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Sometime in October, 1944, two officers met in the lobby of a of London hotel. They were first cousins, almost the same age. One confided in the other, "I am afraid I will turn tail and run when the shooting starts. I am not hero material." "No need to worry about that," the other responded. "Everyone is scared. The thing that keeps you there is knowing the others are depending on you.” "I sure hope you are right", the first replied. "I would hate to run away". With these words, they put the subject to rest and congratulated themselves on meeting each other for the first time since December 7, 1941. Sixty days later they would have an opportunity to check the validity of their conclusions. ********** In early December the 11th Armored Division began unloading at Cherbourg after passage from Weymouth. Brigadier General Charles Kilburn, commanding the division, had elected to dispatch the units of the division, combat loaded. What was to be a training exercise proved to be a very wise and fortuitous decision. Hardly had the division begun its unloading in France when word came of a serious enemy attack in the Ardennes Forest. A day or so later, orders were received moving the division, then in SHAPE reserve, to northeastern France. Roads were cleared by SHAPE military police and the division began a 450 mile march to the village of Sissone. Although the division had not been in previous action with the Enemy, it had extensive experience in conducting road marches. From Louisiana to Texas and then California and the Nevada desert, the division had traveled thousands of miles, moving in multiple columns up and down the roads in the US. In like fashion, when the traffic controllers in SHAPE designated the routes the Division moved out smartly, using three main routes. Each column, in its entirety, was sixty miles in length. On Christmas Day the Division was in an assembly area in the vicinity of Sissone. The tankers spent their time preparing their tanks for fighting in heavy snow by attaching track extensions ("duckbills") to the ends of the tank tracks. The troops also enjoyed a Christmas meal with all the trimmings. Meanwhile the division was assigned to United States Third Army. The next day, the Division moved into Belgium and occupied an assembly area in the vicinity of Longlier. On December 29th, Combat Command B (CCB) ordered the 41st Tank Battalion, reinforced, to attack at 0700 on December 30th from the vicinity of Morhet, with the initial objective of destroying the enemy positions at Lavaselle. ********** There is a very special crunch that sounds when a tank moves slowly across new-fallen snow. Every now and then, a high screech could be heard as a driver steered left or right, locking one section of track briefly. Crunch, crunch, crunch - the tanks moved slowly and deliberately into the dense fog that lay over the open fields. Although it was 7 AM, day had not yet dawned. It was December 30, 1944. The newly arrived 11th Armored Division was moving into battle for the first time. CCB's line of departure was the Neufchateau-Bastogne road. Further to the east, closer to Bastogne, Combat Command A (CCA) attacked with objectives to the north and east. Enemy intelligence was skimpy. The maps indicated there were elements of two Panzer Armies in front of the 11th Armored Division. Half of the opposing troops were thought to be elements of SS units. Somewhere in the area it was reported the elite Füher Begleit Brigade was being deployed for action. Bastogne had been relieved late on Christmas Day by a Combat Command of the 4th Armored Division. The 101st Airborne Division and part of the 9th Armored Division, which had been holed up in Bastogne for a week, were glad to see the tanks from the 4th come rolling into town. The tide of battle had turned, but it was long from being over. The Allied objective was to cut off the enemy in the pocket of the bulge and capture the bulk of the Werhmacht. Earlier, the German objective had been the port city of Antwerp, whose capture would divide the Allies and greatly complicate their supply operations. On the ground, individual soldiers had an objective too. Their objective was to kill the enemy soldiers on the opposite side, and to destroy as much of their equipment as possible. ************ The tanks slowly moved forward, fully deployed in battle formation, gunners and commanders at the ready - all straining to pierce the hazy gloom and see what lay to their front. A screen of light tanks covered the entire front of Task Force Poker. Behind the light tanks, two companies of medium tanks proceeded abreast. The Task Force Commander was in his tank with the reserve - a company of medium tanks plus Engineers, Cav Rcn, and AA troops. A reinforced company of Armored Infantry moved through the heavy woods on the left side of the advancing troops. There was no command post as such; commanders were linked by FM radios, as were members of Battalion staff. Radio silence was in effect - not to be lifted until the enemy was encountered. Far to the rear, CCB's armored artillery was hampered by icy roads and was unable to support the attack. Air Controllers, normally found well to the front with advance units, were not to be seen. Unfavorable weather conditions had precluded normal Air support. The four task forces leading the 11th Armored's attack were going into action without supporting air or artillery. At the moment, there was no contact, but each soldier knew that somewhere out in front, not too far ahead, was a determined, experienced enemy. ********** Now the time had come. It was the culmination of more than two years of intensive training beginning with