in the direction of HUBERMONT,
MILLOMONT, and RECHIMONT. Preparation
was afforded by artillery fire and aerial bombardment. The attack reached the edge of the town of
HUBERMONT P450590 just before dark. On
VOCG the CC withdrew from its forward positions to consolidate S of RECHRIVAL
in the positions previously held due to difficulty of night defense of the
advance area occupied. 2
FO #8 was issued at 0200 2 January. No change in TF’s was involved.
Units were ordered to hold ground gained at daylight. Tank elements were withdrawn from forward
position to mobile reserve and infantry was employed to defend assigned sector
along CC front. CP CC A moved to MORHET. Warning O’s were received to
the effect that the CC would be relieved by elements of the 17 A/B Division in
place. During the night artillery laid
down planned defensive fires. 3
Patrols from 63 AIB and C Tr 41 Cav maintained contact with
the enemy until relief was accomplished, 17 A/B being in position by 1500. Initially orders were received to move the
CC to a rear concentration area but they were remanded before execution and
units were held in mobile reserve immediately behind the front in the event of
enemy counterattack. 4
At 1000 4 January telephone orders were received from Division
to move to concentration area vicinity SIBRET P4954. A verbal order was issued through liaison officers and the
forward elements moved at 1230.
Route: LAVASELLE P5656, POISSON
MOULIN P4855, SIBRET. CP CC A
established SIBRET 1530, all units being closed by 1600. Troops maintained semi-alert status prepared
to support either 17 A/B Div to N and NW, or 101 A/B to N and NE. 5-7
Entire command remained in place performing maintenance and
personal hygiene. Routes and areas for
possible future use were reconnoitered by CC staff and officers from
units. At 1715 7 January orders were
received from 11 Armd Div placing CC A on alert status, prepared to reinforce
NE sector of 17 A/B Div on 11 Div O.
Medical detachment of 42 Tk Bn performed evacuation functions for
elements 17 A/B Div after their facilities were destroyed by fire. All units of CC A were alerted and remained
on alert status during the night. 8 At 1000 B Co 602 TD Bn was attached to 42 Tk Bn which unit was ordered to dispose TD’s to N edge of woods at Coord P4759-4959. 63 AIB was ordered to reinforce B Co 602 TD Bn with 2 Platoons 57 mm AT guns and 2 squads of Inf. FO #9 was issued at 2100 placing CC on alert status prepared to support 17 A/B Div on order. 9
42 Tk Bn ordered to move platoon of 76 mm tanks to vicinity of
CHENOGNE. 42 Tk Bn (reinf by Plat A Co
56 Engrs) moved to vicinity VILLEROUX P508553, and closed at 1645. Purpose of move was to facilitate
counterattack if required. 41 Cav Rcn
Sq troops maintained patrols from NIVIERS DU PAPE to MONTY between 2 elements
of 17 A/B. 10-11 On 10 January engineers checked routes and trails for mines. Located minefield P509565, gapped and marked west end of field so as to facilitate passage of our troops to N and NE. All elements continued reconnaissance of routes and areas to the N. Units commenced painting vehicles white in accordance with Div O. On 11 January C Co 42 Tk Bn was moved to P506588 to be prepared for immediate movement. A Co 56 Engr Bn cleared roads vic 42 Tk Bn, reconnoitered for German arms and equipment. Liaison was established with 193, 513, and 507 Inf Regts of 17 A/B Div. Aslt gun platoon of 42 Tk Bn moved into position jointly with 490 AFA to act as additional battery in G/S. Counterattack plans were formulated and discussed with commanders. 