Preparation for Combat
By Brigadier General Charles S. Kilburn
On March 8, 1944, confidential orders from the War Department were received at Division Headquarters transferring Major General Edward H. Brooks to an overseas command which late proved to be that of Commanding General of the Second Armored Division. General Brooks led the Second Armored Division over the beaches of Normandy shortly after D-Day and, as a part of the First Army, participated in the Saint Lo breakthrough shortly thereafter with brilliant success. General Brooks led the pursuit of the First Army northward to the Belgium border. During this pursuit, he with a small number of his staff and a small detachment ambushed a sizeable German column and through effective command control, resulting in prompt reinforcement, practically annihilated the hostile force. Because of the outstanding achievements of the Second Armored Division under his leadership, General Brooks was soon elevated to command the VI Corps, which assignment he held at the end of the war.
On the departure of General Brooks, Brigadier General Charles S.
Kilburn assumed command of the Division. On March 16 War Department orders
were issued confirming, officially, his assignment as division commander.
The division, on the departure of General Brooks, also lost the
Chief of Staff who had so ably handled all staff matters since its activation,
Colonel Charles D. Palmer. Charlie Palmer joined 'Ted' Brooks as Chief of
Staff in the Second Armored Division and moved with him to the VI Corps in the
same capacity where he was promoted to Brigadier General in the early Spring
of 1945.
With General Kilburn moving up to division headquarters from CC A,
a new realignment in command channels became necessary. For the resumption of
a strenuous training schedule, after the readjustment of equipment incident to
the movement of the division from the Desert to Camp Cooke, the following
command slate materialized:
Division Commander: Brigadier
General Charles S. Kilburn
Commanding CCA: Colonel
Willard A. Holbrook (transferred from Division Trains)
Commanding CCB: Colonel
Thomas Stark
Commanding Division Reserve: Colonel Virgil Bell
Division Artillery: Colonel
John H. Howard
(Replaced Colonel William Gilmore who had departed for an important
assignment in Italy and who shortly thereafter was promoted to Brigadier
General)
Division Trains: Colonel
Robert Lowe
It is of interest to note here that all battalion commanders
announced on the reorganization of the division in September, 1943 were still
serving in those positions and were to continue to do so until the end of the
war with two exceptions; Lieutenant Colonel Theodore G. Bilbo who left command
of the 490 F.A. later to become Executive Officer of CC A, and Lieutenant
Colonel James R. Hoffman of the 21st Armored Infantry Battalion who was
injured in action on the first day of combat. It was a most fortunate record
for a division to go through the combat experienced by the 11th Armored
Division with only one casualty among Battalion commanders; although Joe Ahee
was out of action for 24 hours with an embarrassing wound. To replace Colonel
Palmer as Chief of Staff, Colonel Wesley W. Yale arrived on April 3 and
assumed that position.
Preparatory to leaving the desert, the division received orders to
evacuate to Camp Cooke all motor equipment in its possession as well as other
motor equipment in various motor pools scattered throughout the desert as the
War Department had resolved to liquidate the Desert Training Command at that
time. With an abundance of motor vehicles of all types, the movement to Camp
Cooke was materially facilitated. Upon arrival at Cooke it was found that all
motor equipment of the 6th Armored Division, including tanks, was available to
the division, the 6th having departed for the ETO. From the accumulated
equipment now present at Cooke, the division was enabled to equip itself
promptly and effectively for the important training ahead, although it meant
again the usual prodigious and efficient efforts of all maintenance echelons.
Excess motor equipment was turned in at Camp Roberts wherein lay an
unusual incident insofar as the division was concerned. For the only time in
its existence, the division was charged indirectly with improper care of motor
equipment. For the movement of the division from the desert, our
identification symbols had been placed on the bumpers of all vehicles. It was
thus that vehicles turned into Roberts bore the 11th AD. The Inspector General
of the Army, visiting that camp at this time noted some of these vehicles and
indicated that they showed signs of abuse. When presented with information
that we merely had evacuated the vehicles from the desert and the "11th
AD" was installed only for the overland march, the matter was clarified
and dropped.
With the approach of D-Day, which was common knowledge, our ensuing
training was considered in the light of "pay dirt". The following
objectives were emphasized:
Final qualifications in marksmanship with all weapons, both of an
individual character and of a crew nature, including the 57mm Anti-tank
Cannon.
Final phases of artillery firing including fires over tanks and
infantry, concentration of massed fires, etc.
Tactical employment of tanks in various roles—offense, delaying
action, defense, etc.
Communications—perfection of individual operators up to combat
command and division control nets, emphasizing use of simple and effective
code procedures.
Constant small exercises utilizing all supporting fires— machine
guns, mortars, bazookas, artillery.
Platoon, company and battalion problems culminating in the
employment of small task forces using small detachments of all arms—infantry,
tanks, engineers, medical, etc.
During this period, also, stress was paid to high standards of unit
internal housekeeping with kitchens and messes receiving particular attention.
As a result, our standards of sanitation were acknowledged in all subsequent
inspections from higher levels.
It was evident at this time that our remaining opportunities for
training might be limited. It appeared appropriate, therefore, for the new
division commander to orient all members of the division on the aspects
present under such circumstances. Accordingly, at an assembly of the division
on March 24, the following features of an effective combat force were covered:
Discipline—Only a division with great esprit and pride can be
said to hold high standards of discipline, for that intangible virtue is based
primarily on self respect as well as respect for those individuals from whom
the fibers of discipline emanate in any group—discipline based on loyalty
springs from the top, in the squad, the platoon, company all the way up.