the activation of the Division at Camp Polk, LA, in 1942. The light tanks of Company D, 41st Tk, spread out across the wide open fields, hedged with dark forests on either side. The open ground was about 1000 yards wide. Based on the experience of other armored units, the 41st Tank Battalion deployed a key member of the battalion staff with each of the companies in the task force. For example, the S2 of the unit - Captain Dick McCoy - habitually accompanied the Company Commander of Company D. The concept behind this staff deployment was to relieve the company commander of the need to keep the battalion commander constantly informed of his situation - that was the responsibility of the staff officer. Using the facilities of the battalion staff radio net, the commander could stay abreast of the situation at all times. Only when there was need for a personal word would the battalion commander directly address his company commander. The system worked well, and had been adopted by a large number of US units in the European Theater. The first indication of things to come was the sharp crack of a 37mm tank cannon when an alert tanker discerned the hazy outline of a German Mark IV directly to his front at a range of about 100 yards. At that distance, tank guns don't miss. They only question is, who shoots first? The US light tank fired the opening round of the engagement and scooted for defilade. Up and down the line, guns roared. US medium tanks moved up and took on their German adversaries. The range was almost point-blank, due to the cover afforded by the haze as the first rays of dawn broke on the battlefield. The Enemy was later identified as the Füher Begleit Brigade, Hitler’s personal guard battalion. Although most of the German tanks were the battle tested MK IV with its 76mm gun, there were a few Panther and Tiger Tanks in the unit. They put up a good fight. It was all over in about 15 minutes - US losses were some 13 tanks. The Germans suffered even heavier losses, but managed to disengage and pull back. The 41st took its assigned objective but the cost was heavy, both in men and materiel. [When a tank is hit, usually there is one casualty - dead; one severely wounded and the remainder of the crew unhurt. If the round penetrates the turret, the armor piercing projectile careens around the inside of the turret before coming to rest. In its trip around, it frequently sets off high explosive shells that are stored in the turret, or it sometimes comes into contact with gasoline from the engine compartment. In any event, there is usually a series of secondary explosions as the tank ammunition is set off.] The troops rallied on the objective and prepared for the enemy counter-attack that came as promised. The enemy failed. Heavy snow and bitterly cold weather coupled with the need to refuel, resupply and attend to personal needs made life difficult. Men were working on a schedule that averaged 18 hours out of 24, with those who were fortunate getting six hours of sleep somewhere along the line. The long schedule of work days had started long before the troops experienced their first taste of combat. The Battalion Supply Officer (S4) was responsible for providing resupply of ammunition and POL products when the opportunity presented itself. Rallies usually afforded time for resupply. At night the trucks came up into the perimeter, having spent the day traveling back to the resupply points in the Division Trains area. The cooks accompanied the nighttime resupply, bringing hot food in marmite cans for the hungry warriors. The wounded were normally evacuated as quickly as they could be attended to, throughout the day. Evacuation was by both small trucks and ambulances from the Battalion Trains area to the supporting field hospital somewhere in the Corps or Army area behind the Divisions. In tank battalions, the battalion executive officer supervised the activities of the S1, the S4, the Chaplain and the Battalion Surgeon. He also maintained contact with the Division Main Command Post and with the Combat Command Main Command Post (CP). ********** Returning from a trip to the Combat Command CP, Captain McCoy worked his way back into the front lines, looking for the Battalion CP. It was late in the day, most of the fighting having taken place in the very early morning hours. He noticed a burned out US tank and saw several bodies nearby. Going over to one of the bodies that was lying in a face down position, he rolled it over and was shocked to see the face of one of his erstwhile roommates looking up at him in death. At that time, the only thing he could do was to report the location of the body to S1 at the Bn CP. A few minutes later he located the Battalion CP, located in what was left of a farmhouse. The terrain on either side of the farmhouse was open, devoid of vegetation. A distinctive odor pervaded the whole area of the battlefield. It was a combination of smells from the dead and dying, the gunpowder and cordite, the gasoline and other smells associated with thousands of vehicles. It is a smell that one never forgets, even though he hopes he will never ever smell it again. It is the smell of war. ********** When he reported to the Battalion Commander and passed the written documents pertaining to the plan for the following day, the colonel reminded him that he was one of the very few officers in the entire battalion who had attended the Army's Mine Warfare School. McCoy acknowledged that he had indeed completed the course and added that he had never been as glad to finish a school in his life . " I don't want anything to do with mines and booby traps!" he assured the colonel. "That training should help you now, McCoy", said the colonel. "There