12 At 1100 12 January order was received from Div to assemble in area S LONGCHAMPS - - to attack on O. O of march was given as 63 AIB, 490 AFA, Div Arty, CC A Hq, C Brty, 575 AAA, 42 Tk Bn, 56 Engr, 41 Cav. Route: VILLEROUZ (P5055), BASTOGNE (P5558), LONGCHAMPS (P5363). Movement was interdicted by Div Arty, which had priority on the road. All troops closed in new concentration areas by 2100. During movement, reconnaissance was conducted by CG, Ex O and subordinate commanders. Div FO #8 required relief of 101st A/B elms in place, and contact was made by unit and Co commanders with the commanders of 101st units during daylight hours, while troops were on the road. CC A CP closed ROLLE P530619, and all troops had closed in concentration area by 2100. Relief of 101 A/B Elms was completed by 2200. At 2200 CCA FO #10 was issued calling for CC A to attack N, reduce enemy salients, and capture Objs in Z. Troops were as follows:
63 Armd Inf Bn 42 Tk Bn Atchd: Co C 811 TD Bn SP, 1 Plat A Co 56 Armd Engr Bn Btry C 575 AAA AW Bn (-) Co C 133 Ord Maint Bn Co A 81 Med Bn C Tr 41 Cav Rcn Sq (Mecz) sent out patrols to ascertain enemy strength, positions and movements. 13 Arty preparation commenced 0940 and attack jumped off at 1000 with 63 AIB leading. Atk proceeded, encountering moderate resistance. At 1155 Res Comd was attached to CC A, adding the following troops: Hq Res Comd 55 Armd Inf Bn Atchd 1st Plat Co C 56 Engr Bn 22 Tk Bn (-B Co) 3rd Plat Tr A 41 Dav Rcn Sq, (Mecz) Co C 81 Med Bn Res Comd had initially moved on left flank of CC A, and then moved in behind the combat elements of CC. At 1355 42 Tk Bn, having passed through 63 AIB on VOCG, reported elements on objective at BERTOGNE, and consolidating positions. CP CC A moved from ROLLE P536610 and closed LONGCHAMPS P5363 at 1600. At 1540 units reported town of BERTOGNE surrounded and CR SW of town occupied, thus accomplishing mission of cutting main road to HOUFFALIZE P6172. At dark the Elms, N, W, and E of BERTOGNE were withdrawn to N edge of the woods to the SE, in a position to dominate the Obj by fire. At 2200 D Troop of 41 Cav was attached to CC A to be utilized on call through Div CG. 14 At 0300 14 January, CCA FO #11 was issued calling for the CC to turn E in direction of high ground S of HOUFFALIZE, seizing intermediate Objs in Z. Troops in this operation were: Hq & Hq Co CCA (Atchd Btry C(-) 575 AAA Bn and Hq Res Comd) 42 Tk Bn (Atchd 1st Plat A Co 56 Armd Engr Bn) 41 Cav Rcn Sq Mcz (-) 63 AIB A Co 56 Engr Bn (-) Co C 811 TD Bn (SP) 55 Armd Inf Bn (Atchd 1st Plat Co C 56 Engr Bn) 22 Tk Bn (- Co B) D Tr 41 Cav Rcn Sq (Mecz) (Atchd on call) In place (CHAMPS) and proceeded to
join command, traveling on foot. B Co
602 TD was attached vicinity LONGCHAMPS and ordered to join 42 Tk Bn as soon as
possible. The attack advanced slowly throughout the day through heavy woods in the face of concentrated enemy small arms and mortar fire, together with some artillery. At 1500 55 AIB reported on the initial objective and 41 Cav on their right reached their objective at 1730. All elements then prepared to defend in place awaiting orders for next movement. FO #12, issued 2300, divided the CC into two major task forces with troops as follows: TROOPS Hq & Hq Co CC A Res Comd C Btry (-) 575 AAA AW Bn SP TASK FORCE STUBBS 193 Inf Regt (- Bn White) 41 Cav Rcn Sq Mcz (-) 55 Armd Inf Bn Plat C Co 56 Engr Bn Med Co 42 Tk Bn Med Co 22 Tk Bn Co C 811 TD Bn SP (- 1 Plat) TASK FORCE BELL 63 Armd Inf Bn 42 Tk Bn (-) White Bn 193 Inf Regt B Co 602 TD Bn Sp A Co 56 Armd Engr Bn CC RESERVE 22 Tk Bn (- Cos B & C) Plat Co C 811 TD Bn CC TNS Cos A & C 81 Med Bn Co C 133 Ord Maint Bn Plat 224 Med Co 15
Attack commenced 1000 15 January. TF Stubbs met little or no opposition and seized their first
close-in objective at 1100. TF Bell,
following intensive artillery and air bombardment, seized the first major
objective PIED DU MONT P5467 at 1130.