Military Courtesy—There is only one standard, high. Several
laudatory messages were read from various letters and military reports
illustrating the current reputation of the division in both civilian and
military spheres.
Maintenance—Only vehicles which run are effective in combat.
Lives may depend on the excellence of maintenance at that time. Maintenance of
weapons, and of personnel from the point of view of medical attention and
operation of messes is equally important.
Training for combat—A definite objective in every day's training.
No unit must suffer the consequences of lost time and lowered morale induced
by ill prepared training periods. Now was the time for combined training to
inculcate mutual confidence; infantry in tanks—tanks in the infantry—both
in our artillery.
Mental preparation for combat—Now was the time to visualize the
shock and rigors of battle. Training to produce as close simulation to combat
as possible. The first days of combat at Bastogne paid with interest the days
of training now at Cooke.
High standards—All adjacent units to adopt the standards of the
division—not the division falling to the standards of any neighbors. The
division to excel in any undertaking. The unconfirmed report that certain
young women of the community considered members of the division below par in
dancing must cease. To overcome such delinquency, the prohibition against the
wearing of light civilian shoes was herewith rescinded. Even in the field of
jitter-bugging, the division would excel.
On March 31 an additional assembly was conducted involving only the
officers of the division in order to re-orient certain factors of importance
to all leaders. The first obligation and duty of an officer concerned the care
and welfare of men whose fortune it was to fall under his command.
Only those who set example by precept in personal and military
conduct met the standard of an accepted leader within the 11th AD.
The activities of the division during the period April-August may
be covered under the following general features: During April and May small
unit problems were conducted concurrently with final phases of marksmanship.
In June every unit of the division conducted a problem under combat
command, Reserve and Trains Headquarters supervision. Each problem included at
least one black-out march. Training for the month culminated in combat command
and reserve command exercises, utilizing all arms in a fire problem. By this
time the fires of our artillery had become highly efficient and every problem
involved the use of artillery overhead firing.
Artillery firing went on constantly. A minor incident on May 12
restricted materially our available firing areas. On that date, with all
battalions participating, a fluke ricochet struck the crack Daylight Limited
of the Southern Pacific. Fragments penetrated the dining car injuring two
persons. As a precaution, the northern artillery area was withdrawn from use,
which thereafter confined all firing to the southern area.
With battle lessons coming in from the Pacific and from Europe,
particularly after D-Day, much attention was given to air ground liaison and
the principles of close air support for ground troops. As no Army Air Force
tactical elements were available on the West Coast, rather close ties were
established with the Navy Training Command with headquarters at San Diego.
Admiral Ralph Davis demonstrated the greatest interest and arranged for the
participation of naval close support aviation in several exercises with the
division.
On July 18 word was received that Major General Charles L. Mullins,
Commanding General 25th Infantry Division (previously CG, CCB) had requested
the assignment of Colonel Stark as his Chief of Staff. Official orders were
received within a few days confirming this new assignment for Colonel Stark.
On August 15, Colonel J. J. B. Williams, who had served as Patton's Chief of
Artillery in North Africa and who was currently on duty with the Armored Force
Center reported at Cooke as our new Chief of Staff. Colonel Yale left the
position of Chief of Staff for reassignment as the new commander of CC B.
By the first of August our preparatory measures for movement
overseas were well along. As a final gesture of combat training, before
packing weapons and turning in vehicles prevented their use, arrangements were
made for a concluding problem utilizing all arms along lines of the most
recent combat lessons. On August 8, with the Corps Commander, Major General
John Millikin, present, the division undertook a rather formidable exercise in
conjunction with a large contingent of naval aircraft in close support. The
entire division, less participating troops, occupied grandstand seats for the
event. After an artillery preparation with salvos falling some 500 yards in
front of the spectators, the engineers of Lieutenant Colonel Inge with
accompanying infantry in support, reduced a simulated enemy fortified strong
points. Two task forces then advanced as a coordinated attack on a distant
objective under the support of naval dive bombers. Our measures for air-ground
liaison proved effective, as the objective came under prompt and severe
punishment from the air. After leading tanks had over-run the hostile
position, the exercise terminated in an assault by tank borne infantry to
occupy the dominating high ground and initiate a pursuit while the artillery,
by overhead fire, searched the routes of retirement of the simulated enemy.
The entire event was executed with precision to the entire satisfaction of the
division commander and the approval of the corps commander.
While orientation for movement overseas started as early as June,
practical measures started in earnest after the first of July. Medical
requirements such as various innoculations as well as dental corrections were
processed on a 24-hour schedule. Each unit established a key group qualified
in all details of packing with the 56th Engineers acting in the leading role
for the division.
On June 1, a message to division headquarters inquired as to
whether the division could be ready for overseas service by July 1. The answer
by the division commander to higher authority was an unqualified
"YES". Although unconfirmed, it was later learned that the foregoing
inquiry was based on a request from General MacArthur's Headquarters that the
11th A.D. be made available to the Pacific. It is to be assumed the Combined
Chiefs of Staff decided that the maximum armored strength be assembled in the
ETO, hence our decisive role at Bastogne and historic pursuit into Eastern
Europe.
During our tour at Camp Cooke a number of notable persons visited
the division.