is another house nearby, like this one and not as badly shot up. Go check it out." It may be of some interest to observe that Captain McCoy was one of his commander's favorites. As such, McCoy had the privilege of going back to the Combat Command CP to receive and personally convey the written orders for his unit; he also had the privilege of making contact with units on either flank when there was such a need; once when he was reconnoitering a route through the bayou country of Louisiana, it fell his privilege to construct a bridge over a deep creek and later put a battalion of tanks over the bridge. He had been engaged in all sorts of special assignments during the events leading up to this first full day of combat. As a matter of fact, he had not been asleep for a single minute for more than three days when he received the order to check out the house. He was one of those "invaluable men" for whom his CO always had a special job. The second house was less than 50 yards away. McCoy walked over to check it out. The night was black, the cold was intense, and there was the overwhelming smell of death all around. As he approached the door to the house, he could see something inside - what he could not tell. He entered the house and discovered it was filled with German panzerfaust rockets. They were stacked neatly from the floor to a level of some six feet. As far as he could see, which was not far, the house was filled with them. "Colonel", he reported to the CO, "that house is filled with Panzerfausts. We can't use it. By the time we could check each of those rockets and then move them to another location, it would be late tomorrow afternoon." "McCoy, I am disappointed in you. I thought for sure you would be able to handle that job with no problem, considering your education in mine warfare," the colonel joked. Fortunately for the captain, that was the end of the subject. ********** It was extremely cold in Belgium in December, 1944. One of the big problems men in armored units had was in handling their equipment. In armored units, everyone has an assigned place in a vehicle - somewhere. With all those vehicles, there is a place for a good number of weapons, ranging from sidearms to tank cannons. Every tank not only boasted a cannon, but it had a number of other, smaller caliber weapons such as .30 and .50 caliber machine guns. Carrying ammunition was no problem. The tankers simply stacked it in their tanks, filling every cubicle and hole with ammunition. Then there was the cold to consider. How far it was below zero the troops did not know. It was cold. One's hands would stick to the metal. How could a man expect to fire a gun or pull a trigger under those conditions? He could take off his gloves, or his mittens if he was lucky enough to have such, but then his hands would be in contact with the freezing metal. McCoy often wondered how he would handle that. The answer came soon enough. As soon as the guns began to roar, off came the gloves. Bare-handed, tankers, infantry, artillerymen had no problem. They became so excited the blood raced through their veins and the cold metal was no problem. Their fingers did not stick. Once the fighting slowed down, and the immediate situation cooled off, they put on their gloves and mittens again. It was just that simple. ********** At some point during that initial period of contact, McCoy was directed to contact elements of the Airborne. He took his light tank, rather than the jeep he used on trips to the rear areas, and moved out, cross-country to the Airborne position. The nice thing about this little trip was that it was made, not during daylight hours, but at night. There were no roads to be seen since the countryside was covered with two or three feet of snow. Maps were available and they were used to poke around the countryside. No one was ever sure just where he was. Somehow McCoy found the Airborne position and after inquiring from the super-troops holding down the lines, he located the CP. While he was in the CP, the Abn S3 received a message that an enemy tank was moving in on the Abn position. What happened next astonished the US tanker. The S3 turned to one of his assistants and in a very matter of fact manner, he said, "Get the tank-killer team down there right away." What kind of a tank-killer team would the Airborne come up with? Their adversary might well be a huge 60 ton mammoth with as much as 12" of sloped armor plate protecting its front and lesser but appropriate armor on its sides. The Germans, by December of 1944, had fitted most of their heavy tanks with long barreled 88mm guns. How could a lightly armed outfit like Airborne Infantry possibly cope with such a goliath? The answer? Just like the story of the young shepherd in 1 Sam 17. A few minutes later the tank-killer team, consisting of two GI's armed with a 2.36" Bazooka, left the CP and hiked over to the area where the enemy tank was moving around. Their plan was simple. Find him, shoot him in the side, pick off the crew as they come out of the tank. That was it. The giant Mark V was a terrifying adversary for the smaller, lightly armored US M4s. Almost impenetrable on the front slope, and with a gun that the Werhmacht used not only for AA defense but with equal success on its tanks, the Mark V had just one enemy that gave it reason to pause - the Infantry. The big tank was more than a match for US tanks. Usually it took four or five US tanks, working as a team to destroy a Mark V. One or two would distract the Mark V while the others sneaked around to the side for a shot in its more thinly clad sides, just above the tank tracks. When a Mark V encountered enemy infantry in the woods, it was at a tremendous disadvantage. If