Rcn was initiated and attack reorganized at once. Driving E in a coordinated Tank-Infantry attack,
TF Bell overran COMPOGNE P5567 and RASTADT by 1500. TF Stubbs initially assisted attack of TF Bell by fire, and then
started a flanking movement on COMPOGNE from the S and SE. Attack of TF Bell was continued to VELLEROUX
P5568, but after reaching outskirts of town by dusk, enemy counterattack
consisting of tanks and infantry necessitated withdrawal to defilade west of
town. Enemy tanks after counterattack
retired to woods NE VELLEROUX. 16
At 0300 report from 41 Cav placed them NE of RASTADT at coord
P5571. During the night, TF’s
reconnoitered crossings of VAUX RIVER in Z.
At 0820 Plat of A Tr reported 1 Km S of objective. At 0930 Plat A Tr 41 Cav Rcn Sq Mecz reached
objective on OURTHE RIVER. 17
During the night, 18 prisoners were taken in southern sector
of CC A zone, and patrols located enemy troops in COWAN. Morning of 17 January units maintained
positions reinforcing front line elements under control of Col. Stubbs. CCR components of CC A reverted to CCR
control and moved early to new locations to the S. Warning orders were disseminated to all units to prepare for move
to rear area. 63 AIB, Co A 56 Engrs
moved out 1400 on VOCG to billets in LONGCHAMPS. 18-19 Div FO #9 received 18 January confirmed movement of all troops. At 1000 42 Tk Bn moved to LONGCHAMPS, 22 Tk Bn to MONAVILLE (P5768). C Tr 41 Cav Sq moved under control 41 Cav Sq to Sq bivouac at VILLEROUX (P5155). CP CC A moved from COMPOGNE at 1200, closed P540621 at 1315. Commenced maintenance and refitting, continued throughout 19 January. CP moved to ROLLE P530618, closed 1615. 20-21 At 1430 20 January CC A commenced movement on Div order to concentration area vicinity NOVILLE. Route: LONGCHAMPS – RECOGNE (P5763) – COBRU (P5864) – NOVILLE (P5864) – RACHAMPS (P6067). Movement was made under very difficult road conditions, and proceeded slowly. CP established RACHAMPS P615667, and all units closed 1900. Tr C 41 Cav ordered to reinforce Tr D patrols on line WANDE-BOURCY (P6468) – BOUER (P6467). A Co 56 Engr Bn plus Div Engrs cleared mines in path of Adv. Div O called for seizure of BURET (P6668), and plans were formulated for this objective. Scheme of maneuver originally set was abandoned due to patrol reports that the enemy had withdrawn from the Div front. L/D was moved to NE edge of wood opposite BOEUR, and 63 AIB left Biv area at 0730 closely followed by 42 Tk Bn and one Btry of 490 AFA Bn. TF SHEELY, composed of one Tk and one Inf Co jumped off at 0900 to take BOEUR. No resistance was encountered, and the town was occupied without incident, except the location of numerous hasty minefields enroute. Blown bridge at BOEUR retarded movement of vehicles, but during repair by A Co 56 Engr, dismounted infantry and cavalry forded the stream and proceeded toward BURET. Objective was occupied at 1200 by leading elements, and entire command closed in the town by 1800. All troops were ordered into billets for the night. Cavalry patrols from C Tr 41 Cav continued advance to the end of the Div sector, contracting Elms of 17 A/B on N and 6th Armd Div on S. 22
By morning of 22 January, cavalry patrols had reached the end
of the Div sector and encountered no enemy resistance. D Tr 41 Cav relieved C troop in sector, and
continued patrol action. B Co 602 TD Bn
and A Co 22 Tk Bn reverted to Bn control and moved out of CC A sector. 23-25
Troops rested, performed maintenance and conducted road
reconnaissance. Contact was maintained
with flank elements, liaison established with 17 A/B on N and command liaison
accomplished by CG with all neighboring divisions. Engineers removed mines, cleared roads and improved bridges at
HARDIGNY and TAVIGNY. 26-27
Liaison maintained with 87 Inf Div. 28-31 CC
relieved by Div of responsibility for direct liaison with flank elements. Reconnaissance of routes continued by staff
and battalion commanders. Training
program for combined infantry-tank tactics put into effect covering removal of
minefields, Tank-Inf communications, patrolling, attack of fortified position,
tank-borne infantry, and mounted infantry attack. LOSSES
W.A. Holbrook Jr. Brig Gen USA Commanding ADDENDA TO AFTER
ACTION REPORT 23 DEC 44 – 31 JAN 45 During the period from 22 January to 31 January 45, the problem of reorganization of the armored infantry battalion under this command was taken up. Orders received from CG Third Army stated that 57mm AT guns organic to T/O of the armored infantry battalion should be turned in and replaced as may be suitable. After considerable discussion, 63 Armd Inf Bn reorganized on the basis laid down by 11 Armd Div which reconstituted the tactical strength of this component of CC A as follows: In each rifle company 57mm AT guns and sections are eliminated. The personnel formerly employed as gun crews are utilized partially as additional 60mm mortar men and partially as riflemen. The close support mortar strength of the Bn is therefore duplicated and the AT gun, which had proven impracticable in this terrain, has been eliminated. W.A. Holbrook, Jr. Brig Gen USA AFTER ACTION REPORT
HEADQUARTERS CC”A”
11TH ARMORED DIVISION
1 FEB 1945 THRU 28 FEB 1945
HEADQUARTERS COMBAT COMMAND “A” APO 261, U.S. ARMY
15 March 1945
SUBJECT: Action Against the Enemy for Period 1 February – 28 February 1945
TO: Commanding General, 11th Armored Division
1. The following report is submitted of the action of CC A against the enemy for the period of 1 February – 28 February 1945, as required by AR 345-105, C3.