In the last week of March, a letter from the Secretary of War
advised that the Postmaster General, the Honorable Frank C. Walker would visit
the division. Mr. Walker participated in a luncheon at Division HQ Staff Mess
which impresses him to this day. In addition to witnessing the training under
way at the rime, one vehicle of each type within the division was assembled
for his inspection. The NCO in charge of each vehicle described the mechanical
features and tactical purpose of it. Mr. Walker was not only highly impressed
with the quality of Army vehicles but more so with the poise and quality of
the men who operated them in the 11th AD. The highlight of the Postmaster
General's visit was the opportunity of seeing Captain Robert Ameno of the 41st
Tank Battalion. Within a short time Louise Walker, daughter of the Postmaster
General and Mrs. Walker, and "Bob" Ameno were married. Captain Ameno,
the highest type of American young manhood, was killed in action at the head
of his tanks in a most gallant maneuver on our first day of combat at
Bastogne.
On May 2, General Marshall paid a surprise visit to the division.
The division commander received implicit instructions that no program of a
special nature was to be prepared or followed, nor would any information
ensure as to the presence of the Chief of Staff at Cooke. General Marshall
visited the training areas of each type unit undergoing routine schedules;
however, with all radios in the division fairly active it is questionable as
to whether his approach to any area was any great surprise. The Chief of Staff
was impressed with the standards of training he witnessed, especially a firing
problem under way by the infantry under the supervision of Virgil Bell. The
concluding event of his visit involved a talk to all officers and NCO's (first
three grades) of the division in which the principal topic concerned the need
of the most expeditious manner of ending the war with minimum casualties. On
June 5 Mr. Peter B. Kyne, the eminent author, paid us a visit as the guest of
the division commander, an old friend of long standing. The high touch of
Peter Kyne's visit comprised a one-man tank exercise. As an Artillery battery
commander in the First World War, he was accustomed to only indirect fire with
his 75's. Since that war, it had been his aspiration to fire a 75mm as a
direct fire weapon; the tank was the answer. Accordingly under the tender care
of a selected tank crew of the 41st Tank Battalion, Peter Kyne lined up on his
first target at 1100 yards and in his words "knocked the hell out of
it". With direct hits on the next two rounds, the exercise was completed
and the participants, including the tank, returned to the Company motor pool;
the eminent author was content. During the stay of Peter Kyne, the division
received another distinguished gentleman through the good offices of G-1,
"Ole" Olson, — Mr. Jim Jeffries, former heavyweight champion of
the world. Both visitors attended a camp boxing card where "Jim"
officiated as referee. Both were impressed with the offensive power of every
Thunderbolt fighter including the renowned "Andy" Anderson of the
42nd Tankers.
Visits from various inspection groups occurred frequently. Two
parties from the Armored Force Center at Fort Knox looked us over in April and
again in July. On both occasions, their comments registered the high standards
of training and maintenance found in all units. Inspectors from the Chief of
Ordnance and other agencies conveyed similar laudatory views. The climax in
inspections took place in the latter part of August when Lieutenant General
Ben Lear, Chief of Ground Forces, with a considerable staff spent two days
looking us over before we started for the Port of Embarkation. At the same
time Major General Charles L. Scott, Chief of the Armored Force was present.
General Scott was interested, particularly, in the training of tank
marksmanship then in final stages. In July the Division Commander with Combat
Command and Reserve Command commanders had attended a special course at Fort
Knox stressing the highlights of a newly conceived procedure along this line
of training. On their return, the features of this new procedure were
immediately instituted in the Division with the result that all tank personnel
had completed the course prior to departure from Cooke. General Scott was
elated with his observations in the division. General Lear was especially
interested in the progress of the Orientation and Educational measures
developed in the Division. He requested that our measures be outlined in the
way of an S.O.P. (Standard Operating Procedure) which was accomplished
superbly by Lieutenant Harold Gilliam and his crew of assistants including Ted
Cronyn. Our S.O.P. as provided the Army Ground Forces was subsequently
distributed to the Army at large.
During our stay at Cooke, a number of events, beyond the purview of
routine training took place.
On March 11, 12 and 13 a selected group comprising all arms
participated in an elaborate War Bond Drive" in the amphitheater at San
Diego. For three consecutive nights, this group of Thunderbolts, under the
charge of Lieutenant Colonel Bray, C.O. of the 63rd Armored Infantry
Battalion, demonstrated modern war before crowds of 30,000 or over. Every
feature of war by small elements, which was practical, was introduced into the
demonstration. On the final night, the work of the detachment was witnessed by
high Army and Navy brass including the division commander before a S.R.O.
crowd. Numerous letters were received at Division Headquarters commending the
outstanding performance of these representatives of the Division as well as
their exemplary appearance and conduct in San Diego.
On the Fourth of July the Division was represented at Santa Barbara
in a most spectacular demonstration. Again the spirit to excel was manifest in
the appearance of all equipment and the personal conduct of every member
participating. Again laudatory letters were later received expressing esteem
for members of the Division by the California public.
On Easter Morning the Division Chaplain, Chaplain Johnston,
organized a sunrise service. Although on the chilly side by way of weather a
large attendance gathered for services. It was the initial appearance of the
division's choir which was to reap much appreciation as time went under the
inspirational leadership of Chaplain Hamilton of the Division Artillery. All
who were privileged to hear this men's choir fell under its spell. Requests
came in from San Diego to Seattle and as far East as Salt Lake City for its
presence.