it had no accompanying infantry to protect it, the big one was a sitting duck. Almost blind, even though it had the capability to drive through walls and houses, it could not easily locate the enemy. If the tank crew depended on its periscopes to locate the enemy troops, it would prove a poor choice. Better to open up the commander's hatch and look around, hoping to spot and dispatch the enemy before they covered it with fire. That night the big German tank sensed the odds were against it. Long before the tank-killer team reached the section of the perimeter where the Mark V was reported, it withdrew and rumbled off into the darkness. About an hour later the tank-killer team returned, reporting no contact. ********** On the second day following their initial attack, TF Poker closed on its assigned objective, cleared it of the few remaining enemy troops, and then moved on toward its next intermediate objective. McCoy, who had been on a mission back to the Main CP, was in his tank, following the well defined trail of the main effort as it proceeded north. He arrived at a partially wooded hill top and decided to orient himself. He saw no sign of any activity - US or German. He pulled out his operations map and noted a checkpoint that seemed to coincide with his location. While he was studying the map and trying to recognize terrain features on the ground, he heard a message on the command net. He recognized the voice of the CCB commander saying, " If you have secured check point XXX, back off a bit and we will play them a little song." He heard his own TF commander respond, "Go ahead. We are clear". McCoy wondered where checkpoint XXX might be. And he wondered what the "little song" might refer to. Then something flashed into his sleep deprived brain. The CCB commander had told his subordinates sometime earlier that on occasion, the entire artillery of the Corps could be so coordinated as to simultaneously hit the target. It was called a corps serenade - TOT - time on target - by the artillery. McCoy realized that he was sitting on the target . CCB had ordered the combined fires of the 31 battalions of artillery in the US VIII Corps to concentrate on Checkpoint XXX. He had just time to reach up and close the tank commander's hatch. Then he and all the crew prayed - scared to death. If you ever heard a clap of thunder strike the ground very near you? That is what it sounds like to be right on the target for a "Corps Serenade". Probably the lightning is more dangerous, but there is little to choose between. Can you imagine all those shells coming in, from 31 battalions of artillery? Each battalion has three batteries of at least four guns. (Some have six guns). 372 guns, firing a pattern of nine shells each for a total of 3,348 rounds! How could anyone live through that? With God, all things are possible. The Lord had plans for those men in that little light tank that chanced to stop on Checkpoint XXX . Not a single round of the 3,348 hit the tank! ********** As the attack continued to move to the north and northeast in a relentless pincer to cut off the German salient, the troops rapidly gained the combat experience so necessary if casualties were to be contained. From the perspective of the soldier, he almost never saw the enemy. What he did see was high ground (which he knew was a privileged enemy position), a dark timberline on the edge of open fields (which afforded an excellent position for anti-tank guns, tanks, and other heavy weapons, and villages (which offered excellent cover for infantry who were determined to stay as long as possible). All the foregoing became prime targets. It was SOP for the tanks and automatic weapons to fire into these suspect areas, seeking to draw return fire. When it was necessary to move across open ground, whether it was 100 yards deep or a mile or more, covering fire was always placed on the timber lines, villages and other locations that seemed to offer protection to the enemy. When the tanks encountered mine fields, covered as they were with snow and virtually impossible to detect visually, it became SOP for the vehicles that followed to swing wide to the left or right (depending on the terrain) and speed rapidly toward the suspect enemy positions overlooking the minefield. Quite often this maneuver enabled the crews of the disabled vehicles to get out and sometimes to save their tanks or half-tracks. Meanwhile the wide envelopment served to further out-flank the enemy. ********** Because of the armor protection against small arms fire, tanks were able to press the attack rapidly and cover, not yards, but miles in a day's action. When tanks are employed as a part of an armored division, it is not unusual for as many as 100 tanks to be involved on a front of 1000 - 3000 yards. Under such conditions, armored infantry is used to move through the wooded areas on the flanks, leaving the tanks in the open ground . Some tanks were always employed in support of the armored infantry, primarily to deal with heavy weapons or other types of armaments difficult for the infantry to handle. ********** A few days into the fight, (it was a day and night - 24 hour affair) the Division was notified it was to be relieved in place by the 17th Airborne Division. That was good news. The troops were groggy from the continual, day and night effort that is the lot of all Army combat actions. The closer one is to the actual front, the more one must stay alert and keep his wits about him. Soon the leading elements of the Infantry made their way into the positions occupied by the armored units. Men sloughed through the snow, taking advantage of the tank tracks where the snow had been compressed, making progress much easier. Many