FEBRUARY 1945
1
The month of February 1045 proved to be most inactive for CCA 11 Armored
Division. As the period opened CCA CP was located in BURET, Belgium, the
headquarters being closely surrounded by troops under its control. Composition
of the command was as follows: 2-3 During the last few days of January the CC had initiated training, especially of its tank and infantry elements, based on experience accumulated during combat in the preceding period. From 1 February thru 2 February this program was continued. On 3 February 63 Armd Inf Bn was detached from the Command and moved to concentration area vicinity P8876 under control of CC Reserve.
4 On 4 February during the absence of CC staff, which was engaged in P/R of front line area, CG CCA was given verbal instructions at Division Hq warning that the command was to go into Corps reserve in an area of ST VITH with the following troops:
42 Tk Bn C Btry 575 AAA Bn (SP) A Co 56 Armd Engr Bn Det 133 Ord Maint Bn
A verbal order was issued to assembled unit commanders designating route of March and IP time.
5 On 5 February, orders were changed inasmuch as road clearance could not be obtained for the movement. Billeting parties were sent to the proposed concentration area vicinity SCHLIERBACH while CG performed P/R in that area and CC Staff reconnoitered routes. At noon Division issued telephone instructions to the effect that a different area had been assigned to the command in vicinity KROMBACH, Belgium, and at 1430 Division FO #11 was received confirming this new assignment.
6 On 6 February billeting party under CCA S-2 left for the new assembly area and upon receipt of telephone instructions from the Ex O at 1330 the S-3 issued orders to the command to move. The first element crossed IP in BURET at 1330 and all units closed in vicinity of KROMBACH P8185 by 1915. Route of march was BURET – TAVIGNY – CETTERU – LIMERIE – GOUVY – BEHO – MALDANGE – BRAUNLAUF – KROMBACH. Order of march: D Tr 41 Cav, A CO 56 Engr Bn, 42 Tk Bn, Hq & Hq CCA, C Btry 575 AAA Bn, A Co 81 Med Bn, A Co 133 Ord Maint Bn. 63 AIB, moving under oral instructions from Ex O CC A, rejoined the command and billeted at THOMMEN at 1630. At 2155 CW message was received from Division relieving D Tr 41 Cav from assignment to CC A and attaching them to Reserve Command at BERG REULAND 7 February. Orders were issued to effect this movement which took place at daybreak 7 February.
7-8-9 On 7-8 February troops improved billets and commenced work on roads in vicinity of the concentration area which were almost impassable due to heavy mud. At 2025 8 February orders were received from Division by telephone releasing 63 AIB from attachment to CC A and transferred them to CCR on 9 February. Warning orders were issued to 63 AIB which moved 0800 9 February by infiltration to vicinity BERG REULAND to come under CCR control.
10-22 From 10 to 22 February the command was completely inactive from a tactical standpoint, remaining in billets in the vicinity of KROMBACH, Belgium, engaged in daily training of reinforcements, maintenance of roads in the CC area and work on the Corps MSR.