One of the outstanding events of a religious character grew from
the inspiration of Chaplain Gilbert who had but recently joined the division
from a tour in Alaska. Great stress was evident on all sides on the features
of P.O.M. Father Tom suggested that perhaps some thought could be given to the
spiritual S.O.P. and he suggested a Three Day Retreat for all members of the
Catholic faith in the Division, further that such ceremony take place in the
last week of June in the Mission at Lompoc, which had been rehabilitated in
recent years. While some 3,000 members of the Faith were initially expected to
participate, it was found that only some 1200 could be accommodated in the
Mission. On June 25 some 1200 Catholic members of the Thunderbolts marched
solemnly across the rolling California hills towards the Mission. Half way the
column was joined by a robed member of the Order operating the Mission who,
holding high a Cross, led the procession to the Holy grounds where a century
ago the Dons of early California had worshiped.
For two days, given to individual silence and meditation, the
participants benefited from the rituals of the Retreat. A stout-hearted Irish
mess sergeant from the 42nd Tank Battalion with his kitchen crew assured all
attendants adequate physical sustenance. Fathers of the Passionate Heart Order
assured spiritual progress and sustenance to each individual. On the third
day, with the Archbishop of Los Angeles officiating confirmation ceremonies
took place. After the confirmation, the entire group was addressed by the
Division Chaplain, Mr. Joe Scott, a noted orator of Eucharistic renown,
General Kilburn and Archbishop Moncrief. A most appealing and inspiring sermon
by the Passionate Father conducting the retreat terminated the ceremonies. The
press as well as motion picture news agencies carried the details of the
Retreat throughout the nation.
On August 15 the Division celebrated its second anniversary.
Colonel Olson, G- 1, and Major Knapp (Joseph A.) Division Special Service
Officer organized and presented a most complete and elaborate series of
activities. The day was highlighted in the evening when a notable array of
Hollywood celebrities participated in an entertainment attended by a capacity
crowd of the division.
By the first of August War Department plans for our movement
overseas had definitely crystallized. The latest in advanced weapons and
equipment was being received daily, issued to appropriate units and carefully
packed for shipment. Final details, prescribed by the official POM Manual,
were being given constant attention.
One of the first orders received concerned the movement of an
advance party to Elmira, New York, the Holding and Reconsignment point for the
New York Port of Embarkation. The party was to consist of key members of the
various services, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Signal, Medical and Engineers.
Their function was to receive and check all equipment, principally combat
vehicles completely equipped for combat, earmarked for the 11th Armored
Division. As a precautionary measure, the Division Commander elected to
increase the party, as designated by higher headquarters, by a considerable
number (35) of additional officers and assistants. This course of action
proved most effective. The Division party at Elmira, operating on a 24 hour
schedule, had soon identified our equipment to the last vehicle, and so
reported to the Division Commander at Cooke.
Now occurred an untoward incident. The Thunderbolts were definitely
scheduled to follow overseas the 10th Armored Division. At this time higher
authority decided to transfer the 86th Infantry Division to Cooke. In order to
economize on critical railroad facilities it was further decided to delay our
movement until the arrival of rail equipment bearing elements of the 86th
Division. As sea transport had been set up for the 11th AD, the War Department
now issued instructions for the movement of the 12th Armored Division to New
York in order to utilize the shipping already set up for the Thunderbolts. As
the equipment for the 12th Armored had not yet arrived at Elmira, the next
step was to issue the greater part of our equipment to them. It was this
series of events which delayed our departure for England and resulted
ultimately in our assignment to the VIII Corps where combat objectives were
given frequently far remote from those appropriate to an Armored Division.
One incident arose at this time indicating a manner in which the
best laid plans go astray. After our advance party reached Elmira, new tables
of equipment were published authorizing two-way radio, transmitting as well as
receiving, for all tanks. Heretofore only two tanks out of five in a platoon
were so equipped. The value of such equipment was so obvious that the division
commander spared no efforts in seeing that every Thunderbolt tank was so
equipped. Contact with the party at Elmira assured all that such radio
equipment would be secured. When our tank equipment was diverted to the 12th
Armored this issue had to be re-initiated from scratch. Urgent messages were
dispatched to Ground Forces to expedite delivery. On his way East the division
commander stopped in Washington with a primary aim of securing this radio
equipment. Within 24 hours assurance was given that the extra radio sets would
be delivered within the week at the NYPE. A timely check there later located
the equipment in a box car at Cleveland, Ohio. Drastic messages succeeded in
placing this valuable equipment in our hand in time to be loaded just prior to
the departure of our convoy.
About the third of September our first business-like movement took
place when our advance parry, with personnel from every unit departed for the
ETO under Colonel Holbrook. By the time the party reached New York, it was
under Brigadier General Holbrook to the delight of the entire division.
General Holbrook led his personnel aboard the HMS "Queen Mary" for
the crossing. Aboard on the trip was a VIP in the person of the Honorable
Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain. Before landing in England,
the top brass in the party had enjoyed luncheon as guests of the Prime
Minister as well as prodigious liquid refreshments into the late afternoon. As
our original overseas orders intended our landing on the beaches at Cherbourg,
General Holbrook immediately departed from Southampton for that destination.
As later explained, our advance party actually received us in Southern
England.
By September 10 our movement toward Europe was well under way with
our troop trains departing from Cooke as often as the units of the 86th
Division unloaded. Insistence on immaculate kitchen cars on departure delayed
briefly a few trains; however, when it was evident to Southern Pacific
officials that we would not load until kitchen cars passed inspection, a
little further delay was experienced.