of the troops were pulling little two wheeled carts, loaded with ammunition. It was the first relief in place experienced by the tankers and they were quite solicitous about the status of the relieving unit's ammunition supply. As mentioned above, because the tank crew had places to store vast quantities of ammunition, especially .30 caliber ammunition for machine guns, they could not believe the response of the infantry to their inquiries. It would have been much easier for them to understand, had they been the ones who were dragging everything they owned through the deep snow. Wanting to make sure their relief would not run short, tankers began unloading additional cases of ammo in the positions where the Airborne set up. Hundreds of thousands of rounds were provided all up and down the line. The tankers wanted to make sure they would not be called upon to re-enter the fray as soon as they pulled out. The relief was completed under the cover of darkness. The armor withdrew and the Infantry took over. ********** About three weeks after the 11th Armored Division's initial commitment to action, and with bitter fighting having continued throughout the period, General Bradley pressed his Army commanders to close off the salient completely. CCB , using two Task Forces abreast, was given the job of closing the Bastogne-Houffalize highway. Elements of First US Army were moving South toward Houffalize to link up with Third Army.TF Black Jack consisting of the 41st Tk Bn (- Co B and a platoon of light tanks from Co D) was further reinforced with Co B, 21st Armored Infantry and platoons of Engineers, Cav Rec and AAA. The TF assaulted the village of Cobru, just a kilometer north of Noville - the Combat Command's principal objective. The date was January 14, 1945. The attack was carried out brilliantly by Company C, 41st Tk and Company B, 21st Infantry working smoothly in unison. The attack met with little resistance and the village was occupied. The infantry began the job of clearing the enemy from the houses and cellars. Some forty-five minutes after the objective was seized, the Germans launched a strong counterattack. They were able to get an anti-tank gun in position in a wood line overlooking the village and they got a tank into the village itself. At this time, about a half hour before dark, Captain Sucharda - the tank company commander and Captain McCoy - representing the TF commander were both in their tanks parked at the end of the main street of the little village. Their conversation, made possible by use of radio since they were both in their tanks, was suddenly interrupted. Sucharda noticed the enemy tank pull into the street, 200 yards away and prepare to swing his turret to take the Americans under fire. Sucharda immediately swung his gun in the direction of the enemy tank and ordered his gunner to fire. He did, but the AP round bounced harmlessly off the heavily armored German. McCoy was in his tank hatch, exposed from the waist up, when Sucharda swung his tank cannon around and fired. The gun tube was right over McCoy's head and the resulting muzzle blast took care of his sight and hearing for sometime thereafter. The German tank immediately returned fire, ignoring McCoy's tank, which actually was a bit closer and completely exposed. The German gun ripped an 88mm hole in the turret of Captain Sucharda's tank, killing him instantly and probably killing or severely injuring other crew members. Two more rounds followed quickly and the US tank exploded in a mass of flames. There were no survivors from that tank crew. The driver of the light tank did not wait for instructions. He threw his tank into gear and spun away taking cover behind a corner building. Immediately all available firepower was concentrated on the German tank and he ceased to be a danger to anyone. The armored infantry rounded up about 200 German troops in the little village. In short order the anti-tank guns were also destroyed. In the end, the Americans were victorious, but the cost was high. McCoy felt the loss of Sucharda deeply. They were best friends. The following day the link up was made at Houffalize and the Bulge was history. The cost to the 41st Tank Battalion was high. Between the 30th of December, 1944, and the 17th of January, 1945, the battalion had lost some 60 killed in action and 150 wounded. Included in this group of casualties were the company commanders of every company in the tank battalion. Among those wounded and subsequently awarded purple hearts were the battalion commander, the S1, S2, S4, eleven other officers, 39 sergeants and 98 enlisted men. To get a better understanding of the impact of these casualties, [many of which would not have occurred if the unit had been better trained or had been committed to action in a less desperate fight that the Battle of the Bulge], it is interesting to recall General Patton's remarks to the officers of the 90th Infantry Division at Metz. The fortress city had not been taken by an enemy force for more than 1000 years when 3d Army arrived. After a fruitless, three day attack was turned aside by the determined German defenders, Patton held up the action. He assembled the officers of the division and told them bluntly that the problem was leadership. He expressed it this way: "There are not enough 2d Lts being killed. Now go back to your units and get out there and lead your men. They will follow you anywhere." Metz fell, but there was a price. Officer leadership was not lacking in the 41st. The company commanders gave their all. They led, and they fought and they died. So did many other valiant men. In 19 furious days, there were 60 killed and 150 wounded.
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