23-24 On
23 February, G-3 alerted the command with a telephone message stating that a
probable movement to the vicinity of HERMESPAND was contemplated. Route
reconnaissance was immediately undertaken by members of CC staff and Bn staffs
and warning orders issued to the troops. On 24 February route reconnaissance
was continued and command liaison established with 87 Inf Div. At 1800 24
February letter of instruction was received from Division based on VIII Corps
FO #12. CCA was to be attached for operational control to the 87 Inf Division
for a defensive mission or to repel possible counterattack against 87 Inf
positions. A Co 705 TD Bn was to be attached. Attachment of CC A to 87 Inf Div
was confirmed as of 1300 24 February. At 0130 25 February memorandum was issued
to all units concerning details of the march to 87 Inf Div area. Under Division
letter of instruction 24 February new composition of CC A was as follows: 24-28 63 AIB, 490 AFA Bn and 41 Cav (-) moved separately from rest of command from vicinity LEIDENBORN P9173 via BLEIALF – SCHONBERG – Vic MANDERFELD. Balance of CC moved from concentration area Vic KROMBACH via HINDERHAUSEN – SERT LES ST VITH – ST VITH – SCHONBERG – MANDERFELD. All elements had closed west of MANDERFELD by 1900 25 February. Attachment of B Btry 174 FA Bn (155mm guns) and 161 Smoke Generating Co was confirmed 25 February and units proceeded to join the command from their previous location. Troops were assembled west of MANDERFELD on arrival in that vicinity, and under cover of darkness 25-26 February relief of elements of 347 Inf Regt was accomplished by 41 Cav Rcn Sq (-) and 63 AIB.
Relief was completed by 1200 26
February. A Co 705 TD relieved elements 607 TD Bn in 347 Inf sector in place
and completed relief 0130. CC A CP was established at MANDERFELD. On 26
February, CC A, having occupied its share of the 87 Inf Div line (from L0397 to
L0592), prepared plans to hold that position and to counterattack if necessary
while infantry elements of the 87 Inf Div cleared the pillboxes of the
Siegfried line to their direct front. At 1300 Commanders of CC A units were
assembled at CP and issued FO #15, confirmed in writing at 1600. Under
provisions of this order CC A supported by fire the attack of the 87 Inf Div,
thus diverting the attention of the enemy in its sector while the 87th attacked
the Siegfried installations from the south. Two companies of the 42 Tk Bn and B
Co 174 FA Bn were attached to 490 AFA Bn to deliver indirect H & I fires
under 490 AFA Bn control. One gun of B Btry 174 FA Bn was moved to a forward
position to fire directly at enemy pillboxes.
28 On 28 February warning orders were received from 11th Armd Div preparing CC for release from 87 Inf Div control within the following 36 hours. Liaison was re-established with 11th Armd Div pending more definite instructions. During the day reconnaissance was instituted by air and from forward Ops by CC A and Bn staffs to study the terrain in CC A sector of the 87 Div zone with a view to locating routes of access for tanks to support infantry in the attack on Siegfried defenses in zone, should it be ordered.
The month of February closed with the command having seen little action. On the final day of February troops were still under control of 87 Inf Div but were awaiting release to return to the 11th Armored Division for future employment. LOSSES
OUR OWN FORCES ENEMY FORCES Personnel Personnel Killed 1 Prisoners of War 8 Wounded 3 Killed & Wounded Undetermined Missing 0
Material - None Material – Could not be determined
W.A. Holbrook, Jr. Brig Gen, USA Commanding HEADQUARTERS COMBAT
COMMAND “A” APO 261, U.S. ARMY
16 April 1945
SUBJECT: Action Against the Enemy for the Period 1 March – 31 March 1945
TO: Commanding General, 11th Armored Division
1. The following report is submitted of the action of CC A against the enemy for the period 1 March – 31 March 1945, as required by AR 345-105, C3.
MARCH 1945
1 The month of March opened with the command still under operational control of 87th Inf Div in vicinity of MANDERFELD, Belgium. The sector occupied was directly opposite a portion of the German Siegfried Line, and plans under which CC A operated called for aid by fire to be given to elements of the 87 Inf Div then engaged in clearing that portion of the line by an enveloping movement from the south. 1-3 Routine patrolling of the zone continued actively both night and day and staff members continued front line reconnaissance. At 2230 3 March word was received from 87 Inf Div that tentative objectives of CC A had been taken by 347 Inf and that mission was now to continue defense in place until relieved by elements of the 87th.