The Division occupied Camp Kilmer, New Jersey, for final
processing. Within a few days, statements of camp officials indicated that the
Thunderbolts were unusually efficient in all processing details. Reports,
likewise, indicated that troop trains arriving with units of the Division were
the cleanest and best organized to reach Camp Kilmer over a considerable
period. Arrangements were made to see that every member of the Division had an
opportunity to see and visit the city of New York.
Just prior to sailing, General Kilburn held his final assembly of
the division in this country. Four factors in the days ahead were stressed.
In all further opportunities for training, the strictest attention
would be paid to assure that every available supporting weapon was utilized.
Any weapon not firing was a weapon wasted. No hostile objective would be
subdued with human blood and sacrifice when the same could be achieved by
firepower. Let massed fires play their part. From the first action let the
Germans realize that to snipe a Thunderbolt from the depths of any building
meant total destruction of that building. The Germans could either die or
surrender, but once our units were within a town or village he could not snipe
and live.
That with winter approaching, bad weather would be the normal
situation. Therefore, every member of the Division was to expect the rigors of
inclement and severe weather and be mentally and physically prepared for it.
The wet rain of Southern England and the snow and subzero weather at Bastogne
tested the mettle of the Division in these respects with normal effects on the
tasks at hand. That no division would go into combat where its individual
members nor its collective units were better prepared for eventualities nor
with better prospects of valiant and effective action than the group of
American soldiers in the present assembly.
On the afternoon of September 27 our advance parties left Camp
Kilmer to board the ships on which the Division would sail. Colonel Bell had
been designated Troop Commander aboard HMS "Samaria" and Colonel
Lowe commander of troops aboard USS "Hermitage".
On the following day, September 28, in accordance with a rigid
troop movement table, the remainder of the Division boarded trains at Camp
Kilmer and transferring to ferries on the West Bank of the Hudson River was
landed at piers adjacent to either the Samaria or Hermitage. With each man
carrying every item of individual combat equipment, including weapons, only
men in prime physical condition could have negotiated the steep and slippery
gangplanks onto the vessels. The gracious and patriotic women of the American
Red Cross, ever present with our troops, were on hand with hot coffee and
doughnuts which were enthusiastically accepted by all ranks.
By dark, the division was aboard with some 5,000 on the
"Samaria" and some 4,800 on the "Hermitage". Late in the
evening the Postmaster General came aboard the Samaria to bid his son-in-law,
Captain Robert Ameno, 41st Tank Battalion, a last farewell and to bid
"good-luck' to General Kilburn and Colonel J. J. B. Williams, Chief of
Staff.
Shortly after midnight, in the early hours of September 29 we were
headed for our rendezvous with the minions of Hitler. With daylight, we
discovered that we were in a convoy of some 48 ships under a Commodore, U. S.
Navy. The horizon disclosed a number of destroyers and corvettes busily
occupied against enemy submarine threats. Within the 48-ship convoy it was
understood that our combat equipment, including all vehicles and tanks, was
complete and would be available to us almost immediately after debarkation.
Such was not to prove to be the case.
On this first morning, the Master of the Samaria disclosed to the
division commander that our destination was Cherbourg. With our advance party
probably already there the situation appeared most satisfactory. The first
four days of our voyage followed a routing pattern with moderate weather and
no signs of German submarines. On the fifth day our course swung to the
southeast on a drastic tangent. The submarine warning system had disclosed a
wolf pack concentrating along our previously charted course.
On the sixth day out of New York, Captain Bates of the
"Samaria" informed General Kilburn that our destination had been
changed to England. Later, it was advised that condition of the beaches near
Cherbourg were no longer in shape to receive heavy combat loads such as tanks
and heavy motors.
Late on the afternoon of October 10 the dim and misty shores of
Southwestern England first appeared to curious eyes. At the same time it was
announced that the "Samaria" would tie up at Liverpool while the
Hermitage would unload at Southampton. By daylight October 11 the
"Samaria" was anchored off Liverpool. By dark, General Kilburn and
Colonel Williams with Captain Robert Neiman, Aide to General Kilburn, were
over the side by Jacob's ladder and soon in Liverpool to check the details of
unloading and concentrating the Division.
On the 12th of October the first units of the Division stepped
ashore on British soil. News from General Holbrook disclosed that our advance
party, less detachments, had returned and taken over our billets in Southern
England. As units on the "Samaria" debarked under a schedule
prepared by the Transportation Corps of the Liverpool Section, CZ, ETO, they
entrained for travel to the south. At the same time a similar procedure was
being followed for all units leaving the "Hermitage".
On this date, General Kilburn was handed three highly significant
letters.
The first letter signed by Captain O. Bateman, Master HMS
"Samaria" read in part, "I would like to express my admiration
of the officers and men under your command, and also to add that in my opinion
they are the best disciplined division it has been my honour to transport
overseas." It may be stated here that Captain Bateman, for the greater
part of the war, from 1939 through 1943, had been Vice Commander of HMS
"Queen Mary"; he remarked that during the entire war he transported
on vessels on which he served over one million troops of the Allied Forces,
British, Canadians, Australians, Americans, etc.
The second letter signed by Colonel Grover C. Davis, Transport
Commander, HMS "Samaria", read in part, "Your officers and men
are the finest I have ever carried and you are to be congratulated as their
leader."