4 11 Armd Div was immediately informed of our change in status and at 1250 4 March orders were received returning the command to Division control and requiring movement at once to a new assembly area vicinity L0584, leaving 1 medium Co 42 Tk Bn, 1 Co 63 Armd Inf Bn and 1 Tr 41 Cav Sq to hold sector until relieved by elements 87 Inf Div. 41 Cac (- A Tr) was to revert to Division control on arrival in new assembly area. All units were alerted at once and the first unit crossed IP at MANDERFELD at 1500. Order of march: 490 AFA Bn, 42 Tk Bn (-B Co), A Co 56 Armd Engr Bn, A Co 705 TD Bn, 41 Cav Sq (-A, B, C), C Btry 575 AAA Bn, Tr A 41 Cav, B Btry 174 FA Bn, Hq Co CCA, A Co 81 Med Bn, 63 Armd Inf Bn (-B Co), Det 133 Ord Maint Bn. At 1530 orders were received providing 490 AFA Bn revert to Division Arty en route and would be met along axis of advance and diverted to proper area. B Btry 174 FA Bn was contacted by Ln from 174 FA Gp and diverted while en route to another location leaving CC A control. Route of march of principal elements of column was: MANDERFELD – ANDLER – SCHONBERG, BLEIALF – SELLERICH – NIDERMELAN, thence assembly area vicinity WASCHEID. Extreme darkness and poor road conditions retarded the march but all units had closed 0015 5 March. 5 At 0100 5 March written memorandum was received from 11 Armd Div ordering movement of command to new concentration area in vicinity BUDESHEIM L1680 – WALLERSHEIM L1478. Movement was to be initiated by 1200 5 March. Route reconnaissance was immediately undertaken early morning 5 March by CG and other officers. At 1200 5 March CC initiated movement to new concentration area. Order of March: 42 Tk Bn, 63 Armd Inf Bn, A Co 56 Engr, Hq Co CCA, C Btry 575 AAA Bn, Tr A 41 Cav Sq, A Co 705 TD Bn, Det 133 Ord Maint Bn, Co A 81 Med Bn. Despite unfavorable road conditions and priorities of other units on the roads, all units were closed in new area by 1830. Route followed: WASCHEID, CR 073845, RJ 088859, WILLERATH L0984 – GONDELSHEIM L1282 – RJ L119809 – WALLERSHEIM L1378. A Co 81 Med Bn Mvd via PRUM – FLERINGEN L1679 to WALLERSHEIM and was the last unit to close. The march was made without incident except that in swerving to pass a vehicle just out of WASCHEID, a medium tank of Hq Co CCA struck a mine which induced sympathetic detonation of nearby stack of mines, thus demolishing the tank and instantly killing the crew of five. During the evening of 5 March occasional artillery concentrations were received in the general area of the assembled troops but no casualties were incurred. At 2000 5 March orders were received from Division requiring reconnaissance of routes and attack positions in area of 4th Inf Div commencing daylight 6 March. In compliance, CG, Executive Officer and members of battalion staffs left on forward reconnaissance promptly at daylight. 6 At 0830 6 March Division FO #16 was received indicating possibility of movement through 90th Inf Div sector as well as the 4th Inf Div sector. Additional reconnaissance was immediately instigated in this direction. While staffs reconnoitered routes vicinity LISSINGEN L218802, reconnaissance was continued during the afternoon by cavalry elements for other crossings in area to the south. At 1700 General Ernst of the 90th Inf Div visited CCA CP and discussed the possibility of crossing KYLL River during the night of 6-7 March. At 1945 all units CC A were placed on a two-hour alert for this contingency. At 2100 a meeting of unit commanders was held to discuss plans for crossing of the KYLL River and a breakthrough to the east. At 2300 a platoon of A Tr 41 Cav was dispatched to vicinity of bridge site to ford the river and reconnoiter routes from the bridge site east until enemy contact was established. 7
At 0530 7 March report from this patrol stated that the road was being repaired
by friendly infantry but that enemy still held positions east of GEROLSTEIN
L2381. No demolitions of the type to impede motor movement were found. No
bypasses leading east from the bridge site were found, however, and the river
was considered to be unsuitable for fording by a column. It was therefore
necessary to wait completion of a suitable bridge. At 2400 CC A engineer
reported that the 90th Inf Div engineers were constructing a Bailey bridge
which would be completed during the morning of 7 March. The estimated time for
this completion was 0900. At 0700 7 March unit commanders were given verbal
order disposing troops in order of march as follows: Tr A 41 Cav, Task Force
AHEE, 42 Tk Bn (-1 Med Co), 2 Rif Cos 63 AI Bn, A Co 56 Engr (-), Hq CCA, C/575
(-), 490 FA Bn, Task Force BRADY, Med Co 42 Tk Bn, 63 AI Bn (-), Plat A 56
Engr, A Co 705 TD, 333 FA Gp, CC Tns. 8
Defense was organized and the town of KELBERG outposted. B Co 63 AI Bn was sent
forward a mile of HUNNERBACH L438883 to establish a line of departure for the
next day’s operations and seize the stream crossings between KELBERG and
HUNNERBACH. All crossings were captured intact. Remainder of Force AHEE
defended KELBERG night of 7-8 March making preparation for continuation of
mission, while elements in the rear set up perimeter defense in their own
sector. During the night task forces were reconstituted while A trains came
forward under most difficult circumstances to re-supply the column. H and I
fires were continued by FA Bns. New task forces were composed as follows (In
order of march):
BRADY Cos A & C 42 Tk Bn Plat A Co 56 Engr A Co 705 TD Bn (-1 Plat)
PICKETT 42 Tk Bn (-) RIF Co 63 AI Bn Plat A/56 Engr Plat A/705 TD
9
During the night patrols were sent out to contact friendly units thought to be
operating to the north. The town of ANDERNACH directly east on the RHINE River
was still in German hands and infantry patrols were dispatched to determine the
nature of enemy resistance. During the rest of the night Comd endeavored to
refit and prepare for operations against the final objective ANDERNACH after
0600 the following day. Gasoline supply was critical. At 0930 9 March patrols
returned from the town of ANDERNACH with information that defense was
apparently not highly organized and that the town was comparatively quiet.
Civilian reports stated there were large numbers of stragglers passing through
the town. 10 At daybreak 10 March operations were resumed and resistance was still found to exist. Civilians and SS troops dressed in civilian clothes accounted for a large portion of the action. During early morning a number of enemy attempted to escape across the RHINE in barges, several of which were destroyed by direct fire from tanks resulting in several hundred enemy dead. Force BRADY was augmented by B Co 55 Armd Inf Bn and later by D Co 42 Tk Bn in order to speed reduction of the town. PWs were sent back in increasing numbers throughout the morning. Cavalry operating on the north also returned large numbers of PWs principally from the town of EICH. At 1500 D/42 Tk and B/55 AI were returned to CC reserve as resistance in ANDERNACH had been reduced to a minimum. 11 On 11 March instructions were received from Div assigning a sector to be cleared by the CC in addition to the town of ANDERNACH. While Force BRADY as originally constituted completed the mopping up of ANDERNACH, Force AHEE, organized into three small forces and a reserve, continued mopping up operations in the smaller towns and wooded areas in the CC sector. 12 By 1200 12 March the entire CC area had been cleared. CP CCA was moved from PLAIDT to KRUFT L7198 at 1430 12 March. At 2230 Division operations Memo No. 33 was received ordering CC to move to a new assembly area upon relief by 6th Cav Group. Reconnaissance was immediately undertaken in the new area. Routine patrols were maintained until instructions were received from Division to execute proposed movement to new concentration area. 13-15 63 Armd Inf Bn moved to THUR L6795 afternoon 14 March and remainder of CC completed movement morning of 15 March commencing at 0600. CP CCA cleared KRUFT 0900, closed OBERMENDIG 1000. At 1030 15 March all troops were in their new locations which were as follows: Hq CCA, C/575, A/81 OBERMENDIG L6597; A/705 TD BELL L6498; 42 Tk, A/56 ETTRINGEN L6395; A/41 Cav ST JOHANN L6194; 63 AI Bn THUR L6795. 