The third letter was signed by Captain J. T. Talbert, U. S. Navy,
commanding USS "Hermitage" and read in part,
"This ship has transported in the last two and one-half years
a fair sized Army, and I can assure you that the personnel of your division,
which it was our privilege to transport, were by far the best organized and
most outstanding that the ship has ever carried."
At nightfall, October 13 the Division was again concentrated in the
training areas of Southern England.
While the area and billets assigned the Division were satisfactory
from the viewpoint of shelter, they were entirely unsatisfactory from a
training angle. The area was roughly 60 miles from north to south and some 40
miles from east to west. Measures were instituted without delay to improve the
situation. The need for more adequate training areas than were now provided
became more acute when it was found that only a portion of our equipment had
arrived with our convoy. It was evident, therefore, that with late arrival of
training and combat equipment the time element might prove a serious factor in
our readiness for combat. Accordingly, every argument was presented London and
the British Billeting Committee to afford better and more ample facilities. By
the middle of November, the Division had been regrouped at the expense of time
and a burden on units involved but with justifiable results.
Knowing that late receipt of equipment might result in a mental
let-down, the division commander specified that during the period October
15-November 15 every member of the Division would be afforded an opportunity
of visiting London. With the outstanding caliber of our personnel, such
education advantages were matters of obvious recognition. Prior to our
departure for the Continent in December, the greater number of our men had
seen practically all points of historic interest in Southern England.
Realizing that our equipment could not catch us for a considerable period,
request was made and authority issued for a series of groups from the Division
to visit the front. These groups extended down to battalion commanders and
their key staff officers. By pre-arrangement, different groups went to various
parts of the front, with the result that by early December, we had a
comprehensive picture of the different tactical problems and countermeasures
existing among all American Corps and especially armored divisions.
In addition to the 11th AD in the south of England we found on our
arrival the 12th Armored Division occupying Tuthall Barracks. This
establishment had been designed and constructed primarily to provide the
requirements of an Armored Division. Here again, the delay in our movement
overseas proved a burden to the division. The 12th Armored moved to the
Continent about the middle of November and within a short time the Commander
had requested, by name, the assignment of the 11th AD. Being only
partially equipped at that time the foregoing request could not be mer by
SHAEF.
During our stay in England the Division received a number of
distinguished visitors. Perhaps one of the most illustrious was Lieutenant
General Sir Hugh Elles who commanded the Southern Region in the British
Administrative Command. General Elles had the distinction of commanding the
first tank action in modern annals when he took the First Tank Brigade into
the attack at Cambrai. Sir Hugh was most generous in his comments on the
personnel and activities of the division on his departure. In early November
General Brooks had requested the services of Lieutenant Colonel Paul Chalmers
G-3, as Deputy Chief of Staff, VI Corps. This meant a promotion to the grade
of Colonel for "Black Jack" so that no objection was interposed on
his projected reassignment.
To replace Chalmers, Lieutenant Colonel Spelman Downer Executive
Officer, CC A, was brought up to Division Headquarters. After much discussion
and consideration Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Bilbo, Jr., C.O., 490 Field
Artillery, was relieved of his command assignment and replaced Downer as
Executive Officer CC A. The command of the 490 F. A. diverted to Lieutenant
Colonel Harold H. Davitt, Jr., who commanded that unit brilliantly in action
in the same fashion as did Ray Lumry and Louis Alt with the 491st and 492nd,
respectively.
By the end of November, the Division was once more in possession of
practically all combat equipment, although a slight shortage in radio sets
existed for an additional 10 days. Opportunities had been provided for every
unit to fire all weapons newly received, including the artillery 105's and the
76mm Tanks. The first week in December found us ready for any eventuality.
News of the next move was not long delayed. By December 3 advance
orders directed preparations for a move to ETO. An advance party, again under
General Holbrook, was dispatched to Southampton. The first echelons of the
division were m move on December 10. The division commander was advised,
confidentially, that our destination would be Liege, Belgium, for duty with
the First Army. By December 12, over half of the division was in movement.
That evening an urgent message from Captain William D. Marland, CC A, liaison
officer for the Division at Cherbourg, was received by General Kilburn. The
message was to the effect that drastic changes in our orders had been issued;
that the situation was such as to warrant General Kilburn awaiting the arrival
of Captain Marland in England. The following day, General Kilburn traveled to
London and found that the division was now slated to proceed to Chateau Briand
to relieve the 94th Infantry Division and assume the containment mission
against German forces in St. Nazaire and Lorient. Steps were taken immediately
to divert our advance party from LeHavre to Cherbourg. General Kilburn, that
day (13th) flew to Cherbourg and on December 14 arrived at Chateau Briand to
initiate action in relieving the 94th Division.
General Holbrook succeeded in promptly swinging his advance party
to Cherbourg, although a few unit detachments were still missing at LeHavre,
their LST having failed to show up. By December 18, several battalions of the
division had landed at Cherbourg, had combat loaded with ammunition under
severe conditions at ammunition dumps now located in knee-deep mud, and were
enroute south towards Rennes. Colonel Virgil Bell was utilizing his accustomed
drive and energy in moving the remainder of the Division out of Southampton,
although a considerable portion, especially the service contingents, was still
in their billets in England.
At dusk on December 16, faint bits of news reached Chateau Briand
of a formidable German counteroffensive somewhere on the front of the Twelfth
Army Group. In the meantime the majority of the division staff had reached the
new Command Post and all hands were busy in the final features of the plans to
relieve the 94th. On the following day our plans for containing St. Nazaire
and Lorient were complete. Assignments to each combat command had been
developed and the location and make-up of Colonel Bell's Reserve Command were
confirmed.