15-16 On 15 and 16 March the command rested, performed maintenance and improved billets. Enemy aircraft was active in the area but no casualties were incurred. Division Operations Memorandum #34 provided a new troop list for CC A as follows: 42 Tk Bn, 63 Armd Inf Bn, A/41 Cav, A/56 Engr, A/705 TD, C/575 AA, C/81 Med, A/133 Ord On 16 March CC staff was actively reconnoitering routes from OBERMENDIG to the MOSEL River line. CG 11 Armd Div visited CC A GP 1200 16 March and at that time communicated with CG VIII Corps and as a result of conversation placed Division on a 4-hour alert. CC A troops were informed of the alert and at 1330 were told to be ready to move by 1700. Brief telephone orders from Division gave destination of the command as LUTZERATH P7469. Control of the Division had been passed from VIII to III Corps. Verbal orders received by phone added A90 AFA Bn in D/8 and B Tr 41 Cav Sq to the previous list. Verbal order of march was given to assembled Ln officers with the IP at NEIDERMENDIG. Order of march: 63 AI, Hq CCA, C/575 AA, A/705 TD, 42 Tk, A/56 Engr, A/41 Cav, 490 AFA, A/133 Ord, C/81 Med, B/41 Cav. As the march was initiated 42 Tk was strafed by enemy aircraft while forming column. No casualties were suffered. The IP was crossed on time and the march proceeded. 17 By 0130 17 March all elements of the command had closed in vicinity DRIESCH L4870. CP CCA opened at DRIESCH 2105 16 March. Route of march: NEIDERMENDIG – KAISERESCH – DRIESCH. The march was made under extremely difficult conditions due to the poor road surface and extreme darkness. Difficulty of march was increased by the fact that vehicles coming the other way were employing lights since part of the route was behind the Corps no light line. Another incident of the march was destruction of one half track when the road gave way and the vehicle plunged 25 feet down a steep embankment. No casualties were suffered. At 0245 17 March Division Operations Memorandum #36 was received assigning routes of advance to the east including mission for CC A of advancing along a given route clearing En in Z, protecting L flank of Division and attempting to seize bridges across the RHINE River upon arrival. 33 FA Brig was to follow CC A. 355 Inf Bn also was to use this route. On the basis of these orders CC A FO #16 was issued at 0900 listing troops in order of march as follows:
TF AHEE HQ GROUP Co/42 Tk Bn Hq CC A Co/63 AI C/575 AAA AW Bn Btry 490 AFA Bn Plat 705 TD Bn 42 Tk Bn (-) Hq 33 FA Brig (-) A/56 Engr Bn B/41 Cav Sq Co/63 AIB Plat 705 TD Bn
TF BRADY Co 42 Tk Bn Btry 58 FA Bn 63 AI (-) A/285 Engr Plat 705 TD Bn 58 FA Bn (-) Bal Hq 33 FA Brig 775 FA Bn Tdwy Br Elms A/56 Engr
“A” Tps Gas Trucks Ammo Trucks Water Trucks
“B” Tps Kitchens C/81 Med Bn Gas & Ammo A/133 Ord Maint Bn
Request was made to Div to have A/41 Cav cross the MOSEL as an integral part of CC B in order to establish En contact along CC A route and gain information of the route of advance. Request was granted and at 1200 movement of A/41 Cav was initiated. At 1430 XII Corps order was relayed to CC A restricting movement east of NAHE River except for the establishment of the bridgehead. At 1440, in accordance with FO #16, forward elements of CC A comprising Force AHEE started to move. Rapidity of movement was restricted only by the crossing at BULLAY and enemy contact was not established until A/41 Cav at the head of the force approached KIRCHBERG L764164. Gp AHEE was deployed to meet and eliminate resistance which consisted of road block and enemy infantry in woods 2 Km N of KIRCHBERG. Resistance was eliminated and at nightfall security was established and patrols sent into KIRSCHBERG. KLUDENBACH on the W flank of the Clm was secured and the woods to the E were patrolled during the night. Remainder of Gp closed rapidly behind leading Elms and CP CC A was established at KAPPEL L7355 at 1930. B/41 Cav following the Clm reached KAPPEL and was sent forward to aid in patrolling vicinity KLUDENBACH at 2055. 18 At 0300 18 Mar message from C-3 released B/41 Cav to Sq control in place at 2200 17 Mar. Information was communicated to B/41 Cav. By VOCG A/41 Cav was reinforced by Plat Lt tanks D Co 42 Tk Bn and moved out 0600 to protect both flanks of road S of KIRCHBERG, wh |