The news from the front was ominous—the Germans had penetrated
American lines to a depth of 35 miles. General Maloney (94th) and Kilburn held
hourly conferences. In the afternoon, General Kilburn motored to Rennes to
look over the 21st Armored Infantry under Hoffman, the 55th Armored Infantry
under Hearn and the 490 F.A. under Davitt, all having arrived at that point
under the control of CC B and Colonel Yale. To check last minute details with
the Brittany Base Section, in Rennes, General Kilburn visited that
headquarters and was handed this message: "Suspend all movement 11th
Armored Division in place and await further orders—Signed Lee." The
message was paraphrased to Holbrook at Cherbourg with instructions to get word
to Bell at Southampton.
The discussions within the staff went on far into the night. On the
morning of December 19, word reached Division Headquarters that the 11th
Armored Division would move as promptly as possible on three routes to the
vicinity of Reims in SHAEF Reserve. The Zone of Communications under
Lieutenant General John C. H. (Courthouse) Lee required all of the 19th to
develop routes of march, gasoline supply, etc.
The Thunderbolts headed East at daylight of December 20. Yale led
the group now in bivouac at Rennes. Holbrook started CCA and those units
waiting at Cherbourg. Bell put the heat on loading the last of our units out
of England. Six hundred miles away by circuitous routes marked with temporary
bridges lay the first march objective in Europe.
General Kilburn accompanied by Colonel Williams and Captain Neiman
headed for Paris. With the mud and muck of winter ahead it was imperative that
our new tanks be equipped with "track extensions" before our first
action; the best source of supply was Paris. Within 48 hours, 8000 pounds of
medium tank track extensions were on the way to Soissons for installation on
our tanks. Just how much these accessories were to benefit many of our tank
crews during those first bloody days at Bastogne may be questionable; yet
there is satisfaction in the knowledge that no effort ever was spared in the
Division to secure every possible advantage for its members by every staff and
command echelon.
At a visit to SHAEF on December 22, the division commander was
advised in an informal manner that, perchance, the 11th Armored Division might
prove to be the lone remaining combat element between the advancing Germans
under Von Rundstedt and the Atlantic Ocean. That afternoon, having been
preceded by Colonel Williams General Kilburn headed for Reims. Arrival there
found General Lee and his Reims commander in a rather portentious conference
discussing the adequate defense of the Meuse River. The knowledge that the
Thunderbolts were concentrating on Reims dispelled materially the heavy
atmosphere of anxiety. (Note: With the remaining elements of the Division
still moving out of England, the wheels and tracks of our march columns
continued their grind over the roads of France. In the meantime General
Kilburn had been placed in charge of all defenses along the Meuse River from
Verdun to Givet, some 160 miles. A large portion of the Division Staff was
assembled at Charleroi coordinating this mission. In fact CC A had been
ordered bivouacs north of that city for use as a mobile reserve. Together with
three battalions of French Resistance Forces, CC A, on arrival was to push
reconnaissance elements well to the east of the river.
Christmas Day 1944 found the Division still moving on the Reims
area with the Division Commander and Staff engaged in a mission remote from
dose contact with our own elements. During the day, great fleets of C-47's
(Cargo Planes) soared over Charleroi headed for the embattled forces at
Bastogne to drop desperately needed supplies. The spirit of Christmas was not
with us, but the situation of other men caught in the merciless pressure of
the Bulge made our position enviable by comparison. On the following day, the
26th, a message to this effect was phoned to General Kilburn from both SHAEF
and General Bradley's Twelfth Army Group, "Your friends to the north may
give a party. It may be a large affair, but only a part of your family is
invited to participate in some phases of it"—Transcribed, "The
British forces to your north may execute an attack; their attack to be
reinforced by certain elements of the 11th AD."
In accord with the foregoing message, word was received from the
VIII Corps requesting the Division Commander to join in a reconnaissance with
staff members of the Corps for assembly areas near Givet. General Kilburn with
Lieutenant Colonel Downer, G-3, and General Holbrook and Staff spent the
greater part of the day on this purpose. On returning to Charleroi late in the
afternoon, it was found that the 17th Airborne Division had arrived in such
force as to enable them to assume the defense of the Meuse. Our staff lost no
time in departing for the Division C.P. which had been installed in a French
manor house some distance northeast of Reims. The assembled staff on the
evening of the 27th was a welcome sight to General Kilburn who had been out of
direct contact with the division since the 13th of the month. It was this
night that the news was announced that the last of our units had closed in
their assigned bivouacs at two o'clock that morning.
The first event on the morning of the 28th was a meeting of all
unit commanders and staffs at the Division CP. Without delay the combat
groupments of the combat commands and reserve command were designated with the
directive that liaison agents would report at once to appropriate
headquarters. Likewise the immediate preparation of an operating signal annex
and other features of a SOP character, incident to our current situation were
directed for early distribution. The remainder of the daylight hours were
given to checks of supply matters to assure adequate issues of ammunition,
gasoline, etc. A liaison officer already had been dispatched to the VIII
Corps. (Captain Emmett Keough). The wide dispersion of the division, with CC A
north of Charleroi, gave some concern.
At 8:30 p.m. (28th) the Division Commander's phone rang with the
Chief of Staff, VIII Corps, on the other end. General Kilburn repeated this
message, "Alert your division to march—Have the Signal Officer copy
this coded message." To prepare the issue of orders and assure
distribution down to subordinate units with a division requires six hours by
all acceptable standards in Army circles. With some impatience the decoding of
the message given to the Signal Officer, was awaited. When clarified, the
Division had received orders to move without delay to assembly areas southwest
of the beleaguered town of Bastogne. The only feasible route lay through Sedan
with a one-way bridge on the Meuse River at that point. Within an hour, march
orders had been prepared and issued to the major commands. By 1:00 a.m.,
December 29, CC A was in movement Midnight of that day was to find the 11th
A.D. with a march depth in single column of over 50 miles, beyond a one-way
bridge and closed in bivouac some 96 miles to the east. Only a highly
efficient, well organized, disciplined division could have accomplished that
fear.
The Division CP was established at Neufchateau. Enroute to that
point, General Kilburn visited Headquarters VIII Corps. There the proposed
plan of attack of the Thunderbolts, to relieve besieged Bastogne, was
discussed. The Division was to attack at daylight, December 30 (The next
morning). It was noted that the plan specified an attack by one combat command
to the east and the other to the west of a heavily wooded area; a situation
which precluded any possible mutual support between these two major elements.
This feature was protested by the Division Commander as dangerous to the
welfare of our units as well as futile towards decisive results. This protest
was over-ruled on the basis that the 87th Infantry Division would attack on
our left and being a green division should be supported by the availability or
armor. The 11th A.D., also, was to taste combat for the first time. The plan
as outlined, however, was to prevail—at a cost.
At 4:00 p.m. General Holbrook and Colonel Yale reported to the
Division CP. Both had been in contact with the 6th Cavalry Group which was in
contact with German Forces in the area in which we were to launch our attack.
In so far as could be ascertained, two German Panzer Divisions held around
which we must secure. (Soon identified as the 3rd Panzer Grenadier and 15th
Panzer Grenadier Divisions). In addition the Reimer Brigade (an armored unit
commanded by a Brigadier named Reimer who previously had been chief of
Hitler's personal bodyguard. A brigade comprising selected personnel of the
most flagrant type of young and brutal Nazi. Comparing tables of equipment,
the German forces opposing us were potentially hr stronger in tanks than
ourselves. The proposed plan of attack was discussed and instructions given
for the combat commanders to conduct final reconnaissance in view of the
attack orders anticipated. A concluding assembly of unit commanders would be
held at 9:30 p.m. when the formal orders for the attack would be issued
In the meantime the never ending stream of vehicles continued to
flow through Neufchateau on their way to final assembly positions and their
rendezvous with destiny and the German. Dusk fell and gave way to a clear,
cloudless sky in which glowed a brilliant full moon. The sound of airplanes
announced the strafing? of our columns by small flights of Messerschmidts.
Alert driving together with the effective actions of our 575th AAA Auto
Weapons Battalion resulted in negligible casualties. Later the 575th was to
draw first enemy blood when their guns knocked down a lone German fighter who
attempted to rake the Division CP. The kitchen crew of Division Headquarters
Mess brought in the first German prisoner when the wounded aviator landed by
parachute close to their culinary operations. While after midnight, the mess
crew, always alert ones, were on the job and pounced on the Heine the moment
he struck the ground.
The formal written Corps Orders, for the attack, were delivered by
Keough at dark and the provisions of the Division attack for the following
morning were complete by 9:30 p.m. when the major unit commanders assembled in
the caravan of the Division Commander. The widely divergent maneuver by our
two combat commands, previously specified by Corps, still held. Details for
the coordination of supporting artillery fires, particularly for the
supporting role of Corps Artillery, were anything but clear and specific.
Air-ground liaison groups of the 9th Tactical Air Force operating under the
Third Army had yet to appear. Information of the hostile situation in our zone
of action provided by the 6th Cavalry Group was, to the Division Commander, of
a hazy and indefinite nature.
As to be proven during the five ensuing days, as now described by
Robert E. Merriam in the book "Dark December", the division was to
contribute hugely to the decisive Battle of the Bulge. Its gallant and
impetuous assault to assure American retention of the vital road-center of
Bastogne was to result in the destruction of a great part of Von Rundstedt's
hordes which otherwise, on withdrawal to the East, would have manned later the
Siegfried Line. As was declared afterwards by the VIII Corps Commander, the
Thunderbolts saved that critical area and the attendant travail and confusion
which would have prevailed had it fallen to the now desperate Germans.
By 10:30 p.m., the
major unit commanders had received their orders, discussed last minute details
and departed. Within a dozen hours the Division was to have tasted the rigors
and the cost of modern war. The stakes were high but irrespective of cost the
Division had that fiber and that caliber to meet, head on, the severest crisis
of its history. We were to join that Holy fraternity who, throughout American
annals, have been launched into the throes of major battle in their first
engagement. Outnumbered in tanks, out-gunned in tank cannon, operating in
tricky tank terrain, we were to force two crack Panzer Divisions and a picked
armored brigade of the vaunted German legions to surrender over six miles of
key ground. Our junction with the intrepid 101st Airborne Division assisted
materially in cracking the back of the Bulge.
Only a disciplined, trained division, high in esprit and pride, with complete confidence in every member could have boasted this magnificent achievement. When the harsh winds of winter and the mild zephyrs of Spring flow over the graves of those valiant men of the division whom we left under European soil, one may distinguish, faintly but exaltedly, the undaunted refrain—"We were Thunderbolts".